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Abstract
Political discontent appears to be growing across the aging democratic world, with an
increase in popular support in many nations for niche or populist parties. Although
often connected to this declining support for mainstream parties and the rise of these
competitors, it is unclear precisely what is contributing to this diminishing political
trust across varying electorates. This dissertation suggests that political discontent
may be driven by parties failing to represent voters, a possibly long standing behav-
ior, first envisaged by Katz and Mair (1995) in the form of the cartel party theory. The
cartel party theory suggests that as party systems mature, party behavior ultimately un-
dermines representative connections with voters, with parties becoming increasingly
reliant on their relationship with the state and their rivals to maintain their positions
in government. If cartelistic behaviors have emerged, it is expected that parties will
show broken voter-party linkages and increased collusive relationships with rival par-
ties, thus limiting competition, while undermining representation. Furthermore, the
issues that are presented to voters across elections should show signs of manipulation,
meaning that parties should fail to respond to voters while coordinating to manipu-
late their issue positions with their rivals. These two central expectations have guided
the following research, testing whether parties appear to be colluding with their ri-
vals and disregarding voter sentiments and if the issue spaces that are presented to
voters remains representative or manipulated, as suggested by the cartel party theory.
Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European
Social Survey (ESS) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), this work tests
whether voter-party linkages appear intact across the left/right issue dimension, mul-
iii
tidimensional issues, and party types. The findings suggest that mainstream parties
are colluding with their rivals to limit inter-party competition, while presenting in-
creasingly manipulated issue spaces to voters, suggesting that deepening discontent
across advanced democracies may be connected to representative failures of parties
participating in cartelistic collusion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Changing Political Dynamics
A cursory examination of modern democratic competition suggests that politics may be changing
in advanced democracies, with rising discontent and declining support for mainstream parties,
signaling that political dynamics may be fundamentally changing. The rise of parties like the
Alternative for Germany, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and the Sweden Democrats – just to
name a few – indicate that voters are moving away from traditional mainstream parties in exchange
for organizations who take more extreme party positions (Goodwin 2018), but what might be
leading voters to abandon their political loyalties and vote for new parties and untested candidates?
Rising populism and niche party success across the democratic world has challenged academics
to explain declining support for mainstream parties across aging democracies (Hobolt and Tilley
2016, Henley, Bengtsson, and Barr 2016, Algan et al. 2018, Goodwin 2018). Some suggest
that party politics has evolved as a result of changing economic uncertainties, with the rise of
populism being driven by economic insecurity and political distrust (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van
Droogenbroeck 2016, Hobolt and Tilley 2016, Essletzbichler, Disslbacher and Moser, 2017, Algan
et al. 2018). While others find increases in populist support tied to individual level vulnerabilities,
high levels of political discontent and a negative view of governmental efficacy (Spruyt, Keppens,
and Van Droogenbroeck 2016, Rooduijn, van der Brug, and de Lange 2015). One of the strongest
predictors for populist support has been found to be a poor view of governmental efficacy (Spruyt,
Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016), suggesting that voters are becoming disillusioned with
how the government is being run by governing parties. In fact, negative views of governmental
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efficacy are quite high across Europe; the European Social Survey, asked respondents in 2016 how
much they believed the political system actually allowed people to influence what the government
does1 and the survey shows that over 60% of the respondents expressed that the political system
had ‘little or no influence’ on the what the government did. This literature and data suggests that
parties are facing a wide array of grievances from voters, signaling changing political dynamics,
but none of this research is able to tell us why voters are so disgruntled with their stations in life
and what has increased these voters’ vulnerabilities and distrust in governing institutions.
Charitably, we often discuss changing political environments, such as the growth of support for
niche and populist parties, as if the growing discontent expressed by the electorate is merely a new
political problem mainstream parties must navigate, but might it also be possible that parties are to
blame for the problems that are facing? What if mainstream parties are losing to populist and niche
party challengers and facing an increasingly discontented electorate because they have failed their
constituencies for so long that their voters are finally starting to abandon them? This dissertation
suggests that this increasing discontent may actually be a symptom of mainstream parties’ neglect
of the interests of voters, testing the presence or absence of this dynamic relationship assumed
between voters and parties will be the central focus of this dissertation.
1.2 Assumptions About Voter-Party Linkages
The fundamental role of parties in representative democracies is to represent. This may appear an
obvious assertion, but the connection between parties and voters is often taken for granted.
It is assumed that role of the party is to act as a surrogate for the interest of group of individuals.
This means that parties are servants of the interests of voters, which assumes that parties will be
driven to maintain, if not expand, their voter base – implying that if parties fail to satisfy voters
they will be punished by the electorate (Powell and Witten 1993, Anderson 2000, Kayser and
Peress 2012, Soroka and Wlezien 2009). Thus meeting the demands of voters and keeping inline
with their interests is expected to be of paramount importance. This constant approximating and
1Exact question wording for all survey questions referenced in Appendix.
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satisfying of voters then becomes the foundation of the voter-party linkage (Blyth and Katz 2005).
The relationship between voters and parties forms the backbone of what we assume informs
the decision making of a party – when voters’ preferences change, parties will respond to these
dynamic changes. Ultimately, the voter-party linkage requires these adjustments because without
the close maintenance of the voters’ interests, parties risk losing their roles in government, but
what if the relationship between voters and parties changes at its core, what if parties are no longer
representatives of the public interest?
1.3 The Cartel Party Theory
In 1995, Katz and Mair suggested exactly this; the evolution of the party system had altered the
political incentive structure so substantially that parties began forging ties to the state and with rival
parties, at the cost of their relationship with voters. The theory posits that parties, working in their
own self-interest, will become so challenged by the changing political dynamics as competition
evolves that they will become more dependent on state and their relationship with rival parties to
protect their positions of power (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009).
This relationship with the state, utilizing its resources and power to their advantage, also
changes the interactions between opposing parties, allowing them to appreciate their shared goal
of maintaining political power, while opening new opportunities to collude with one another (Katz
and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009). This coordination suggests, most crucially for representa-
tion, that parties are no longer responding to their voters, but rather working together with their
rivals to limit political competition, otherwise referred to as inter-party collusion. The implica-
tions of the emergence of the cartel system are poor for representation, because they suggest that
not only should there be collusion between parties, but that voters should also be ignored. But why
would voters keep voting for parties that do not represent their interests?
The primary reason parties collude is to ensure their positions in government. This is achieved
by manipulating the issues presented to voters, by limiting the ability for a voter to vote switch,
allowing parties to safely disregard voter preferences (Blyth and Katz 2005). Following this logic,
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if all parties coordinate to ignore a new issue or to take the same position on it, voters will have
no ability to change their previous vote based on this new issue. In other words, parties colluding
are attempting to force voter stability by undermining representative responses to their voters –
they are manipulating the issues and positions presented to them, in order to force voters to vote
similarly to the previous election (Blyth and Katz 2005). When a new issue arises, yet no viable
party takes a position on it, then voters will likely vote for their previous party, thus ensuring
a fairly stable vote distribution among parties across election cycles. This suggests that not only
should we expect colluding parties to coordinate with other parties, at the detriment of representing
their constituencies, but that the issues that are presented to voters should be manipulated, as well.
In total the cartel party suggests that the natural evolution of the party system changes the
incentives for parties, making representation a risk, while inter-party collusion becomes a viable
alternative to satisfying voters. Thus, the somewhat counterintuitive suggestion emerges as an
alternative, providing a way for parties to fail to represent, but to continue to maintain roles in
government. As the previous discussion alludes to, parties could collude, but voters may catch on
to this behavior, opting for parties that are may be ‘different’ when they feel as though voting for
the traditional mainstream choices does not seem to influence how government actually functions.
These trends away from mainstream parties, and apparent distrust of the functions of the governing
institutions, may be better explained as symptoms of a populous punishing parties for their lack of
representation as a function of emerging cartel conditions.
1.4 The Question of Collusion
This dissertation began from an intuition – political dynamics around many advanced democracies
seem to be changing, but what could be at the heart of these alterations? Much of the rise of niche
party populist support, anecdotally, appears connected to a rejection of mainstream parties and pol-
itics ‘as usual,’ signaling that voters are renouncing previous loyalty to parties for greater political
uncertainty, but why? The cartel party theory presents a possible framework for understanding
how parties may not be victims of volatile electorates, but may be to blame for their own losses in
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power. Political dynamics seem to be changing in advanced democracies, visible in the behavior
of voters and their expressed discontent with the government, but what if party politics changed
years before now, what if party systems evolved in a manner that undermined representation at its
core, as suggested nearly 25 years ago by Katz and Mair (1995)? The following chapters endeavor
to test the possibility that parties may have been colluding for some time now, across a variety of
topics and even party types.
This dissertation hopes to answer two central questions: do political parties seem to be collud-
ing with rival parties, while ignoring voters and do these parties present manipulated issue spaces
to their voters? Both of these questions are at the core of each of the three empirical chapters,
while each chapter examines different issues or party types to determine whether representation
appears broken across modern democracies.
The following chapter explores the theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation, exploring the
cartel party theory and its reformulations. This discussion informs the typology that underlies the
analysis, allowing us to determine whether party systems are colluding or remain representative.
This presents 4 ideal typical conditions ranging pure collusion and pure representation, with the
intermediate conditions of partial collusion/representation, and polarization/clientelism. This al-
lows for the central negative implications of the cartel party theory to be tested – colluding parties
will respond to one another, while ignoring voter preference changes on the issues.
Taking the theory one step further through, if parties are attempting to force voter stability, they
will coordinate to manipulate the issue spaces that are presented to voters, by either converging on
an issue or presenting a stable issue space size across elections. This implication allows us to
explore to what degree cartelization has advanced and how well parties are able to coordinate their
collusive behaviors.
Finally, the theoretical chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the justification for exam-
ining how mainstream party behavior influences focal parties in the system, as the primary starting
point for exploring collusion in democratic systems. Relevant research indicates that party type
matters in understanding representation, suggesting that mainstream parties have different incen-
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tives that may make them more prone to collude (Adams et al. 2006, Meguid 2005, Wagner and
Meyer 2016, Ezrow et al. 2010).
The third chapter begins the empirical analysis with presumably the most durable issue position
for a party: their location on the left/right economic issue dimension. The left/right issue dimension
is often thought of as being divided between opposing views on governmental involvement in the
economy, with individuals on the left expressing greater support with governmental involvement
in the economy and those on the right holding the opposite position (Hellwig 2008). The left-
/right issue dimension is thought to form the basis for much of the competition between parties in
democracies, so foundational, that it is often the only distribution of issues considered for capturing
political competition (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kitschelt 1994, Hellwig 2008, Rohrschneider and
Whitefield 2009). This informs that expectation that guides this chapter: party policy positions on
the left/right dimension should be durable in the face of collusion because they are so foundational
to parties that undermining them through collusion seems unlikely, particularly compared to more
complicated multidimensional issues. Not only should parties resist collusion on these topics, but
it is also expected that issues spaces should be difficult for parties to manipulate, again, because
moving away from these central issues should be risky for parties.
The fourth chapter examines multidimensional issues that should induce collusion – those top-
ics that are difficult for parties to take positions on because they may undermine their traditional
voting constituencies. Multidimensional in their nature, these issues may divide voting blocs and
should provide conditions under which the cartel party theory would predict parties to be partic-
ularly collusive. This is because multidimensional issues are often complex and new to parties,
making failing to represent voters on these topics the most risk adverse way to deal with these
new issues’ salience. This chapter looks at the issues of equality, the environment and EU in-
tegration, with the expectation being that parties should be even more collusive on these topics,
compared to the left/right economic dimension. Furthermore, the expectation is that parties should
be particularly adept at their coordination on these issues, because presumably they should have
induced collusion on these topics since they became politically relevant, compared to the left/right
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dimension.
The fifth chapter explores the relationship between party type and collusive behavior, with the
expectation being that niche focal parties should be more resistant to collusion, while mainstream
focal parties should be drawn toward this coordination. The literature on niche parties suggests that
these focal parties should have much more to lose if they fail to represent their voters and should
be particularly resistant to collusion on issues that are foundational to their party platforms. The
literature shows that when niche parties moderate their positions, they are often punished for these
transgressions, thus they have much more to lose if they appear collusive to their constituencies
(Adams et al. 2006). In total the expectation is that across all issues, but particularly foundational
issues, niche parties should show less collusive tendencies than their mainstream counterparts.
In the end, the conclusions that can be drawn from these chapters are concerning for represen-
tation. The findings suggest that when it comes to inter-party collusion, across a variety of issues,
data sources and cases, a trend emerges that suggests parties are indeed colluding with mainstream
rival parties – when mainstream parties change their positions on the issues, focal parties respond
to these changes, but when voters change, focal parties ignore these shifts. These trends hold for
both for the left/right issue dimension and multidimensional issues though, as expected, multidi-
mensional issues induce a much greater response, with the exception of the issue of EU integration.
Additionally, mainstream focal parties are consistently collusive, compared to niche focal parties,
but, crucially, it depends on the issue. As suggested by the niche party literature, issues that are
foundational to parties appear to make them resist collusion. Additionally, when it comes to the
issue of the EU, mainstream focal parties show partially collusive tendencies, but niche parties
continue to be representative.
In total this suggests that changing political conditions may have altered political dynamics
allowing parties, particularly mainstream parties, to coordinate their issue positions in a manner
that undermines representation. No longer can we say that the central assumptions underlying
representation hold – parties are not striving to represent voters, but working to protect their own
interests at the cost of the voter-party relationship. This means that voters may lend their vote to
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a party, but that parties are taking these votes for granted, no longer concerned with maintaining a
dynamic and responsive relationship with these constituencies. These findings ultimately suggest
that for the most part, parties are no longer fulfilling their representative duties to their voters.
Guided by the provocative insights outlined by Katz and Mair in 1995, this work has provided
evidence for a different explanation for the trends we see across the aging democratic world –
voters may be disillusioned by the government and drawn toward fringe parties because they are
finally reacting to the failure of mainstream parties to represent their interests. The evidence pre-
sented in the following chapters will show that cartel expectations hold, allowing us to interpret
current dynamics in a different light.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Expectations
As argued in the introduction, politics in modern democracies seems to be changing, with the
emergence of widespread political discontent and niche and populist parties rising in their electoral
success, though it remains unclear what might be driving these changes (Goodwin 2018). The
previous chapter suggested, electorates in these aging democracies may be rejecting traditional
political parties as a result of mainstream parties doing a poor job of representing voters’ interests.
In other words, that maybe parties have been behaving in bad faith toward their constituencies
and now these voters are beginning to abandon them. Consistent with the cartel party theory’s
expectations, which will be explored in greater detail in this chapter, it is possible that parties
have been poorly representing their constituencies because political dynamics facing them have
changed, altering the political realities for parties and drawing them away from representation and
toward their rival parties in the interests of party survival. But what might draw parties toward
collusion with their rivals?
It is often assumed that parties, like people, are driven by their own self-interest (Katz and
Mair 2009, Downs 1957). The underlying assumption being that parties desire power, which
motivates them to maximize their role in government. Spacial models of representation often
assume that parties, behaving rationally, will attempt to maximize their vote share by appealing to
the most voters (Downs 1957). Thus suggesting that parties should behave in a manner that satisfies
increasingly broad groups of voters, moving away from narrow political interests toward general
appeals (Katz and Mair 1995, Mair 2000, Mair 1998). Crucially, this assumes a link between
voters and parties, one that expects parties to strive to satisfy voters by representing their interests,
but what if parties find a way to gain power, and keep it, that is easier than trying to please broad
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swaths of a population? What if parties realize it is easier to work together than to court voters and
represent their interests?
The cartel party theory suggests exactly this; parties working in their own self-interest will be-
come less responsive to voters because they will find that the most risk adverse option is to collude
with one another (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009, Blyth and Katz 2005). Undercutting
democratic representation, this theory suggests that colluding parties will manipulate the issues
presented to the voter in hopes of promoting voter stability in the system from election to election
(Blyth and Katz 2005). This dissertation follows this theoretical suggestion: parties may no longer
be responding to voters interests and representing them, rather they may be colluding in the back-
ground to manipulate the policy choices presented to the voter, in a manner that undermines the
quality of representation in modern democracies. These assertions are essential for the state mod-
ern democracies and if proven true would bode poorly for electoral representation, thus it becomes
centrally important to test whether these assertions may be true.
This chapter will outline the theoretical expectations that have guided the empirical chapters
that follow. To begin, the cartel party theory will be introduced, including the reformulations
and evolution of the discussion. This presentation will suggest that the cartel party theory gives
us distinct empirical expectations about how colluding parties should behave and how this coor-
dination undermines representation. This review of the theory will suggest that collusive party
behaviors are characterized by two conditions: parties become responsive to rival parties on the
issues, rather than their voters. This will lead the central typology describing conditions of party
behavior: pure collusion, partial collusion/representation, pure representation, and polarization or
clientelism. Though this discussion will provide the foundation for distinguishing conditions of
collusion from representation, the theory also suggests that colluding parties will manipulate the
issues presented to voters by either minimizing the issue space presented to voters or keeping it
stable. Although party coordination and failures to represent voters should meet the conditions
necessary to suggest that inter-party collusion is present, resultant issue spaces presented to voters
allow us to examine the degree to which parties have perfected their abilities to coordinate with
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each other over time. Together this chapter will present the theoretical foundations from which the
following empirical analyses are grounded.
2.1 From Catch-all to Cartel
The cartel party theory asserts that as democracies evolve, parties will increase their dependence
of the state in order to maintain their positions of power in complex political environments (Katz
and Mair 1995, Blyth and Katz 2005, Katz and Mair 2009). Challenged by evolving political
conditions, this theory suggests that parties, in an effort to ensure their positions in government,
will alter their behavior in a manner that undermines representative connections. Ultimately, within
the theory, parties will begin to coordinate with their rivals to fix the political game, rather than
remaining politically responsive to their voters (Blyth and Katz 2005). The argument presents
bleak picture of the state of democratic representation and if correct, these suggestions bode poorly
for how modern democracies organize the representation of the public interest. But what leads to
the cartel system?
2.1.1 Systemic Evolution
The cartel system, Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) argue, is the most recent development in the evo-
lution of parties. Arguing that a series of systemic transformations had occurred over the lifespans
of advancing democracies, the authors propose that the emergence of exogenous problems facing
parties have shaped the relationship between society, parties and the state, moving parties from
organizations resembling cadres, though the emergence of the familiar mass-party, toward Kirch-
heimer’s catch-all party, and culminating into what Katz and Mair (1995) call the cartel party.
In the first stage of representative democracy, parties represented very narrow constituencies
and functioned much like cadres or caucuses (Katz and Mair 1995, 8). The first systemic trans-
formation of representative democracy began with the extension of suffrage, expanding the voting
populous and requiring parties to make broad overtures to voters, though still to defined portions
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of the population (10). The resultant mass parties were defined by their appeals to traditional class
based cleavages, but as increased mobility, social conditions and the introduction of mass media
altered the political landscape, parties were forced to make even more generalized policy proposals
(Katz and Mair 1995, 12). From this emerged what Kirchheimer calls the “catch all party,” fur-
ther altering the relationship between the state, society and parties (7). Within this system, parties
functioned as brokers between the society and the state. Though, as systems evolved, organizations
were forced to make ever more general appeal appeals to mass publics, often requiring increased
spending to maintain voter support (Katz and Mair 2009, Blyth and Katz 2005).
Katz and Mair first suggested in 1995 that a new stage in party evolution had emerged, arguing
that parties had moved away from the people and become “semi-state agencies” (19). Though met
with heavy criticism when first introduced, the authors argued that rather than merely manipulating
the state, such as in the catch-all party system suggests, parties, they argue, have become reliant on
the state (Koole 1996, Kitschelt 2000, Katz and Mair 1995, 14 -15).
They propose three transformative problems that contribute to the increasing political complex-
ity facing parties, which ultimately alter the incentive structures facing parties, motivating parties
to become dependent on their relationships to the state, at the cost of representing voters. The first
problems the authors argue is the increasing homogeneity of citizens’ experiences, which renders
cleavage based appeals made by parties ineffective (Katz and Mair 2009, 758). Parties become
unable to use traditional cultural issues that had divided society to ground their political appeals
and gain partisan loyalty, ultimately contributing to a tenuous situation for parties in maintaining
their voting coalitions.
With the spread of mass media, parties also find that campaigns have become much more
expensive to run successfully (Katz and Mair 2009). Couple this problem with the decreasing
loyalty of partisans and it become particularly difficult for parties to run successful campaigns
(Katz and Mair 2009). Parties under these conditions, they argue, will begin to use the state to aid
their campaigns, through the creation of systems of subvention, in order to create more reliable
sources of funding during uncertain times with their constituencies (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and
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Mair 2009).
The final problem that Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) argue contributes to movement toward
cartelistic behavior being exhibited by parties hinges on the inability of parties to continue to
spend to maintain voter loyalties. One of the central features of the catch-all system is that parties
become brokers between the state and the people, using their relationship with the state to reward
their voters through government spending (Blyth and Katz 2005, Katz and Mair 2009). This is
the mechanism though which parties are able to keep voter loyalty, even as cleavage based ties are
diminishing. Crucially, governmental spending is not infinite, ultimately reaching a point where
parties must increase taxes or cease the profligate spending, lest they initiate a financial crisis (Katz
and Mair 2009, Blyth and Katz 2005). Therefore it follows that if parties are no longer able to keep
voters by meeting their demands through increased spending, then parties will be forced to change
their strategies in maintaining voter loyalty.
In the end, this increased political complexity produced by these three interrelated problems,
Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) argue, should induce parties to become more dependent on their
relationship with the state, ultimately leading to inter-party collusion to limit party competition
and manipulated issue spaces to force voter stability, an idea that will be discussed in further detail
in a following section (Blyth and Katz 2005).
2.2 Collusion
One of the features of increased party proximity to the state is that parties are able to collude and
coordinate with each other more easily (Katz and Mair 2009, 754). Again, realizing their shared
interests of maintaining their roles in government, the authors argue, parties will begin working
together to limit competition, rather than responding to voters, but what might this look like?
This section will argue that the most appropriate place to look for inter-party collusion to limit
competition would be to examine how a party’s policy positions change over time.
Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) argue that as parties evolve, their relationships will resemble car-
tels. Cartels, as Blyth and Katz (2005) explain, “maximize joint profits of oligopolistic firms
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through the restriction of competition. Firms are able to collude by varying either prices or quan-
tities or both” (39). An economic cartel can emerge when firms either explicitly or tacitly begin
to work together, not to maximize competition, but to minimize competition with other firms. A
political cartel, Blyth and Katz argue, can emerge in a similar way, though the ‘good’ they are
expected to fix is not prices nor quantities, but policy.
Parties are acutely aware that although the goal of all elections is to win and increase the scope
of power that the party is able to command, and while not every year can be a success, the party
will instinctively try to keep the losses to a minimum (Katz and Mair 2009, 756). The profession-
alization of politics has heightened the importance of attempting to keep parties in power, even
if they are unable to ‘win’ in every election. These pressures, shared by all parties, are what the
author argue, initiates the collusive behavior of parties (757). Parties do not need to explicitly enter
into these collusive arrangements either, Katz and Mair (2009) explain:
A very important part of their shared interest is to contain the costs of losing, and in
this sense to find an equilibrium that suits all of their own “private” interests. This
also means cooperation, even if this cooperation need not be overt or conscious. That
is, even if parties might be disinclined to rely heavily on overt deals with one another,
their mutual awareness of shared interests, and their sense of all being in the same boat
and relying on the same sorts of resources, means that we can conclude by hypothe-
sizing collusion (or its functional equivalent) and cartel-like behavior.
- Katz and Mair 2009, 757
In the end, we should expect parties to collude using policy coordination, and although the
behavior may be tacit or explicit, we can expect that policies should be manipulated by parties
who, facing increased complexity within the political system have become reliant on the state to
maintain their positions of power because representing voters becomes too difficult. If parties
begin to manipulate the state to their advantage, to protect themselves and their competitors, one
would expect for representative connections to deteriorate, as the theory argues. Following this
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argument, it becomes clear that collusion, if cartel expectation hold, will present itself though the
coordination of policy among rival parties. This coordination allows parties to protect themselves
while protecting their competitors, but for the totality of the negative implications of the cartel
party theory to be considered, connections to voters must also be undermined.
2.2.1 Party Behavior
This movement from catch-all to cartel systems represents the potential deterioration of the mass-
party linkage, seriously undermining the quality of representation if these conditions emerge. This
discussion suggests that as parties move toward the state, they will simultaneously move away from
the voter and toward their rival parties. Imperatively, parties may approach the state, as previous
research has indicated (Scarrow 2006, van Biezen and Kopecky 2014, van Biezen and Rashkova
2014), but for the negative implications of the theory to hold there must also be a failure to represent
voters and an apparent coordination with other parties. Without these two characteristic behaviors,
proximity to the state does not have the negative implications suggested by the theory, therefore
it becomes paramount for to determine whether these party behaviors are truly undermining voter
preferences or if they are merely new features of the catch-all configuration.
Therefore, the cartel theory’s negative implications about party behavior hinge on the pres-
ence or absence of two empirical conditions: parties increasingly respond to the policy preference
changes of other parties and, simultaneously, fail to respond to voter preferences. These two char-
acteristics allow for a straightforward set of conditions defining party behavior, if cartel expecta-
tions hold. Thus, an appropriate primary test of the cartel party theory examines whether parties
respond to their voters and whether parties respond to the issue positions of their competitors.
Before presenting the typology undergirding the following work, we must first define a set of
terms that will become crucial to distinguishing the parties from one another. When considering
the relationship between parties, rival parties and voters, we will refer to the observation party, the
party that comprises the dependent variable, as the focal party. This will allow us to distinguish
between the focal party (the dependent variable) and the rival parties (a predictor). This language
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serves to make this delineation between party types and allows for a more straight forward discus-
sion, that becomes muddled without it. Moving forward, we can now consider the ideal typical
scenarios that the negative implications suggest.
Considering focal party responsiveness to rival parties and voters leads to four ideal typical
conditions dependent on these two factors: pure collusion, partial collusion/representation, pure
representation, and polarization or clientelism. Pure representation, means that focal parties re-
spond to voters and do not respond to rival parties. In other words, focal parties determine their
policy positions based on the opinions of the voters, as one would expect in a properly functioning
representative democracy. Focal parties that are purely representative will adjust their positions
on the issues in relation to voter preferences and will not respond to the issue positions of other
parties because they will not be conspiring to limit competition or to manipulate the issues pre-
sented to voters. A focal party that is responding to voter preferences on policy should respond to
voters in a representative manner, thus they should not appear to be coordinating with other parties
simultaneously.
Pure collusion, on the other hand, means that focal parties work together to limit competition,
while failing to respond to policy opinion changes in the electorate. The primary concern to a
focal party colluding with rival parties will be the survival of the party, not the voters they are
purporting to represent. This means that focal parties will be more responsive to other parties in
the system, while ignoring their voters or working against their interests. Thus, pure collusion
means that focal parties ignore voters or move in opposition to their opinions, while responding to
other parties in the system. In short, colluding parties undermine the expectations about properly
functioning democracy and representation because parties, in this understanding, are no longer
attempting to maintain their role in government through representation, but rather manipulating
voters through their coordination with other parties to limit political competition.
As table 2.1 shows, there are three intermediate conditions produced by issue responsiveness
considerations. Partial collusion/representation occurs when a focal party is responsive to the vot-
ers, but also responsive to rival parties. Parties that are behaving in this manner are not fully
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Table 2.1: Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Responsiveness
Responsive to Parties?
Yes (Positive) No (Negative or Null)
Response to Voters?
Yes (Positive) Partial Collusion/Representation Pure Representation
No (Negative) Pure Collusion Polarization or Clientelism
representative of their voters, but they are also not entirely negligent of their interests. This means
that focal parties, in partially collusive scenarios, may be manipulating the issue space in collusion
with other parties, but still maintain some representative linkages to voters. This can be considered
a deficient form of representation, and thus partially collusive or partially representative, because
focal party positions are connected to rival parties, and not completely determined by their repre-
sentational connections with their constituencies.
Research examining voter-party congruence has argued that connections between parties and
voters is strong in modern democracies, although more recent findings suggest that issue congru-
ence may be becoming more complex (Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011, Powell 2000, Adams
et al. 2004, Powell 2013, Dalton 2015, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). Partial collusion/rep-
resentation presents a condition where congruence on the issues may appear very high, but artifi-
cially so if parties are colluding to limit the issues that are allowed into the political mainstream.
Parties can appear representative, but if they are working together to manipulate the issues pre-
sented to the voter, then the implications for representation remain negative. Without considering
the possibility that parties may be responding to one another, it remains possible that parties may
be actively undermining representation, even though party-voter congruence appears quite high
when the influence of rival parties is not considered.
Party behavior could also be characterized as polarized if focal parties fail to respond to voters,
but show a strong negative relationship to rival parties in the system. This means that focal parties
will be determining their policy positions, not because they are representing voters, but in attempt
to distinguish themselves from the other parties in the system. Though not predicted by the cartel
party theory, this condition remains possible.
17
Finally, clientelism is characterized by focal parties that do not appear responsive to voters or to
the rival parties. In other words, clientelistic parties do not limit competition in coordination with
other parties, leaving its size fluid, but these parties are also not responsive voters or representative
of their interests. This condition can be considered clientelistic because, presumably, parties that
are not responding to shifting public opinion as a whole must be representing such a small portion
of the electorate that their issue positions would be lost in the aggregate of voters, such as activists
within the party or special interest advocates. In other words, the special interest that the party is
satisfying is disconnected to the issue positions of the society, but also of rival parties. If focal
parties are not representing voters or colluding with rival parties, then it stands to reason that they
must be representing some narrow interest group.
The cartel party theory’s primary negative implications suggest that colluding parties should not
only fail to respond to voters, but should be strongly connected to issues positions of rival parties in
the system. This suggests that the relationship between voters and parties is broken and that parties
are no longer working in the best interests of their constituencies, but using their relationships
with one another to protect their positions of power. The theory suggests that collusive party
behaviors should undermine the connections between voters and parties, but why would voters
continue to vote for parties that no longer respond to their needs? Why would parties expect voter
loyalty if they are no longer representing their voters? The following discussion will explore this
counterintuitive suggestion, – that inter-party collusion should lead to voter loyalty through issue
space convergence or stability – which provides a distinct set of expectations regarding issue space
variability under conditions of representation or collusion. Following the implications of the cartel
party theory one step further, not only should parties respond to one another, while ignoring voters,
but if cartelization is advanced, they should present highly stable issue spaces or converging issue
spaces in order to maximize voter stability, while, of course, further undermining representation.
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2.3 Party Coordination
As the previous discussion details, pure collusion would be defined as party responsiveness to rival
parties, while ignoring voter preference changes. The theory suggests that parties behave in this
manner because they have begun colluding to manipulate the issues presented to voters, with the
logic being that parties, faced with increased political complexities, will be drawn toward collusion
because they each realize that they share a common goal: maintaining their access to power (Katz
and Mair 2009). Recognizing this shared agenda, will lead parties to work together to insure
simultaneously their own political positions, as well as their competitors (Katz and Mair 2009).
Consequently, parties become unresponsive to their voters, exchanging their efforts to represent
their constituency’s interests with their participation with other parties to fix political competition
(Blyth and Katz 2005).
Parties can ensure their political position if the political game does not change dramatically
across elections cycles; the logic being that if parties keep the same positions, and their challengers
do as well, then voters will have few opportunities to alter their voting behaviors (Blyth and Katz
2005). This creates incentives for parties to behave in a manner that ultimately undermines voters.
If parties respond to changing voter sentiments or take positions on new issues, they run the risk
of alienating some of their voting coalition and consequently could lose some of their vote share.
Because their motivations are centered around maintaining their role in government and share of
political power, taking new positions or adopting new issues runs a high political risk. The cartel
party theory suggests that parties will be drawn toward the more risk adverse option of working
together rather than possibly losing their political power by representing a diversifying electorate
(Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009).
Though the cartel party theory suggests that collusion should be defined by party responsive-
ness to other parties and a disregard for voter preferences, taking the implications one step further,
cartelistic parties should be expected to also limit the issue options presented to voters by either
keeping issue space size stable across time or decreasing its size. The following section will ex-
plain conceptual issue spaces and how this connects to advanced cartelistic behavior.
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2.3.1 Issue Spaces
Issue spaces are the conceptual distance that exists between parties in a political system, tradi-
tionally envisaged as unidimensional. The space that exists on the issue dimension between the
right-most party and the left-most party delimits the area of political competition. Issues that are
ignored by all parties within a system are considered outside of the political mainstream because
there is no party representing some of the voters’ interests. In other words, an issue that resides
outside of the mainstream issue space would be that issue that no party takes a position on and
thus falls outside of the conceptual distance between the left-most party and the right-most party.
Parties behaving purely collusively are interested in keeping the issue space either the same size
or smaller from election to election. Parties may choose issue space stability with the assump-
tion that the more consistent the battery of options provided to the voter, the more consistent the
behavior of voters across elections. And conversely, parties may find this coordination difficult,
making convergence another attractive option. The logic being that offering fewer choices to the
voter or presenting a unified position on the topic also limits the ability for the voter to deviate
from previous voting positions.
Parties have incentives to minimize the issue choices presented to their voters in order to keep
the choice set manageable, particularly when facing new issues or parties entering into the sys-
tem (Albright 2010, Hellwig 2008, Tavits 2008, Meguid 2005, Blyth and Katz 2005, Leeper and
Slothuus 2014). Thus new issues can disrupt the current voter distributions and challenge parties to
take positions on topics that may alienate some of their voters (Tavits 2008, Albright 2010, Hellwig
2008). The suggestion that parties will strive to maintain the same issue spaces between them or
a limited issue space size, leads to distinct expectations about how issue spaces will be influenced
by collusive party behavior.
In total, there are 5 issue space conditions, three predicted by the negative implications of
the cartel party theory and two that are contrary: perfect coordination, imperfect coordination,
convergence, polarization and representation. Though the preceding discussion has presented the
conditions necessary in order for collusion to be present following the cartel party theory, an addi-
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tional implication of this theory is that not only should we expect collusion to present itself though
party responsiveness to one another and a disregard for voter preference, but we should also find
evidence that parties are manipulating the choice set of issues presented to their voters. Ultimately,
issue space manipulation should be indicative of developed levels of coordination and should be
considered even more pronounced evidence of the emergence of the cartel party system.
2.3.2 Collusive Issue Spaces
The cartel party theory suggests that focal parties will coordinate with one another to force voter
stability across elections by rigging the political game through their collusion (Blyth and Katz
2005). There are two ways that a party might manipulate the political issue space provided to
voters, they can work toward perfect coordination, mimicking each other’s movements across the
conceptual continuum, striving for perfect 1:1 responses, or they can converge on the issues, mov-
ing increasingly close to one another, offering fewer options for voters. Both of these behaviors
will be devoid of representative linkages with voters, and provide further evidence of inter-party
collusion through issue space coordination.
Focal parties behaving in a cartelistic fashion will respond to rival parties on the issues and
ignore voters, suggesting a broken system of representation and inter-party collusion. This sugges-
tion leads to the expectation that parties that are colluding with one another should not be interested
in creating a larger issue space for voters, because offering more options to voters may lead to voter
instability and uncertainty, both of which are the mechanism that justify inter-party collusion in the
first place. One way to avoid this instability is to attempt to artificially keep the issue space the
same size. Thus, focal parties behaving collusively might attempt to precisely match responses
in rival parties, whenever they change on the issues, though this will be difficult to achieve. This
leads to the ideal typical expectation of issue space behavior: perfect coordination.
If parties are coordinating in an attempt to maintain the same sized issue space that divides
them, then when rival parties move positively 1 point, the focal party should move 1 point posi-
tively in the same direction, as shown in table 2.2 below. This would ensure that the space between
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them would stay exactly the same, even though policy positions are changing. By keeping the issue
space between themselves and the other parties the exact same, focal parties will be attempting to
force voters to behave exactly the same as previous elections. The expectation being that if par-
ties offer similar issue spaces from across elections then voters will not have the ability to defect
from their previous party. Although this condition would be difficult to achieve, it is theoretically
possible. Additionally, the cartel party theory suggests that as party systems evolve, parties should
become more collusive. Implied by this evolutionary component, parties should be working to-
ward perfect coordination, thus response in focal parties should approach 1:1 as time passes and
potentially surpass it, becoming issue space convergence. Although this condition may not present
itself often, a 1:1 response would be perfected coordination, if the goal is to keep the issue space
the same size. Though this response would be what parties might strive for, the theory suggests
that cartelization is an evolutionary process, leading to the possibly of an intermediate condition,
which we will call imperfect coordination.
Table 2.2: Issue Space Coordination
Rival Parties Move 1 point Resulting Issue Space
Focal Party Reaction
β > 1 Convergence Diminishing
β = 1 Perfect Coordination Stable
1 > β > 0 Imperfect Coordination Meaningless Expansion, ignoring voters
β = 0 Null Relationship Meaningful Expansion, responding to voters
β < 0 Polarization Extreme Expansion
Imperfect coordination occurs when focal parties are unable to make the perfect 1:1 shift with
their colluding counterparts, but do appear to be conspiring to do so, as indicated by their respon-
siveness to the rival parties in the system and their failure to respond to voters.
Before moving on to discuss imperfect coordination in detail, it is important to recognize that
the issue positions that we are discussing are relational; this means that initial programmatic posi-
tion of the focal party in relation to the rival parties’ positions influences the issue space between
parties over time, which becomes crucial for understanding how the models have been constructed
in the following empirical chapters. For example, if the rival parties in the system are to the right
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of the focal party, then a 1 point shift to the right by the rival parties and a simultaneous shift by
0.51 of the focal party to the left increases the issue space between them. This is because the focal
party is making a smaller movement, by 0.5 to the right, when the other parties have moved 1 point
away from the focal party. In other words, the shift from the focal party is not nearly enough to
make up the movement made by the rival parties in the system, therefore the space that divides
them is increasing. Conversely, if the rival parties are to the left of the focal party and they shift
1 point to the right and the focal party shifts 0.5 points again, the space will decrease between
them. Considering this visually again, if the rival parties are moving toward the focal party to
the right, and the focal party responds by moving 0.5 points less away from the rival parties, this
will decrease the distance between them. Thus, the initial starting position changes the resulting
issue space size and whether this is increasing or decreasing. In order to equalize these positions,
making the conditions equivalent, change from year to year must be examined, controlling for the
previous year’s position. This allows for change over time, without the complicating effects of a
party’s starting point in relation to other parties in the political dimension to obscure the findings.
Accounting for these distortions, parties can be considered coordinating imperfectly if their re-
sponse to rival parties’ issue position shifts is above 0 but unable to achieve a perfect 1:1 response,
while ignoring voter preference changes on the issue. This would be an undereaction to the shift
in the rival parties and would result in a marginally increasing issue space size. However, because
this response to rival parties by the focal party comes at the expense of not representing voters,
this suggest that although the issue space is increasing these movements are not due to represen-
tation, but rather imperfect coordination. Meaningful issue space expansion requires that parties
are responding to voters, to some degree. Without some connection to voters, then issue space
positions of focal parties cannot be considered representative, even if the issue space is expanding.
What gives issue space expansion meaning for representation is a distinct connection to voter pref-
erence changes, without this connection, it should be considered imperfect coordination between
1This could be any figure that is not an exact 1:1 response, because that is the only way in which the relationship
between the starting positions of the focal party and rival parties does not influence the resultant issue space – because
it stays exactly the same size with a 1:1 shift.
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colluding parties.
If focal parties are moving inline positively with rival parties in a significant fashion and ignor-
ing changes in voter positions on the issues, this should be considered a condition of pure collusion,
even though the coordination to limit the issue space is imperfect. This would be purely collusive
because it meets the two central characteristics of the condition: apparent cooperation with rival
parties – as shown by the positive relationship between changes in the rival party position and focal
party position – and a lack of responsiveness to issue position changes of voters, indicating broken
representation. The issue space would be meaningfully expanding if the shift in placement of the
focal party was connected to the voters, anything else would be a feature of imperfect coordination
with rival parties and indicative of collusion.
Though we have discussed perfect and imperfect coordination, the cartel party theory suggests
that parties may be drawn toward another strategy in issue space manipulation: convergence. Al-
though it might be preferred for parties to keep issue spaces stable, because this would be the most
clear cut way to force voter stability, they may also choose to narrow the issue space, becoming
increasingly similar on the topic and offering even fewer options to the voters. This might be an
attractive possibility if an issue is particularly challenging to a political system. If parties all share
nearly the same position on the topic, then voters will be forced to vote using some other issue
criteria. Issue space stability should be attractive for issues that have been politically salient since
before collusion began, whereas issue space convergence may be more attractive on newer issues
that enter the political discourse after collusion has already become common place.
Together this means that there are three issue space conditions we expect to see if collusion
is present: perfect coordination, imperfect coordination and convergence. Parties may manipulate
the issue space by attempting to keep it stable over time, showing signs of imperfect or perfect
coordination, or they may wish to limit the issues presented to voters broadly and may attempt
to converge on the issues. Whichever approach a party takes, the implications are the same for
representation: parties are manipulating the political playing field in an attempt to force voters to
vote for them while failing to represent their interests. No matter which condition presents itself,
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without a connection to voters, representation is clearly undermined in each of these conditions.
There are two remaining types of issue spaces that may exist that are not predicted by the cartel
party theory, though only one is meaningful for representation.
2.3.3 Non-Collusive Issue Spaces
There are two types of issue spaces that are not connected to collusive behavior, both of which lead
to meaningful issue space expansion: polarization and representation.
Meaningful issue space expansion can be driven by either parties or voters. If parties are in-
creasing the size of the issue space as a response to voters moving in that direction, while ignoring
the issue positions of their rivals, then clearly representation will be strong. Even if rival parties
move positively and the focal party responds, if the party remains somewhat connected to the voter,
then the issue space will be expanding in a meaningful fashion. Though there might be collusive
tendencies shown by the relationship that may exist between rival parties and focal parties, because
there remains a party-voter connection, we cannot definitively say that the issue space expansion
is meaningless and a sign of imperfect coordination, rather it becomes representatively expanding
in conjunction with voter preferences. There is no limitation to the issue space in this scenario
because parties are clearly not coordinating with other parties. This would achieve pure represen-
tation, again, because it meets the two characteristics for this condition: parties will respond to
voter preference changes, with no relationship to rival parties’ issue position changes.
The greatest expansion of the issue space, not connected to voter preference changes, would be
party polarization. If rival parties move positively one point and focal parties move in a significant
way negatively, to any degree, the issue space will be expanding in a fashion akin to polarization.
This means that parties will be making their policy position changes based off of distinguishing
themselves from competing parties, not coordinating to limit issue spaces, or responding to voter
preferences, thus achieving a condition of polarization.
Together, the discussion has provided clear expectations about how parties should behave if
the negative implications of the cartel party theory hold and how issue space coordination should
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appear if cartel conditions are evolving in modern democracies. Though focal party responsiveness
to rival parties, while ignoring voters on the issues should be indicative of inter-party collusion, the
cartel party theory suggests that parties should additionally manipulate the issue spaces presented
to voters. If parties are interested in maintaining an issue space similar from election to election
they should be expected to move together to limit the choice set presented to voters in the hope
that this behavior should force voter stability. Alternatively, parties may find strategic incentives,
particularly on new issues, to present an increasingly narrow issue space to voters. If parties
respond to changing voter preference, their positions of power may not be guaranteed, and thus
as political complexity increases, parties should be expected to behave in a cartelistic manner by
responding to other parties and manipulating the issue spaces presented to voters. Finding collusive
tendencies in party behavior is a first step in determining the validity of the cartel implications,
while this further test regarding issue space behavior allows us to determine how well parties are
able to limit the issues and promote artificial voter stability.
The previous discussion has outlined how the negative implications of the cartel party the-
ory provide empirical predictions about party behavior and coordination. Purely collusive parties
should show a disregard for voter preferences, while responding to other parties in the system and
advanced levels of collusion should show increasingly perfect coordination or convergence of issue
spaces. To this point, the cartel party theory has provided the foundation of expectations about col-
lusive party behavior and how cartelization should manifest itself in issue space manipulation, but
there is a final component to this discussion that has informed expectations about how collusion
should present itself in advanced democracies. Although not a consideration in the cartel party
theory, there is reason to believe, using relevant research, that party type should influence party
proclivity to collude. The final section will suggest that mainstream parties are the most likely to
collude, while niche parties have greater incentives to stay connected to their partisan voters. These
differences require a discussion of the ways in which party type and voter type should change our
expectations about party behavior and coordination.
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2.4 Party and Voter Types
Although the original cartel party theory does not address party differences, there is reason to
believe that collusion and representation may depend on party type, particularly because some
studies have shown that party type matters when understanding party-voter linkages (Adams et al.
2006, Meguid 2005, Wagner and Meyer 2016, Ezrow et al. 2010).
When it comes to predicting party behavior by party type, the literature would suggest that
niche parties should resist the temptation to collude with mainstream parties because they may lose
their fraction of the electorate if they increase their similarity to their mainstream rivals (Adams
et al. 2006). Niche parties are more responsive to their ideologically-driven constituents, while
mainstream parties make adjustments toward the independent or median voter (Adams et al 2006,
Ezrow et al. 2010). These findings indicate that niche parties should be the least likely to collude,
because they may be punished if they become increasingly to similar mainstream parties, because
this could alienate their partisan voters. This leads to the expectation that parties should offer
more durable policy choices over time in the face of change, because they need to keep a strong
connection to their voters, thus not only should party type change party behavior, but it should also
influence party coordination of the issue space.
Mainstream parties should be drawn toward greater responsiveness to rival parties and coordi-
nation of the issue space, compared to niche parties, and should limit the entrance of new issues
into the political mainstream by either ignoring the new issue or taking the same position on it.
When a new challenging issue arises, a subject that will be discussed in greater depth in chapter
3, mainstream parties have incentives to keep these issues outside of political competition. This
avoids allowing an issue to become salient or voters to express their positions on the topics, often
providing niche parties with complete issue ownership (Meguid 2005). Because niche parties are
often champions of new issues, it should be expected that the type of party will influence how issue
spaces are coordinated and how parties behave in relation to one another and their voters.
This discussion has argued that party type may influence the extent of collusion, but also
touches on an important point through the relevant findings – mainstream parties cater to me-
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dian or independent voters, while niche parties are more responsive to their partisans (Adams et al
2006, Ezrow et al. 2010). This suggests that voters should not be treated as a monolithic category,
rather there is reason to believe that parties may pursue different strategies which may alter the
type of voter they are interested in representing.
Parties often need to mobilize two groups in order to win elections, their partisan supporters
and a large enough portion of independents to win, trying to satisfy both of these groups creates
what Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) call representational strain. Though parties will want to
satisfy their partisan voters, particularly niche parties, these partisan voters are often more extreme
on the issues than the party itself, which complicates the party’s ability to appease independents,
who generally hover around the middle of the left/right political issue distribution (Dalton, Farrell
and McAllister 2011, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). This leads to parties being pulled in
two different directions, unable to respond in a manner that does not undercut the other voting
bloc. Add to this a growing contingent of the electorate becoming dealigned with parties, and
courting independents becomes even more central to electoral success (Albright 2009, Dalton and
Wattenburg 2000). This leads to two different models of representation possible: the partisan and
the dealigned (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). This allows for another theoretical distinction
between representation type, allowing for the possibility that there may be different strategies
implemented by parties, neither being indicative of a preferred type of representation.
That being said, there become two types of pure representation: partisan and dealignment
(Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). Parties may be interested in maintaining strong represen-
tational connections with their partisans if they are partisanly representative, or independents, if
dealignment representation is their strategy. This means that there are two types of pure represen-
tation that may present themselves, though these conditions are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
nor are either of these representative strategies comparatively deficient, rather they merely indicate
possibly different strategies in representing the interests of voting coalitions.
Together this discussion of party and voter types suggests important distinctions that have
guided some of the choices made in the chapters that follow. To begin, party type is considered in
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two ways. First, when it comes to collusion, the expectation is that mainstream parties should be
the most likely to collude, therefore all of the models included in this study examine how all parties
in a country respond to the mainstream parties’ positions on the issues. This allows for us to test
whether mainstream parties are colluding with focal parties in the system because the literature
suggests that this is the most likely place to find our first evidence of collusion. The second way
that party type is considered is in differentiating focal party types. It is possible that niche parties
may resist collusion with mainstream parties, while mainstream parties are expected to be highly
collusive with their mainstream rivals, which will become the central question of chapter 4. It is
possible that niche parties are not complicit in collusion with mainstream parties and considering
differences in focal types may help to uncover different party behaviors.
Different types of representation, either dealignment or partisan, are considered in all of the
chapters as well. Parties may have different strategies in representation and satisfying either of
these voter groups would be sufficient to undercut the negative implications of the cartel party
theory. In order to considerer these different strategies in representation, all models consider the
positions of the median voter in a country and the focal party’s partisans.
Though party and voter types are not considered in the cartel party theory, these modifications
have been made because the literature suggests that party types should shape collusive tendencies
and they allow for multiple types of representation to be tested, avoiding assumptions that all
parties should pursue the median voter to maximize their vote share.
2.5 Conclusion
In total, the cartel party theory suggests that the natural evolution of representative democracy leads
to the deterioration of the representative quality of the system. The theory suggests, most contro-
versially, that parties will move away from their voters and toward the state, beginning to collude
with one another to maintain their positions of power. Central to this discussion is the understand-
ing that parties are made up of people who are rational actors, working in their own self-interest
and using the party as a vehicle to further their goals and maintain their political power (Katz and
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Mair 2009). Katz and Mair suggest that when the changing dynamics of political competition alter
incentive structures, it becomes possible that parties move away from representation and toward
cartelization.
The argument that parties fail to meet the representational demands of their voters calls in to
question the legitimacy of these organizations and the system as a whole, making it centrally im-
portant to representation whether the negative implications of this theory hold. Using the cartel
party theory as the starting point, the previous discussion has argued that the theory suggests clear
expectations about how collusive party behavior should manifest itself, and how advanced degrees
of cartelization should lead to unrepresentative issue spaces presented to voters. Together these
suggestions mean that under a collusive system, voters will be ignored and the issues presented to
them will be manipulated and disconnected to their wants or needs. Thus empirically, I expect col-
lusion will lead focal parties to respond to mainstream parties in the system, while simultaneously
ignoring voter preferences of both partisan and median voters. While, if the system of cartelization
is mature, it is expected that coordination to manipulate the issue space presented to voters will be
perfectly stable, or converging. Together, this discussion has provided the theoretical foundation
from which the following chapters will begin investigating whether parties across the democratic
world appear to be colluding with one another or if representational connections remain strong
across a diverse set of issues.
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Chapter 3
Inter-Party Collusion on the Left/Right Economic Dimension
What contributes to a party’s position on policy? As discussed in the previous chapters, one might
assume that these positions are related to voter preference changes – when voters express an opin-
ion on an issue parties attempt to match the changing sentiments – but what if this dynamic re-
lationship breaks down? What if parties no longer attempt to represent voters? The cartel party
theory suggests that as party systems evolve and incentive structures change, parties begin to work
together to limit political competition, ultimately disregarding voter preferences. Under this the-
ory, as parties find themselves challenged by political uncertainties they will be drawn toward the
state and collusion with their rivals to protect their positions in government. In striving for political
stability, parties, this theory argues, should be expected to coordinate to limit political competition
and manipulate issue spaces presented to the voter, with the intention of artificially forcing voter
stability from election to election. So the theory goes, uncertainty of political outcome and in-
creasing political complexity will lead parties to increase their relationships with rival parties and
coordination in policy position, disregarding the changing opinions of voters.
As the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter suggests, focal parties behaving collusively
should respond to rival parties, while failing to represent voters, the likelihood of which should
increase as the party system matures. Furthermore, advanced cartelization will present evidence
of manipulated issue spaces, showing parties striving for stability or convergence of the issue area
presented to the voter. A natural starting point for testing the presence of cartelistic collusion is the
left/right ideological continuum. Often thought of as being divided across issues of government
intervention in the economy (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012, Hellwig 2008), these issues
make up the traditional economic divide, with those on the left supporting greater intervention in
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the economy and those on the right opposing this interference. These positions are often considered
the foundation of party competition, party families and cleavage structures (Lipset and Rokkan
1967). Because the left/right economic continuum is central to political competition in modern
democracies, this issue area should be considered first in testing the negative implications of the
cartel party theory.
The chapter will proceed as follows. To begin, the hypotheses that have guided the subse-
quent models will be presented, each in light of the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter.
Following this, the methods and data will be reviewed and finally the findings will be presented.
3.1 The Cartel Party Theory and Party Behavior
One of the most controversial aspects of the cartel party theory argues that as democracies evolve
parties will begin to work together, ultimately undermining representation. Parties are thought to
be the vehicle through which a voter’s interests are translated into policy and representation. Rep-
resentation scholarship suggests a dynamic relationship exists between parties and voters, allowing
voters to access the evolving conditions within society and reward or punish parties accordingly
(Powell and Witten 1993, Anderson 2000, Kayser and Peress 2012, Soroka and Wlezien 2009).
Implied by this relationship, is that parties will represent voters because failing to do so will lead to
a loss of votes. But, Katz and Mair (1995, 2009,) suggest as party systems evolve, the relationship
between the party and the voter deteriorates, allowing parties to manipulate political competition
and ultimately issue spaces in a manner that breaks down party-voter responsiveness, but without
the consequence of losing voters.
But are parties beginning to work together to limit competition? Some recent scholarship sug-
gests that parties show a responsive connection between issue positions, even among rivals (Adams
and Somer-Topcu 2009, Camia and Caramani 2012, Wagner and Meyer 2016, Rohrschneider and
Whitefield 2016), though none of these authors consider the cartel implications of their findings.
Considering the possibility that parties may be working together with their rivals, as these works
suggest, the following chapters will consider whether this apparent inter-party coordination is to
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the detriment of voter-party linkages. By considering these two interwoven phenomena simulta-
neously – representative connections between rival parties are increasing, while parties may be
increasingly disregarding voter preferences – this work will be able to test the totality of the cartel
party theory’s negative implications for representation, because it is not enough to show that voter-
party linkages are high, while ignoring rival party influences, nor to merely examine inter-party
coordination without considering whether voters remain dominant in influencing the issue posi-
tions of parties. To begin to test these possibilities in total, the following chapter will address three
questions: do parties appear to be colluding with one another and disregarding voter preferences?
Does the passage of time increase party proclivity to collude, as suggested by the evolutionary
component of the theory? And finally, do parties appear to be coordinating their issues spaces to
force voter stability?
As the previous theoretical chapter details, the cartel party theory argues that party evolution
produces an environment in which parties will begin to collude with one another to minimize com-
petition and ultimately manipulate the issues that enter the political mainstream. This discussion
has provided the foundation for determining whether the negative implications of this theory hold,
suggesting that collusive parties will exhibit two distinct behaviors: focal parties should be re-
sponsive to the policy positions of rival mainstream parties, while simultaneously disregarding the
positions of their voters. More generally, these two features define the typology of possible party
conditions, ranging from pure collusion to pure representation as presented in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Responsiveness
Responsive to Parties?
Yes (Positive) No (Negative or Null)
Response to Voters?
Yes (Positive) Partial Collusion/Representation Pure Representation
No (Negative) Pure Collusion Polarization or Clientelism
Presented in greater detail in the previous chapter, these four conditions are pure collusion,
partial collusion/representation, pure representation and polarization and clientelism. Focal parties
that are behaving in a purely collusive manner should disregard partisan and median voter prefer-
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ences, with the appearance of working in conjunction with other mainstream parties. A focal party
could also be responsive to both parties and voters, indicating only a partial condition of collusion,
since voters are not completely disregarded, yet parties appear to be functionally manipulating
political competition. If focal parties respond to the changing policy positions of voters, with no
relationship or a negative relationship to the position of mainstream parties they can be considered
purely representative, since party positions in this condition clearly remain connected to the voter.
If focal parties fail to respond to both voters and rival parties, then it is clear that approximating the
positions of these groups does not influence policy positions on the left/right continuum, suggest-
ing that party position is determined by clientelistic interests, not cartel collusion or representation.
If the positions of focal parties are not related to rival parties in the system and they do not respond
to movements of voters, then there must be other factors unaccounted for in these models driving
these positions, such as a special interest group in society or even internal party activists. If focal
parties are moving away from mainstream parties, increasing the distance between themselves and
their rivals, while not responding to voters, then the condition can be considered polarized. Focal
parties in this condition do not show representative connections to voters, but appear motivated
to differentiate themselves from their opposition. This typology allows for the following research
to have clear expectations about how inter-party collusion should present itself though focal party
responsiveness to mainstream party changes on the left/right issue dimension. This typology sug-
gests that how parties respond to one another and voters alters the type of system that is created, but
underlying these behavioral changes is the deterministic suggestion made by the cartel party theory
– as party systems mature they will become more akin to cartels – which provides the second set
of expectations guiding this chapter.
The second question targets the evolutionary basis of the cartel theory, which justifies treating
the passage of time as predictive of increased collusive behaviors. The mechanisms that drive
cartel changes are grounded in the previously discussed literature on party system evolution. The
cartel system, Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) suggest, is the next step in evolving party systems that
is the result of parties becoming challenged by a changing electorate, the increasing complexity
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and cost of running campaigns, while being unable use government spending to incentivize voter
loyalty, parties adopt the strategies that define the cartel system. This leads to the foundational
expectations that parties will begin to collude with one another because it is the most efficient and
risk adverse way to protect their positions in government, when it becomes too difficult to achieve
representation while maintaining access for parties to governing institutions. Though the specific
mechanisms that Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) argue should convert the catch-all system to the
cartel system include state subvention programs, limited government spending, increasingly more
expensive election campaigns, and rising issue complexity, they also imply that time will bring this
condition to all democracies as a function of changing environmental incentives, thus time should
be in itself increase a focal party’s proclivity to collude.
The final question takes the theory one step further – if cartelistic collusion is mature on these
issues then we expect to see issue space convergence or stability. If voters change their position,
then parties are faced with a choice: adjust to satisfy their voter or ignore them and risk losing their
vote. Voters can only vote based on their opinions if there is a party that offers them a choice on
this topic, if not, then the voter should continue to vote for their previous party. Parties can force
voter stability (voters vote for the party they voted for in the last election) if parties offer a stable
issue space, not allowing for new issues to enter into the political mainstream, or by converging on
a topic, making the choices increasingly narrow for the voter (Blyth and Katz 2005). This suggests
that our expectation for the third question is that colluding parties should show evidence of striving
for or achieving near perfect coordination or issue space convergence, as discussed in the previous
chapter. If all of the parties in the system collude to ignore changing public opinion on a topic and
present a manipulated issue space to voters, then representative connections between parties and
voters may be all the more broken.
This discussion provides the foundation for expectations about party collusion, but before mov-
ing on to the hypotheses, it is important to discuss the rationale behind choosing the left/right
continuum as a starting point for exploring the possibilities of collusion.
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3.2 Dimensions of Collusion
In the most basic sense, the left/right continuum conceptually divides electorates and parties along
economic dimension, a divide often thought to form the primary basis from which political parties
traditionally compete (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kitschelt 1994, Hellwig 2008, Rohrschneider
and Whitefield 2009). Because economic issues are centrally important to traditional political
competition and have been found to be stable over time, it is expected that these topics should be
settled and parties should hold fairly durable policy positions on these economic issues (Dalton
and McAllister 2015).
Though some research suggests political dynamics have increased complexity, indicating that
the single left/right dimension may not be adequate in conceptualizing the totality of politics (Al-
bright 2010, Kitschelt 1994, Marks et al. 2006, Kriesi et al. 2006). With more recent scholarship
arguing that ‘new politics’ and globalization have created a multidimensional political playing
field (Kitschelt 1994, Marks, Hooghe, and Nelson 2006, Wagner and Meyer 2016, Kriesi et al.
2006, Hellwig 2008). These new crosscutting issues should, using the cartel theory, be difficult
for parties to approximate their voters on, and because of their multidimensional nature, increase
the likelihood that parties could undercut their voting coalitions if they take definitive stances on
these new issues. This means that the incentives to collude and present narrowing or stable issues
spaces should be much higher on multidimensional issues, as compared to issues on the economic
dimension (Blyth and Katz 2005). In other words, parties should present comparably more stable
and determinate policy positions across the left/right economic divide, so much so that we would
expect less collusion on these topics, compared to new multidimensional issues (which will be
the focus of the next chapter). Therefore issue positions on the economic dimension, because of
they are foundational to party platforms, should be comparatively stable over time (Dalton and
McAllister 2015), presenting the most difficult test for the emergence of inter-party collusion.
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3.3 Hypotheses
Though the overriding expectation is that left/right issues should be generally stable over time,
there still remains the possibility that parties in cartelistic systems may collude on these topics, not
just the more complicated crosscutting issues presented by multidimensional politics. Focal parties
participating in collusive behavior, the cartel party theory argues, should be driven by their interest
in keeping political competition similar from election to election. Realizing their shared goals,
Katz and Mair (2009) suggest, parties will begin to conspire in order to limit competition and ma-
nipulate the issues presented to voters, becoming increasingly unresponsive to their constituencies.
As discussed in the previous chapter, this type of collusive response from focal parties is expected
to occur between mainstream parties, compared to niche parties. Together, these expectations leads
to the first hypothesis:
H1 - Collusion: Focal parties participating in collusion will adjust their policy on
the economic dimension positively in response to mainstream party movements, while
ignoring voter preferences.
Conversely, in the other ideal typical scenario, focal parties remain responsive to their voters,
either median or partisan, while having no relationship or a negative relationship to the mainstream
parties in the system. If parties present positive responses to either voter group, and a negative or
null relationship to the mainstream party positions, then representation should be deemed strong,
considering changes in voter policy positions appear to be the driving forces in party policy place-
ment on the left/right dimension. This line of logic suggests the second hypothesis:
H2 - Representation: Focal parties, maintaining representative connections to their
constituents, will positively respond to changes in left/right issues in partisan voters
and/or median voters, indicating that representation remains strong. Additionally, sig-
naling party independence on the issues, a focal party’s positions will not be related to
left/right policy placement of the mainstream parties in the system.
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Although these two hypotheses address the central motivations for this research, the cartel party
theory, at its core, is an evolutionary theory. As discussed in the expectations section, the mere
passage of time may increase collusive tendencies within modern democracies. If this evolutionary
process is present as Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) theorize, merely the passage of time should
influence whether cartelistic behavior emerges, presenting a third hypothesis:
H3 - Evolution: If cartelization is indeed occurring, focal parties in advanced democ-
racies will become more collusive as time passes – they will increasingly respond to
rival mainstream parties, while ignoring voters.
Finally, as the previous chapter argues, the theory suggests that collusion should be character-
ized by focal party responsiveness to other parties and broken connections between focal parties
and voters (H1), while representation should show focal parties maintaining representative con-
nections between voters, while ignoring mainstream party positions (H2), but the most advanced
implications of the cartel party theory suggest that colluding parties will be incentivized to ar-
tificially manipulate the issue spaces presented to voters by promoting stability or convergence.
Because the economic issue dimension should be durable and the least attractive policy space over
which to collude, the expectation is that coordination on the economic issue space should not
have achieved perfect coordination or convergence, but that this coordination should be increasing,
although not yet perfected, leading to the fourth hypothesis:
H4 - Issue Space: The highest level of collusion should present either issue space
stability or convergence. Because focal parties should find it challenging to collude on
the economic issue dimension, the expectation is that issue space coordination should
be imperfect, resulting in a marginally increasing issue space size, and a failure to
respond to voter preferences.
Together these four hypotheses cover the major questions to be addressed in this chapter: Do
parties respond to the policy placements of other parties and disregard voters, reflecting their col-
lusion on left/right economic issues or do they remain connected to voters and representative of
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their changing opinions? Do these focal party responses change over time? And finally, if they
are behaving collusively, do parties appear to be manipulating the issue spaces presented to voters
effectively? Answers to these questions will form a primary basis to evaluating the implications of
the cartel party theory and whether party systems have evolved in such a manner that has under-
mined the party-voter linkages.
3.4 Data
To begin, this section will first discuss the data utilized in this chapter’s models, examining party
responsiveness and issue space manipulation on the left/right dimension. The individual level and
party level data will be presented, followed by a brief introduction to the methods underlying the
empirical results.
The data are longitudinal panel data organized by the party/year, and following this structure,
variables are created that produce aggregate figures for a party’s median voters and partisans. To
produce this data set, individual level survey data form the basis for mean partisan and median
voter issue position over time on the economic issue dimension.
Because these issues are central to political competition, policy positions should be durable,
thus requiring data that covers a broad swath of time. To achieve this goal, this work uses the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which presents individual level survey data span-
ning from 1987 to 2010, on a variety of nations. Though there are some particularities with this
dataset, the extended period of time makes it desirable for the question at hand12 Together these
1 Though the ISSP does conduct an annual survey, the question used to target the economic dimension of politics
was not asked each year, thus this data source does not provide time points past 2010 and the spacing of the surveys is
irregular.
2The ISSP data are supplemented using the British Social Survey Data. The way the ISSP incorporated the answers
for the partisanship question in the original datasets was unusable for the purposes of this study. It did not allow for
partisans to be coded because it combined two answers into one:
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a supporter of any political party? If yes: Which one?
Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than the others? If yes: Which one? If
there were a general election tomorrow which political party do you think you would be most likely to
support?
I was able to go into the BSA data and access these questions in a format that was not aggregated into a single
answer. This allowed for partisanship to be determined using the BSA, though the reason the question was being
39
data sources will provide a wide range of cases and time periods in order to gauge party respon-
siveness to issues on the economic dimension, though neither is perfect, the deficiencies in each
are somewhat remedied by the opposing dataset. To capture the respondent issue position on the
left/right economic dimension, the ISSP has regularly asked respondents:
How much do you agree or disagree with each of these statements? It is the responsi-
bility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high
incomes and those with low incomes.
This question is available in 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2006, 2009, 2010.
Though not annually and not a consistent group of counties for each survey, the ISSP provides a
larger window of time to examine, compared to the ESS, since these policy positions are expected
to be durable for parties and voters (Dalton and McAllister 2015). The ISSP data also allows
for nations outside of Europe to be examined, which is useful considering the cartel party theory
should be applicable across all advanced democracies.
One of the major limitations to the ISSP data concerns the party identification question. This
question was asked in each of the surveys that included the economic dimension question, but
question wording differed across country. Because countries were able to determine how they
wanted to ask this question, very few surveys contained exactly the same question wording, though
they did follow trends in questions type3. For the entirety of the dissertation chapters contained
asked was for the ISSP surveys. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to this as generally the ISSP survey, although the
data underlying the British answers comes from the BSA. . To test the robustness of the findings and add a dataset
with significantly more observations, the European Social Survey (ESS) data provides a more recent perspective on the
changing political dynamics in European democracies and an increased number of consistently measured observations,
surveying nations every two years from 2002 to 2016.
3There were four major categories of questions types that were asked in the ISSP. The first asked respondents if
there was a party that they felt close to or sympathized with. For the purposes of the present research, this indicator
was labeled party sympathy. The second type of identification question asked respondents ‘if there was an election
sometime soon (with wide variety in the time periods suggested), which party the individual would vote for?’ This
type of question is labeled future vote question. Though asked much less frequently compared to the other questions,
respondents were occasionally asked who they voted for in the last election instead of the partisan support indicator
(past vote). And finally, the least common asked which party the respondent felt was the closest in policy to themselves
(closest party). For the purposes of the following chapter, the ISSP data using the party sympathy question – which
was the most often asked – is used. Therefore there will be countries missing that were surveyed in the ISSP because
most of these asked who the respondent would vote for soon (future vote). Asking someone whom they sympathize
with or whom they would vote for are very different ways to determine party identification and should not be treated
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here, partisans in the ISSP survey are limited to countries that asked their respondents if there was
a party that they sympathized with or felt close to, which most closely approximates partisanship
within the provided question types4. This allows for the greatest comparability to the ESS data
and presents a more convincing measure for partisan loyalty, compared to other types of question
wording used in the ISSP.
To measure economic left-right orientations using the ESS data, respondents were asked “Us-
ing this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:
The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” with responses rang-
ing from strongly agree to strongly disagree. To determine partisanship using the ESS survey,
respondents were asked whether there was a party that they felt closer to than any other party,
allowing for a yes or no response. Respondents were then asked what party they felt close to.
Together individuals that gave an affirmative response to there being a party that they felt close
to were then coded as partisans for the party they selected. This question allows for a voter-party
relationship to be targeted that should approximate partisanship in a similar fashion to that used in
the ISSP data.
Partisans were determined using questions that individual respondents were asked about their
declared affiliations. To determine independents within a nation the median voter is used as an
approximate measure for this subsection of an electorate, following Rohrschneider and White-
field (2012). These authors argue that independents often cluster around the center of the left/right
continuum and therefore can be conceptualized and measured as being similar in ideological place-
ment as the median voter. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) also use the “no party” responses
to characterize dealigned voters. Though this would be the most preferable way to target this seg-
ment of the population, the ISSP surveys infrequently and inconsistently presented voters with the
“no party” option.
The individual level surveys are used to create two voter-level variables: median and partisan
as the same, they have been disaggregated, respecting the fact that voting for a party does not mean that voters actually
sympathize or support a party. For the purpose of this research the party sympathy question was used.
4Full table of countries covered in ISSP using party sympathy question can be found in table A.1 in the Appendix
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voters. For the partisan voter, an average value is created for each party year using the party
identification question to determine the left/right position. For example, all of the respondents who
selected the Labour Party in Great Britain scores were averaged, creating a mean partisan voter
score for each survey year for the Labour party. Median voters are also calculated by taking the
median respondent position for all the individuals in the country on the left/right question from
year to year. Again, because the data structure is party/year, the average partisan and median voter
is created for each party/year observation.
Party policy positions and ideology are measured in a variety of ways across the representation
literature, though party placement is most frequently determined through surveys of citizens, sur-
veys of experts, and the coding of manifestos (Dalton Farrell and McAllister, 2011). One would
assume that these measures should be somewhat interchangeable, but they in practice are not (Ke-
man 2007). For instance, Dalton, Farrell and McAllister (2011) find, in their work examining the
left/right ideological placement for each party across the spectrum, that the manifesto data “pro-
duce a substantially different" result, compared to expert and citizen surveys (118). One would
assume that these sources should come to relatively similar conclusions, they are measuring the
same phenomenon after all, but might there be another explanation for the discrepancies?
I suggest that it is possible that equating the perceptions of experts and citizens to the statements
made by parties may be misguided, because what we assume is that each of these approaches
is able to approximate is ideological placement of parties at the time. The problem lies in the
fact that the survey data are the perceptions of individuals on the placement of the party, while
the manifesto data represents the party’s promised placement; i.e. future policy considerations.
Separating these factors, reveals a possible reason for the discrepancy. Parties often make promises
that they cannot keep, and positioning on the left/right continuum may change in practice. Where
a party strives to be – as committed to within a manifesto – may be an ideal typical position, rather
than a position achievable in reality. The underlying implication is that surveys of citizens and
experts may be better approximations of policy placement in practice, while manifestos may be
the pledged, although possibly unattainable, positions of the organizations.
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Party manifestos, within this understanding, should be conceptualized as a commitment made
to the voter, though crucially, it could also be seen as a measure of commitments made to other
parties, when collusion is occurring. For the purpose of this chapter, the most appropriate way
to explore the existence of collusion is through the manifesto statements provided by the parties,
because if cartel mechanisms are at play, they should be evident within these documents. It would
be misguided to assume that collusion would be perceived by both citizens and voters directly.
If party manifestos are representations of commitment, that may or may not translate into policy
after the fact, then these documents should be able to reveal whether parties are making these
commitments in response to their voters or to other parties. If collusion is occurring, then parties
should appear to be making commitments to one another to limit competition, without regard for
the voters and their changing opinions. In contrast, if they remain connected to the voter, they
should make the appropriate promises to the people, without a distinct connection to rival parties.
This is not say that voters and experts should not be able to perceive collusion occurring, rather it
should just take longer for these commitments to turn into explicit coordination in practice in order
for it to become perceivable to experts or citizens. In the end, if parties are participating in this
type of behavior, I expect it should present itself first within the party manifesto, if conceptualized
as future commitments to one another.
There are two important variables derived from the Manifesto Project dataset for this chap-
ter. First, the project determines party family, coding parties into agrarian, conservative, christian
democratic, liberal, social democratic, communist, ethnic/regional, nationalist, green and special
issue5. For the purpose of this research, ethnic/regional, nationalist, green and special issue com-
prise niche party status, abiding to the definition of niche parties are “defined as parties that com-
pete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues” (Wagner 2010, Wagner and Meyer
2016). Using this, the second variable is created to capture the annual movement on the left/right
dimension of the mainstream parties in a political system each year. Because the Manifesto Project
codes each manifesto that is produced by parties preceding an election, the score for this manifesto
5Such as parties representing pensioners issues, euroskepticism, or women’s issues, just to name a few.
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is applied to each year up to the year when a more recent manifesto is created. The rationale being
that a given manifesto presents the official policy position of the party up to the creation of a new
manifesto. The second variable from the Manifesto Project captures the economic dimension. To
measure left/right policy position movement in party manifestos using the so-called RILE variable
provided by the Manifesto data is utilized. This variable measures a party’s left/right position pre-
sented in the manifesto ranging from -100 (left) to 100 (right). All individual survey level left/right
questions have been adjusted to comparable directional interpretations. In other words, when the
voter moves to the right this will be a positive adjustment, when a party moves to the right, it will
be a positive adjustment.
Using the RILE score and the party family determination, I created an average mainstream
party position variable. To accomplish this, all of the left/right policy scores for all the main-
stream parties in a system are first aggregated. To avoid double-counting the focal party in both the
outcome and the predictor, the focal party’s left/right policy score is subtracted from the overall
mainstream parties’ aggregate, if the observation party is mainstream. In order to make scores com-
parable across system and year, the aggregate of all mainstream parties’ positions is then divided
by the number of parties in the system6, creating the mean left/right movement of mainstream
parties in a system. As an example, consider Great Britain in 2015, the Conservative, Labour
and Liberal Democrat parties are coded as mainstream, while the Scottish National Party (SNP),
Plaid Cymru and Green Party are considered niche. If the focal party is the SNP in 2015, then
the mainstream party score will be the left/right positions of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal
Democrat parties added together, since the SNP is not a mainstream party. The final aggregate
(-35.85) is then divided by the number of mainstream parties in the system, which in this case is
three, making the final figure -11.95. This creates a variable that can be considered the average po-
sition of a mainstream party in Great Britain in 2015. Conversely, if the observation party were the
Conservative Party, then the scores for the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties will be aggregated
and then divided by two, since the effects of the Conservative have been removed. This ultimately
6To adjust for the focal party again, one is subtracted from the count of mainstream parties in the system if the
focal party is coded as mainstream.
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creates a figure that is relational to each focal party/year.
Together all of this provides the variables needed to explore what contributes to the left/right
policy position changes of parties across time, considering how the focal party’s position and
movement over time is influenced by the mainstream competitors’ position and movement and the
the positions of median and partisan voters over time. These variables allow us to test the four
hypotheses and therefore, determine whether collusion, as suggested by Katz and Mair, shapes
party behavior.
3.5 Methods
All of the analysis within this chapter will utilize linear multilevel models7. Because of the nature
of the dataset, the party can be considered the second level in the data, while the year comprises
the first. This means that each year is nested in the party and each party is nested in the country.
To avoid making assumptions about the data, the intercepts at the party and the country levels
are allowed to vary randomly with unstructured covariances8. Although at the individual level, the
basis for the partisan and median voter positions are derived from thousands of survey observations,
because the data are aggregated as party/year scores, the observations are considerably smaller.
Taking the most conservative approach, restricted maximum likelihood estimations (REML) have
been used9. Although it would be helpful to have likelihood ratio tests to compare models, because
7 Although the dependent variable is not continuous, considering it is bound at -100 and 100, a linear regression is
used because the variable appears normally distributed, with most of the values falling between the -50 and 50 range,
making impossible estimates unlikely (Long, 1997). Tobit analysis was tested, but produced poor model fits (Long,
1997, Twisk and Rijmen 2009).
8 Random effects multilevel models were chosen for several reasons. The clearly clustered nature of the data,
on both the party and the country levels makes a completely pooled approach inappropriate (Bartels 2015, Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2005, Snijders and Bosker 2002, Gelman and Hill 2007). The fixed effects model approach
would consume too many of the degrees of freedom for the models, making the estimates questionable (Bartels 2015).
Ultimately, the random effects models were selected because they considered the underlying dependencies within the
data, while maximizing model fit (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005, Hoffman 2015). The dependent variable has
not been lagged, although this has become more common in multilevel models (Bartels 2015, Beck and Katz 2011),
because the connection between voters and parties should be more dynamic than a 1 year lag would suggest. This
seems too blunt, though further research may consider this approach.
9 Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), correcting for serial auto correlation and heteroskedasticity using robust
standard errors, produced nearly identical coefficient estimates. REML estimates are presented in the body of the text
because the variance parameters should be constantly estimated using this specification, thus making the significance
tests more reliable. Though the coefficient estimates were nearly identical with REML and MLE, the standard errors
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of the REML specification this will not be used as a diagnostic tool for model fit, though AIC and
BIC fit statistics will be presented in tables.
Because the ISSP and ESS data are unbalanced (there are an unequal number of occasions
for each party), the covariance structures that would be applicable are limited (Hoffman 2015,
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). Although the equal spacing of the ESS surveys allows for a
few more options, ultimately the most appropriate structure was determined to be exponential, be-
cause it considers the time dependency in the data, while not requiring balance or similar spacing
between occasions (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2015). In accessing the fit of the models, expo-
nential residual structure produced the best fit for the empty models and after specifications were
added. Though the models were unable to be compared to the unstructured empty model, again
because of the unbalanced nature of the data and the irregular spacing of occasions, comparisons
to exchangeable or symmetric models found the exponential residuals were the most appropriate.
As mentioned before, random intercepts for party and country were allowed to vary in these mod-
els and the covariances for these levels are unstructured, a decision that is not only theoretically
grounded, but also improves model fit. Allowing the intercepts to vary with unstructured covari-
ances, while imposing a residual structure that is exponential, allows for the level-1 residuals over
time to be considered while allowing the parties to be potentially different from each other (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2015). This does not make assumptions about the covariances across party
type, while recognizing that the data have inherent time dependencies.
The models in this chapter will first explore whether or not parties make adjustments to their
positions on economic issues in response to voters, maintaining representative connections, or
if they respond to movements in mainstream parties, indicating collusion. All of the models in
this dissertation will utilize the Hoffman (2015) approach to dealing with the dependent nature of
longitudinal data.
This approach targets different sources of variance in the data, allowing us to test what drives
placement on the economic dimension using the nature of the data to our advantage (Hoffman
were somewhat inconsistent, indicating that the sample size is not large enough for MLE to provide constant variance
estimates.
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2015). As is often lamented but rarely appreciated, there are dependencies within data overtime,
though these dependencies are generally treated as nuisance (Hoffman 2015). Hoffman argues
that rather than treating these features as problematic, we can and should use our data to create
variables to target the concepts we are interested in, separating the the variance into ‘piles’ of
interest (Hoffman 2015).
When it comes to testing the true implications of the theory, it is a central concern that change
be considered. The relationship between parties and voters should be dynamic over time, if voters
change their positions over time, we would expect parties to adjust their positions in response. In
order to capture change, while adjusting for dependancies, these models will create average values
for voters and parties and mean centered change variables to determine what might be driving
placement on the left/right dimension for parties. The most conclusive evidence for collusion
would be finding that a party’s policy positions on the left/right dimension reflect changes in rival
party positions, rather than voter preference changes. In other words, whether focal parties respond
to voters when they move on the issues and change their positions in response to rival parties,
provides the empirical test to determine whether the two conditions implied by the cartel party
theory are indeed present.
Including mean and mean centered figures separates the variance in order to consider the de-
pendency, but also allow us to observe whether parties are influenced by changing positions of
these groups or merely the historical positions of rival parties or voters on the issue. Creating
average values for each variable over the observation (or the mean partisan, median voter, or main-
stream party position), tests whether the stationary position of these voters or parties influences
the focal party’s position, while the mean centered change variables allow us to target the variance
we are interested in – change in left/right position from year to year – to test whether focal parties
have become more responsive to changing mainstream party position, while disregarding changes
in voters’ positions, as the cartel party theory suggests.
Using the running example, this method allows us to partition out stationary influences of
Conservative partisan’s, British median voters and Labour and Liberal Democrat parties’ positions
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on the economic dimension. There should be a baseline effect of these groups; in other words, there
is a general location on the economic dimension where the Conservative party most often finds their
voters, median voters or the mainstream parties on these topics. By creating these mean scores and
subsequently producing mean centered variables to capture left/right position change of partisan,
median and other mainstream parties’ positions away from their average location over time, allows
us to answer two questions. First, do economic positions of the Conservative party correspond to
the general economic positions of the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, Conservative partisans,
or median British voters? And second, when these groups change their position on economic
issues, does the Conservative party adjust their position in accordance? This process allows for
change in policy position to be targeted in the analysis, to better capture the implications of the
cartel party theory. This partitioning of the variables into mean and mean centered variants will
occur in all of the models, with the first two models of the chapter examining whether or not focal
parties appear to be responding to mainstream parties or voters when they change their positions
on the left/right issue dimension, followed by the models that test the influence of time, and finally
issue space size will be considered.
In total, the theory suggests that parties should become increasingly more collusive with the
evolution of the party system. The central expectation of the cartel theory is that parties, as sys-
temic conditions evolve, will become less responsive to voters, while becoming increasingly de-
pendent on their relationships to other parties and the state to protect themselves from competition,
undermining the voter-party linkage. Thus, to test the cartel party theory we must be able to deter-
mine to whom parties respond, with the implication being that responsiveness of focal parties to
mainstream parties signals collusion (H1). The implication of the evolutionary component of this
systemic theory is that the mere passage of time should make parties more inclined to collusive
behavior–they increasingly respond to each other as time passes (H3). In order to consider this
possibility, models 3 and 4 use a time interaction mainstream party changes on the left/right di-
mension, allowing for us to determine whether the linear passage of time has increased focal party
responsiveness to mainstream party position changes on these issues.
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Finally, although the preceding models will explore whether focal parties are responsive to
mainstream parties or voters and how time influences this behavior, these models are unable to tell
us how the issue space is influenced by mainstream parties and voters over time. The expectation
is that as parties become more adept at manipulating the issue spaces presented to voters, they will
be able to achieve convergence or perfect 1 to 1 coordination on the issue(H4). If parties move
in response to one another this signals collusion, but whether this expands or contracts the issue
space size depends on the primary position of the focal party, as was discussed in the previous
chapter. In other words, if mainstream parties move to the right and focal parties also move to the
right in response, if the movement is not a perfect 1 to 1 shift, the starting position in relation to
the mainstream parties’ alters whether this means the issue space is expanding or contracting.
Using the running example, the Conservative party in Britain is to right, in relation to the other
mainstream parties in the system, so if the other mainstream parties move to the right 1 point and
the Conservative party moves to the right 0.5 point, the issue space will be contracting, because
the Liberal Democrats and Labour parties will have moved a full point, making them 0.5 closer
to the Conservative party. But if our focal party is the Labour party, which is to the left of the
average positions of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, then a 0.5 point shift in Labour and
a 1 point shift in the mean mainstream parties would actually expand the issue space. Therefore
in order to determine how the issue space is influenced by inter-party collusion we must control
for previous policy positions, in order to bring all of the parties to the same 0 starting point, so
we are able to see what kind of shift is produced in focal party response to mainstream party
position changes. The final model (5) includes a lag of the previous left/right policy position of
the focal party in order to standardize the starting positions of these parties in relation to their
mainstream opposition. Including this variable removes a large portion of observations, making
the ISSP models too unstable to include, but the ESS data produces a functional model. Including
this lag as a control allows for us to determine whether the issue space is expanding or contracting
when parties are cooperating by effectively changing the dependent variable to examine focal party
change away from previous position on the economic dimension, changing the interpretation of the
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dependent variable.
Together these approaches will allow us to fully explore the negative implications of the car-
tel theory, considering how representation might be effected by collusion, whether this behavior
increases over time, and if the issue spaces presented to voters shows inter-party coordination to
converge on an issue or to maintain issue space stability. The following section will detail the
findings from the following models and the substantive meaning of the findings.
3.6 Results
To recap, the cartel party theory suggests that evolving conditions within advanced democracies
alter incentive structures for parties, in a manner predicting inter-party collusion. Collusion occurs
when parties work together to limit party competition – voters in these conditions are no longer
represented when they change positions on the issues, rather parties are expected to respond to rival
parties participating in collusion instead of their constituencies. This weakens the representational
connections between voters and parties and potentially undermines the basis for representative
democracy. To test this possibility, the influence of partisan, median voter, and mainstream par-
ties’ positions on the left/right dimension in relation to the dependent focal party are examined
to determine which of these groups has the greatest influence on party positions over time and
whether these behaviors meet the expectations detailed in the cartel party theory.
The results will be presented in the following order. To begin, the first models will test whether
focal parties appear to be responding to mainstream parties in these systems, using the ISSP and
ESS data. Following this the evolutionary component will be tested, by interacting time with main-
stream party position changes. Finally, issue space manipulation will be considered, controlling
for the initial positions of focal parties to determine whether inter-party coordination is presenting
manipulated issue spaces to voters.
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3.6.1 Focal Party Response
By separating the time variant and time invariant positions of voters and parties, party policy behav-
ior on the left/right economic dimension uses the longitudinal dependencies within our data to our
advantage to target the concept we are truly interested in: change. Political representation hinges
on a basic expectation of party responsiveness to voters. Implied by the relationship between vot-
ers and their representatives is that when voters change their positions, parties should track these
changes and try to reflect them in a representative manner, with research suggesting this connec-
tion remains intact (Powell 2000, Adams 2004, Dalton and McAllister 2011, Rohrschneider and
Whitefield 2012). The cartel party theory suggests that this responsive relationship is undermined
by the self interest of the party to maintain power, leading parties to collude to keep their posi-
tions in government, rather than risk alienating some voters. Because parties, in the cartel party
theory, are interested in limiting competition between parties, the primary negative implications
of the theory suggest that colluding parties should be responsive to one another, while ignoring
voter preference changes on the issues. Utilizing the methods advocated by Hoffman (2015) the
following models examine to what degree a focal party’s position is dictated by the average, or
stationary, positions of voters or mainstream parties and how focal parties react when these groups
change their positions on the issues, to test whether this dynamic relationship between parties and
voters remains intact.
The first two models presented in table 3.2 consider what determines a focal party’s positions
on the left/right dimension. Using the ISSP data, this produces models examining 27 countries,
158 parties, which results in 356 party-year observations10.
This model shows that when partisan and median voters change their positions on the issue par-
ties fail to respond to these movements, suggesting that the dynamic relationship assumed between
parties and voters may be broken. Consistent with the expectations outlined in cartelistic collusion,
when mainstream parties change their position on the left/right issue dimension, focal parties are
10 Full list of countries and years with LR question, party sympathy question type and manifesto data in Appendix
table A.1
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Table 3.2: Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Responsiveness
(Model 1) (Model 2)
ISSP: Response ESS: Response
Mean Mainstream Party 18.79∗∗∗ 11.98∗
(4.547) (5.991)
Partisan 20.06∗∗∗ 23.48∗∗∗
(3.140) (3.031)
Mean Median Voter -14.19∗∗∗ -19.72∗∗∗
(4.077) (5.758)
Mainstream Party Change 9.120∗∗ 9.077∗∗∗
(3.465) (1.793)
Mean Partisan Change 0.965 0.507
(2.332) (1.383)
Median Voter Change 1.638 -0.242
(1.910) (1.917)
Constant -66.23∗∗∗ -42.61∗
(11.82) (19.57)
Country
Constant 2.73e-15 30.54∗∗∗
(8.03e-14) (30.25)
Party
Constant 59.15 162.0∗∗∗
(224.3) (54.53)
Residuals: Exponential
var(e) 277.5∗∗∗ 191.2∗∗∗
(257.2) (47.42)
Observations 356 874
AIC 2857.0 6702.6
BIC 2899.6 6755.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
predicted to respond positively to these movements. More specifically, model 1, using the ISSP
data, shows that when mainstream parties change their issue positions on the left/right dimension
one unit11 away from their average location, focal parties are predicted to shift 9.12 points. This
failure to respond to voters, while reacting to the issue positions of their rivals, presents evidence
11 In this case a unit would be one response category in the question toward the most ‘right’ response. Recall, ques-
tions for the ISSP and ESS ask respondents whether they agree that the government has a responsibility to minimize
income differences between individuals, someone expressing a right-leaning position would oppose this sentiment.
These questions allow responses from 1 to 5 on a Likert scale, so a one unit increase would mean the respondent
moved possibly from “disagree” to “strongly disagree” that the government should work to reduce income differ-
ences. The mainstream party positions have been rescaled to 5 levels as well, merely to make magnitude of coefficient
estimates simple to compare.
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for pure collusion using the ISSP data.
The mean positions in the model suggest that, the average positions of partisan voters and
mainstream parties positively predict left/right positions of parties to fairly similar degrees – when
mean mainstream parties are on average more right-leaning by one unit this is predicted to influence
focal parties by 18.79 points and when partisans are on average one unit more right-leaning this
is predicted to shift the focal party by 20.06 points. In other words, parties that have more right
leaning partisans or mainstream parties, tend to be more right leaning as well, the inverse also
being true. Conversely, there is a negative relationship with median voters, meaning that when the
median voters in a country are on average one unit more right leaning, parties respond by being
more left leaning. This means that this average location of the median voter actual moves the
focal party in a negative direction, comparatively, suggesting that on the stationary level, parties
are connected to their rivals and partisans, but attempt to differentiate themselves from the median
position.
Although the time invariant mean position of partisan votes is predictive of focal party positions
on the left/right dimension , this only shows that the stationary positions of partisans influences
party behavior, and to the same degree as mainstream parties on these issues. The crucial compo-
nent for representation though, is whether parties present a dynamic relationship to voter positions
over time. This model clearly shows that parties are not responding to the changing positions of
voters, but rather mainstream parties on the left/right dimension, suggesting that pure collusion,
constant with cartel expectations, appears present using the more expansive and diverse ISSP data.
To test the robustness of these findings, model 2 uses data from the European Social Survey
(ESS), covering the years from 2002 - 2016 and presents surprisingly similar findings12. This
model compares 32 countries with 253 parties, which produces 874 observations.
Presented in table 3.2, the ESS data confirms that changes in the left/right positions of main-
stream parties leads to changes in the focal party. Showing a distinct failure to respond, when
partisan and median voters change their preferences, focal parties appear to be only responsive to
12 Full list of countries and years with LR question, party sympathy question type and manifesto data in Appendix
table A.2
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their rival competitors when it comes to dynamic issue position changes. This means that when it
comes to representation, there seems to be little responsive connection between voters and parties,
even on the economic dimension. Showing a remarkably similar magnitude compared to the ISSP
data, the ESS model shows that when mainstream parties shift one point13, focal parties respond
with a 9.08 point change. This shows that focal parties respond to change in mainstream parties
and ignore voter preference changes on the economic dimension, which is confirmed using both
data sources.
Consistent with Model 1, Model 2 shows average positions of partisans remains positively pre-
dictive of party behavior, while mean median voter positions continue to be negatively related.
This means that more right-leaning average partisan positions lead to focal parties that are more
right leaning, but that more right-leaning median voters leads to more left-leaning focal parties.
This shows that although the dynamic relationship between voters and parties is missing, the sta-
tionary positions of partisan voters contributes to the issue positions of focal parties. Interestingly,
the mean positions of mainstream parties in this model show a null relationship to predicting left-
/right issue positions of focal parties, whereas they were positively predictive of left/right issue
position in the previous model. Again, although these time-invariant variables are interesting in
understanding the starting positions of parties, the dynamic relationship between voters and parties
remain central to determining whether voter-party linkages remain intact.
The findings thus far indicate that parties do seem to be behaving in a manner consistent with
cartel theory expectations if pure collusion is present – the location of focal parties on the on
the economic dimension shows a dynamic relationship to mainstream rivals when they change
their positions over time, but not to these changing opinions of voters. Precisely as suggested by
the theory, parties appear to ignore the changing positions of voters, indicating that voter-party
linkages may be undermined, while presenting an apparent relationship to rival mainstream parties
in a manner indicative of inter-party collusion. Overall, the negative implications of the cartel party
theory and the features of pure collusion appear present across across both data sources regarding
13 These variables have also been rescaled to match the 5 levels in the ESS survey question, merely for simple
comparisons of magnitude.
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the left/right issue dimension. The next section will examine whether the mere passage of time
influences the proclivity to collude.
3.6.2 Evolution
Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) suggest that cartelization is a stage in the evolution of the party system,
the step that logically follows after the conditions that made catch-all politics possible deteriorate.
Implied by this logic is that the passage of time should increase the complexity of politics and thus
the proclivity to collude. To test this possibility, the previous models are altered by interacting
mainstream party change with a linear time variable. This allows us to determine whether time has
influenced inter-party collusion in a manner suggested by the theory.
Model 3, presented in table 3.3, takes the same ISSP data and applies the time interaction.
To make interpretation of this interaction a bit easier to understand, figure 3.1 shows that as time
passes, mainstream party changes on the left/right dimension decrease in their influence on focal
party behavior, though the negative relationship becomes statistically insignificant after 2001. This
negative trajectory is contrary to the evolutionary predictions within the theory, suggesting that
collusive behavior may be decreasing over time.
Conversely, the 4th model examines the ESS data using the same approach and finds that as
time passes there is the expected increase in focal party response to mainstream party position
changes, shown in figure 3.2. This model shows that from 2004, when the relationship becomes
significant, mainstream party change alters focal party position 7.14 points, in response to a 1 unit
shift. By 2016 though, this influence has increased by 5.18 points to 12.32. Contrary to model 3,
this suggests that the cartel party theory may be correct in its evolutionary suggestion, but what
can we make of these conflicting results?
The appeal of the ISSP data is that not only does it cover a more expansive time frame, com-
pared to the ESS, but it also does not exclusively examine European democracies, rather the coun-
tries that participate this survey are quite diverse14. This is one possible explanation for the dis-
14 Complete country list provided in the Appendix table A.1.
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Figure 3.1: Model 3 Marginal Effects
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Figure 3.2: Model 4 Marginal Effects
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Table 3.3: Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Influence of Time and Issue Spaces
(Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
ISSP: Time ESS: Time ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 18.44∗∗∗ 10.95 0.333∗
(4.625) (6.019) (0.134)
Mean Partisan 19.47∗∗∗ 23.48∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(3.235) (3.028) (0.0762)
Mean Median Voter -14.52∗∗∗ -20.32∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗
(4.126) (5.791) (0.117)
Mainstream Party Change 1335.8 -858.8 0.407∗∗∗
(1066.6) (1014.1) (0.0740)
Partisan Change 0.232 0.383 -0.0832
(2.362) (1.386) (0.0555)
Median Voter Change 1.749 -0.695 0.0597
(1.919) (1.934) (0.122)
Mainstream Party Change × Year -0.664 0.432
(0.533) (0.505)
Year -0.148 -0.225
(0.162) (0.139)
Previous Position (Lag) 0.227∗∗∗
(0.0479)
Constant 233.2 413.5 18.51∗
(327.9) (281.1) (8.055)
Country
Constant 2.98e-13 31.76∗∗∗ 5.69e-10∗∗∗
(.) (31.45) (2.72e-09)
Party
Constant 60.06∗∗ 162.9∗∗∗
(82.64) (53.43)
Residuals: Exponential
Constant 281.9∗∗∗ 187.8∗∗∗ 51.16∗∗∗
(83.66) (46.12) (8.136)
Observations 356 874 420
AIC 2858.1 6705.0 2631.2
BIC 2904.6 6767.0 2675.6
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
crepancy in the findings. If you take the ISSP data and run the same model, but narrow the country
selection to only Europe, to match the ESS, the results change. By removing countries such as
South Korea, Turkey and Japan, the marginal effects of mainstream party position change over
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Figure 3.3: Model 3 Marginal Effects Europe
time becomes statistically significant from 1995, but falls out of significance after 2007 (again re-
call that the ISSP only goes to 2010). The influence is slightly increasing, as shown in figure 3.3.
This suggests that the evolutionary basis of the theory may not be completely incorrect, rather the
ISSP may be looking at countries at different stages in their evolution. A more precise way to ex-
plore the evolutionary component to this theory should be considered, rather than merely assuming
that the passage of linear time will capture this concept. The conflicting findings, that are some-
what resolved by narrowing the case selection to Europe, which implies that the results may be
dependent on where a country is on their specific democratic evolutionary path. Further research
is required to confirm these possibilities, but these findings suggest that there might be more going
on that is not captured by the current approach.
The following section will test the final hypothesis of this chapter concerning issue space ma-
nipulation and whether parties appear to be striving for issue space consistency or convergence re-
garding the economic dimension. The expectation is that because the left/right dimension should be
durable and central to party foundations, coordination should be imperfect, leading to a marginally
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increasing issue space size.
3.6.3 Issue Space
Finally, the cartel party theory suggests that advanced cartelization should lead parties to cooper-
ate with their rivals to limit the issues presented to voters (Blyth and Katz 2005). At its highest
levels, inter-party collusion should strive for coordination that promotes issue space stability or
convergence on the topic. This means that the expectation is that parties participation in collusion
should strive for 1 to 1 or greater than 1 responses to changing issue positions of mainstream par-
ties. At the most advanced levels, parties should be particularly adept at coordinating the choice
set presented to voters because these issue manipulations are the mechanism through which parties
are able to force voter stability – if voters are unable to vote their preference on a topic, then they
will be forced to use another issue or lesser criterion to make their voting judgements. In this line
of logic, parties are able to break their representative responsiveness to voters because they are
able to jointly work together to leave issues unresolved or unrepresented by the major parties. In
order to force voter stability across elections parties must fail to respond to changing sentiments,
while offering either the same choices as before (1 to 1 stability) or fewer options (greater than 1
issue space convergence). Both of these conditions would be representative of advanced levels of
coordination and are not the expectation for the left/right issue dimension because, as discussed
previously, the economic dimension should be durable and parties should find it difficult to col-
lude on these topics. Therefore, parties are not expected to be very adept at colluding on these
issues and we do not expect to see perfect stability nor issue space convergence, but rather imper-
fect coordination. Although the previous models found that parties are showing purely collusive
tendencies, there should still be imperfect coordination on this dimension, particularly compared
to the multidimensional issues that are explored in the following chapter. This leads to the final
hypothesis and expectation that collusive parties should have a difficult time perfectly coordinat-
ing or converging on economic issues, but should be striving for this perfection as the system of
cartelization advances.
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Model 5 uses the ESS data to determine the degree to which parties respond to changes in
mainstream parties after controlling for the previous positions of the focal party with the inclusion
of a lag variable. As argued, the initial position of the focal party in relation to the mainstream
party variable changes whether or not shifts in the issue positions of mainstream parties leads to
issue space expansion or convergence. Therefore, these primary positions must be controlled for.
Once these previous positions are included as a lag, the dependent variable becomes change in
focal party position. Model 5 standardizes the dependent variable and all predictors to a 100 point
scale, making the 1 to 1 comparisons more straightforward.
The question we are interested in answering using this model though is how inter-party collu-
sion influences the issue space size when mainstream parties shift on the economic dimension and
focal parties change their positions. This model shows, again that when it comes to changes on the
economic dimension, focal parties change their positions in response to movements in the main-
stream parties and not in connection to changing voter sentiments. When mainstream parties shift
one point to the right, focal parties are predicted to change their position 0.41 points in response.
This shows that parties are colluding – they fail to respond to voters, while shifting their positions
in response to mainstream parties – however, their coordination to manipulate the issue space re-
mains imperfect. Recall, that for perfect coordination to be present, parties must be responding
to a 1 point shift with a 1 point shift, which is a difficult condition to achieve. Parties may be
imperfectly coordinating, leading to an increase in the issue space, but because this issue space
expansion is not connected to voters, rather is a function of parties failing to perfect their coordina-
tion, the expansion becomes meaningless for representation. Parties in this scenario are including
more issues in the issue space, which could lead to voter instability, thus parties are expected to
try to work toward stability or convergence as systems of cartelization mature15. This means that
as parties become more adept at coordination they should move to a 1 to 1 or greater than one
response to one another. In line with expectations, model 5 shows imperfect coordination on the
15 In running the same model and interacting time with mainstream party changes in the left/right dimension, it
appear as though parties are perfecting coordination as time moves forward. Figure A.2 in the Appendix presents the
marginal effects of time on the influence of mainstream party changes on these issues in focal party response. This
model suggests that as time moves forward, focal parties perfecting their coordination on the issue.
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economic issue dimension, while pure collusion remains strong when it comes to changes on these
issues. Parties appear to be manipulating the choice set presented to voters, and although the issue
space is expanding, this widening is meaningless because it is not connected to voters. Together
this model is able to confirm that focal parties are failing to respond to voters when they change on
the issues, while showing a responsive connection to rival mainstream parties, presenting evidence
that pure collusion, yet their coordination remains somewhat imperfect.
The remainder of the findings are not all that dissimilar to previous models, even with the
inclusion of the lag variable. Average locations of partisans influences changes in the positions of
focal parties, though the average location of mainstream parties becomes predictive of focal party
position change in this model. When a focal party has more right-leaning mainstream parties, focal
parties are expected to change their position 0.33 points to be more right leaning and if partisans
are more right leaning by one point, focal parties are expected to change 0.40 points to be more
right-leaning. This means that when the previous positions of the party are controlled away, the
mean positions of mainstream parties is now predictive of changes in the left/right issue positions
of focal parties. Again, this model finds that when median voters are more right-leaning, focal
parties are predicted to alter their positions from their previous stance to be more left-leaning by
0.37 points. This means that even when considering focal party change, focal party positions
changes on the left/right dimension are positively related to mainstream parties and partisans and
negatively related to median voters, again suggesting important connections between mainstream
party positions and focal parties, though there remains a connection to partisan voters on this level.
Together this model is able to test what contributes to focal party changes on the economic
dimension and whether this is related to the issues spaces that are presented to voters. We were
interested in determining in this model how advanced issue space coordination has become be-
tween colluding parties and found that although the issue space was marginally expanding, this
was unconnected to voters because parties were colluding, thus this expansion is meaningless and
is rather a feature of imperfect coordination.
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3.7 Conclusion
The left/right economic dimension is thought to form the basis for party competition in much of
the democratic world (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kitschelt 1994, Hellwig 2008, Rohrschneider and
Whitefield 2009). Although criticized for its simplicity, these issues remain centrally important
to political competition across modern democracies (Albright 2010, Kitschelt 1994, Marks et al.
2006, Kriesi et al. 2006). Because the economic dimension is foundational to party competition,
the preceding discussion argued that party positions on these issues should be durable in the face
of pressures to collude among parties. It was suggested that parties would have a difficult time
colluding on issue that were central to their party programmes, and thus it was expected that this
would be the strongest test for the negative implications of the cartel party theory.
The findings suggest that the left/right economic dimension may not be completely resistant
to collusion, showing that focal parties appear to be responding to mainstream party changes on
this dimension, while ignoring voters. This proclivity appears to be increasing over time, if you
consider ESS findings in model 4. Ultimately the issue spaces appear to be manipulated by these
focal parties and even though the spaces that divide these organizations is expanding, there is no
connection to voter preference changes, thus it is meaningless for representation.
This chapter began with the most basic level of exploration by inquiring: do parties respond
to partisan or median voter’s when they change positions on the economic dimension, or are focal
parties connected to rival mainstream parties on left/right issues? The first two models suggest
that the dynamic relationship often assumed between parties and voters is absent on the left/right
dimension, showing focal parties ignoring voter presences changes but responding to the changing
issue positions of mainstream rival parties, presenting the conditions consistent with pure collu-
sion. Though the stationary positions of partisans is positively related to focal party position, focal
parties remain unresponsive to these voters when they change their positions on the issue dimen-
sion and thus ultimately fail to dynamically represent their interests as they evolve.
The deterministic nature of the cartel party theory implies that party system evolution will in-
evitably present the complex conditions that make representation too difficult for parties, resulting
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in the adoption of cartelistic behaviors as a function of evolving incentive structures. The evo-
lutionary underpinnings of this theory make time a central mechanism through which this type
of change should present itself. Interacting time with changes of mainstream party position on
the economic dimension, the ISSP data, with a more diverse set of countries shows that as time
passes this behavior decreases, but the ESS, presents a marked increase in focal party response to
mainstream party change over time. These conflicting results seem to be related to the cases that
underpin the data sources, with the ESS examining more advanced democracies. When the ISSP
model is narrowed to only the European cases, the findings show a high magnitude response to
mainstream party change that is significant from 1994 to 2007, that is marginally increasing over
time. These models show that the evolutionary component of the theory may be present, but clearly
a more precise way to capture the evolution within the theory would be to explore how democratic
age influences the maturity of cartelistic behaviors, suggesting that further research is necessary.
Finally, this chapter takes the cartel party implications to their furtherest extent, arguing that in
order to force voter stability, parties must manipulate the issues presented to them. This leads to the
expectation that issue space manipulation should induce parties to strive for issue space stability
or convergence. Because the left/right dimension should be stable, it is was expected that parties
should find it difficult to collude with their rivals on these issues, thus the issue spaces presented
to voters were expected to not be perfected or converging, at least not yet. Using a lag to adjust
for previous positions, it is clear that focal parties are behaving purely collusively on these issues,
though their responses to mainstream rivals are yet to be perfected or converging.
Together these findings appear poor for democratic representation. The economic dimension
should be the most durable in the face of pressures to cartelize and collude, often forming the
central tenants of mainstream party programmes, thus parties should have the most to lose if these
policy positions are deviated from. To this point, the evidence seems to show that parties have
been increasingly responsive to mainstream parties to the detriment of both partisan and dealign-
ment representation. Considering whether or not parties remain connected to voters when they
change on the issues, it is clear that when change occurs in left/right positions, parties do not
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seem to respond to voters, but appear to be colluding with mainstream rival parties. Though issue
space coordination remains imperfect, these findings suggest that as democracies evolve even the
economic dimension may be able to achieve perfect coordination or produce issue convergence,
seriously undermining representation in advanced democracies. As has been alluded to previously,
the following chapter will examine multidimensional issues, with the expectation being that these
topics should induce even greater levels of collusion, compared to the left/right economic dimen-
sion.
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Chapter 4
Multidimensionality
Consistent with the negative implications of the cartel party theory, the previous chapter indicates
that parties may to be working together to limit competition and manipulate the issues presented to
voters, while failing to represent both partisan and median voters on economic issues. The previ-
ous chapter shows that parties seem to be participating in collusion, by simultaneously responding
to policy changes of other parties, while ignoring voter preference changes. Though political com-
petition is often simplified by conceptually limiting it to economic issues on the single left/right
issue dimension, political competition, particularly recently, has become increasingly more com-
plex, with the emergence of issues that do not map nicely on this single dimension (Albright 2010,
Kitschelt 1994, Marks et. al 2006). The emergence of these new multidimensional issues indicates
increasing complexity and has the potential for collusion, suggesting that the cartel party theory
may have important predications about party behavior and inter-party collusion regarding these
emerging issues.
There are three related questions that this chapter will address: If parties appear to be working
together to fix political competition on the economic dimension, might there be conditions under
which parties may be even more prone to collude? Do parties collude on these issues more over
time, or are collusive behaviors decreasing or staying the same? And finally, are parties also more
adept at coordinating to keep issue spaces consistent on multidimensional issues?
The cartel party theory argues that parties in evolving democracies will find their positions of
power challenged over time, leading them to behaviors that undermine representation and promote
inter-party collusion (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009, Blyth and Katz 2005). The fac-
tors that Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) suggest should lead to cartelization of party tactics imply
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that issues that fall outside of the traditional left/right economic dimension of politics should be
particularly challenging to political parties. Therefore, these difficulties should make dealing with
these new multidimensional issues prone to collusive behaviors. The chapter that follows begins
by exploring the literature on multidimensional issues, explaining their types and why these is-
sues are generally unable to be subsumed by the single issue dimension. Following this, the logic
undergirding the expectations that collusion should be greater on multidimensional issues will be
detailed and the specific hypotheses reviewed. Followed by the methods and data, and finally the
chapter concludes with a discussion of the the results and conclusions.
4.1 The Cartel Party Theory and Multidimensional Issues
The argument underlying the previous chapters, and more broadly in the cartel party theory, sug-
gests that representation is broken in modern democracies. Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) argue
that democratic competition and complicated political environments alter incentive structures for
parties, allowing them to see their common interest of staying in power. Once parties realize they
can work together to protect their positions, the authors suggest that parties will begin colluding,
ultimately undermining voter-party linkages. Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) argue parties begin to
collude in response to changing political environments and increasingly complicated systems that
challenge political stability. The rise of new multidimensional issues, the emergence of niche par-
ties in importance, and the rise of partisan dealignment, all suggest the changing environmental
conditions that could dramatically complicate political competition, altering party incentives and
behavior (Dalton 1984, Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012, Dalton and Weldon 2007, Dalton
and Wattenburg 2000, Hellwig 2008, Tavits 2008). Though these are all possible contributing fac-
tors that may lead to changes in party behaviors, the emergence of new and novel issues to the
political mainstream, could clearly make representation difficult suggesting a trigger for collusive
behavior in parties.
New issues, particularly those that do not map nicely into the left/right issue dimension, suggest
increased complexity that could complicate political competition for parties. When new issues
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arise, parties are often pressured to take positions on these topics, though it may be unclear where
their voters stand on the issue. Approximating voter opinions can be difficult, costly and time
consuming, and there is nothing to assure the politician or party that voter coalitions will present
a united view on the topic. This is precisely the logic that suggests multidimensional issues and
‘new politics’ should be places where parties will find the most risk and thus present the highest
probability of inducing collusive behavior (Kitschelt 1994, Marks, Hooghe, and Nelson 2006,
Wagner and Meyer 2016, Kriesi et al. 2006, Hellwig 2008). Because these issues, from their
onset, are cross-cutting to traditional political dynamics, parties should be better at coordinating
their responses to these issues and thus should present more stable issue space collusion, compared
to issues on the economic dimension because they have more practice in behaving this way, if
collusive coordination is present (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009).
4.1.1 Multidimensional Issues
The last chapter presents evidence that parties appear to be behave collusively in response to the
dynamic movements of other mainstream parties on the left/right economic continuum. Although
it is common to treat political competition as being captured by ideological placement across this
left/right divide, a growing body of literature argues that politics can no longer be exclusively
understood as unidimensional, rather new issues have emerged that do not fall neatly on the eco-
nomic left/right divide (Albright 2010, Kitschelt 1994, Marks et. al 2006). As was argued in the
previous chapter, issues on the economic dimension should be somewhat settled, because these
positions often form the basis of party creation, cleavage structure and party family (Lipset and
Rokkan 1967, Kitschelt 1994, Hellwig 2008, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009). These should
be durable positions because they are foundational to party ideology, often form the justifications
for party existence, and have been found to be quite stable (Dalton and McAllister 2015). Con-
versely, multidimensional issues, by definition do not divide the electorate into two groups, rather
they may undermine these traditionally stable voting coalitions, by pulling voters in different, mul-
tidimensional directions.
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To illustrate this complication, an example is in order. Consider traditionally left-leaning voters
who support greater government intervention in the economy. These voters would be fairly stable
voting coalitions for a left-leaning party that champions worker’s rights and government involve-
ment in economic issues. Though this group of left-leaning voters may agree on economic issues
more broadly, they may not uniformly agree on an issue such as immigration. Some of these voters
may support increased levels of immigration, arguing that multiculturalism is a benefit for soci-
ety. Conversely, others may feel the country has already allowed too many immigrants, and that
allowing more may limit the government’s ability to increase or maintain current social programs,
undermining the ability for the system to intervene to equalize economic experiences. It would be
much more simplistic for parties to find their voters if all issues were able to be divvied up between
the left/right, allowing for new issues to fall neatly into their current dichotomous understanding,
but as this example illustrates, taking a new position on immigration could alienate some voters
for a party on the left, at the risk of satisfying others. If immigration is a primary concern to those
alienated voters, they may vote switch, undermining the voter base that previously made their
voting decisions based on their left-leaning positions on economic intervention in the economy.
Clearly, issues that to not fit neatly into a left/right understanding of political competition, present
clear risks to political parties. That being said, parties should be acutely aware of the threats of
new multidimensional issues in undermining their voting coalitions, thus making collusion with
other parties an attractive alternative to representation.
There are a variety of issues that could be considered multidimensionally challenging. This
chapter will consider issues of equality, the environment, and EU integration. Though some have
argued that a new intersecting political dimension has emerged, described by a divide between lib-
ertarian/authoritarian or gal/tan issues (Kitschelt 1994, Marks et al. 2006), other issues also exist
that do not fall neatly into this distinction, such as EU integration. To begin, the following section
will discuss multidimensionality and the theoretical approaches to conceptualizing the new politi-
cal dimension. The paper will then turn to a discussion of how opinions on EU integration presents
even further complications, all of which will outline the justifications for believing that these issues
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should not only be more complicated but should induce greater collusion from parties. Following
this, the mechanisms within the cartel party theory will be reviewed and their connections and
expectations regarding multidimensional issues will be explored.
4.1.2 A New Political Dimension
To review, the standard conception of the single issue dimension divides individuals and parties
across a left and right, most often understood as being split between government involvement in
economic issues (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Kitschelt 1994, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012).
So central to the theory of political competition in modern democracies, positions on the economic
dimension are thought to be foundational to party origins. More recently though, some have chal-
lenged whether this single dimension maintains relevance within current political environments,
or whether politics has become more complicated (Albright 2010, Kitschelt 1994). Suggesting
that political competition has become multidimensional, these authors have argued that politics
has increased complexity and these developments present clear expectations using the cartel party
theory.
The following section will explore the theoretical interpretations of the new political dimension
proposed by Kitschelt (1994) and Marks et al. (2006). This theoretical approach from Kitschelt
(1994) and refined by Marks et al. (2006) suggest that issues of immigration, culture, and the en-
vironment capture some of the complicating and important issues that characterize political com-
petition in evolving democracies.
Kitschelt (1994), challenges the traditional single dimension interpretations of issue politics,
describing the left/right dimension as being divided between the two primary axiological princi-
ples: equality and liberty, capturing the divide between capitalism and communism. He proposes
that intersecting this division is a new dimension of contestation that is concerned with the prin-
ciple of fraternity. The challenge between conceptions of fraternity is the the degree to which
individuals are divided over communitarian principles of intervention in society, with those on
the libertarian side of the argument being opposed to governmental intervention, and those on the
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authoritarian side promoting greater government involvement in society. The central distinction
between the new dimension and the economic dimension is how one views governmental involve-
ment and whether that applies to economic issues or social issues, or both.
Social issues can clearly cover a wide variety of topics, though the research surrounding mul-
tidimensional issues generally agrees that the new dimension covers issues of the environment,
immigration and nationalism, or traditional values (Marks et al. 2006). Some nations may be more
concerned with issues of immigration, while others see greater divides on the role of cultural tra-
dition. Marks et al. (2006) divide these issues into two categories, which they call gal/tan. Gal
stands for green/alternative/libertarian issues, while tan refers to traditional/authority/nationalism
issues. The authors find that in Western nations, there is often a correlation between gal issues and
the economic left and tan issues and the economic right (Marks et al. 2006). Though in Central and
Eastern Europe, the division is not as clear, indicating that the single left/right dimension is clearly
not adequate to capture political competition in these cases. This gal/tan division nicely separates
multidimensional issues into two categories, which can be more or less prevalent depending on the
context.
Examining research on the new dimension, Wagner and Meyer (2016) explore both economic
issues, as the traditional issue dimension, but also create a composite of “cultural concerns of im-
migration, law and order and social liberalism,” capturing the intersecting new issue dimension
described by Kitschelt (Wagner and Meyer 2016, 3). Using this approach, the authors find that
party systems in Western Europe have shifted toward authoritarian approaches on the issue dimen-
sions and that niche parties have maintained their distinctiveness by becoming more extreme on
multidimensional issues. Although the authors find that parties have actually increased their em-
phasis on economic issues, the systemic shifts to the right on multidimensional issues, suggests
possible collusion, though the authors do not interpret it in this fashion.
To explain this assertion, the cartel party theory suggests that parties should work together to
limit competition and the issues presented to voters, in order to force voter stability (Blyth and
Katz 2005). Finding that parties are moving together to the right, suggests tht parties are working
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together, because if they move together in the same direction they may not be responding to vot-
ers, rather they may be presenting a unified position as a reflection of their cooperation with one
another. Therefore the issue space may not be reflective of voter preference, but rather collusion.
Without testing the responsiveness of parties to voters, as compared to responsiveness to other
party positions, this only remains a possibility. This chapter will consider these multidimensional
issues, with the expectation that parties should be strongly drawn toward collusion on these topics
and will disregard voter preference.
Though it is suggested that there is only a single new dimension, it is also possible that this
is also too simplistic. Though some have created composite scores for cultural issues (Wagner
and Meyer 2016), the following work will examine each issue independently. Though the purpose
of these composite scores is to distill down the issues into a clear dimension, like the economic
left/right, this assumes that there is only one new intersecting dimension dividing the economic
dimension. And although the Kitschelt (1994) and Marks et al. (2006) theoretical distinctions
are based off of a single additional dimension, whether that is divided between libertarian/author-
itarian or gal/tan issues, it seems possibly misguided to assume simplicity of a single intersecting
dimension, particularly coming from a literature that challenges the simplicity of the left/right.
Ultimately, an aggregate could be created, but only after it is clear that these cultural issues do
function on a single unified dimension. The following work will examine how parties change their
issue positions on the multidimensional issues of equality and the environment, though there is one
more complicating topic that should be examined – the EU.
4.1.3 European Union
Though not traditionally considered one of the issues of this new multidimensional issue dimen-
sion, because it does not fall neatly onto the libertarian/authoritarian or gal/tan interpretations of
the new dimension (Marks et al. 2006), political opinion on the EU should also be considered.
EU integration is a non-economic issue that has complicated politics and may undermine political
approaches that only examine the left/right issue dimension.
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The cartel party theory suggests that as politics increases complexity, parties should increase
their cartelistic behaviors and collude with each other to protect their positions of power (Katz and
Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009). Though the new issue dimension suggested by both Kitschelt
(1994) and Marks et al. (2006) captures the growing political tensions between cultural traditional-
ism, immigration and and the environment, the EU does not factor into this new dimension, though
it has arguably become quite salient in European politics. Increasing diversity in positions on EU
integration have been emerging the West and Central and Eastern Europe across the gal/tan and
left/right issue dimensions (Marks et. al 2006). This suggests that a new additional issue dimen-
sion may be further complicating politics in Europe, one that divides the already diverse opinions
of the electorate across positions on EU integration. This alludes to not only increased complexity
of politics in Europe specifically, but also presents a new arena for probable political collusion.
Growing EU skepticism, particularly since the financial crisis, has challenged political parties
to reevaluate their positions on the institution (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2015). Rohrschneider
and Whitefield (2015) find that mainstream parties adjust their positions on the EU minimally when
faced with growing skepticism from the electorate, indicating that their behavior is not connected
to voters, but is more concerned with maintaining consistent positions to protect their reputations.
An alternate interpretation of Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2015) findings suggest that par-
ties may not be concerned with maintaining their consistency to protect their reputations, but are
maintaining their consistency, in the face of voter opinion changes on the issue, as a reflection
of collusion. Consistent with cartel expectations, parties that are challenged by issues or changing
positions of the electorate will ignore voter positions on the topics and move inline with each other.
The works of Wagner and Meyer (2016) and Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016) are not alone in
finding increasing similarity in party policy positions over time (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009,
Camia and Caramani 2012), though none of these works test the cartel implications. This chapter
endeavors to do just this: test whether or not parties appear to be increasingly collusive, while
disregarding voter preferences, and whether this type of behavior is more prevalent on multidi-
mensional issues. It is expected that this collusion should be high for the duration of the data, but
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should somewhat stable, if not increasing on these complex issues. Furthermore, if focal parties
show collusive behaviors, it is expected that we will also find that these parties are more adept at
manipulating the issue space they ultimately present to voters. The following sections will outline
the distinct expectations that this discussion suggests.
4.2 Hypotheses
In total, the changing conditions suggested by the cartel party theory should lead parties to break
their responsiveness to voters, while simultaneously making focal parties more responsive to their
mainstream counterparts. These two conditions form the basis of the primary negative implications
of the cartel party theory, forming the foundation of the theory and ideal types presented in the
more in-depth theoretical discussion in chapter 2. The previous discussion of cartel expectations
and multidimensional issue spaces present the foundations for the following hypotheses that will be
tested in the remainder of the chapter. Though there are a variety of issues that could be considered
multidimensional, for the purposes of the following chapter the environment, equality, and EU
integration, which are examined individually to avoid the assumption that politics is comprised
of only two issue dimensions: a new political dimension and the left/right economic dimension.
Keeping these issues distinct will allow for each to be considered because it is possible that these
issues are not as unified as suggested by the theoretical interpretations presented by both Kitschelt
(1994) and Marks et al. (2006). Each of these issues can be outside of the single dimension
independently, and could possibly divide voter bases in different ways that should be considered
before aggregation.
As table 4.1 shows, looking at individual respondents from the ESS surveys from 2002 - 2016,
there are very low correlations between these issues and the economic dimension, indicating their
multidimensional nature. Support for caring for the environment only shows a 0.09 correlation
with left-leaning economic sentiments. While, supporting equality only correlates with a left-
leaning economic opinions weakly (0.14). Finally, there is nearly a perfect 0 correlation (-0.01)
between the economic dimension and opinions on EU integration. All of this shows that these
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issues do perform as expected in their multidimensional nature. In other words, there is little
relationship between left/right positions and respondent positions on these issues, showing the
complicated nature of navigating these topics for parties. Ultimately, this preliminary examination
of the issues shows that the complexity suggested by the theoretical discussion preceding this holds
true – these issues do not match up with the left/right issue dimension and thus should induce inter-
party collusion, as suggested by the cartel party theory.
Table 4.1: ESS Left/Right and Multidimensional Issues Correlations
Left Environment (+) Equality (+) EU Integration (+)
Left 1
Environment (+) 0.0935 1
Equality (+) 0.1429 0.3114 1
EU Integration (+) - 0.0105 0.309 0.569 1
As the previous chapter argues, the economic dimension is often thought of as the foundation
of political competition, which implies that party positions should be durable, because moderating
these positions could be costly, if these movements were not related to changing voter sentiments.
New political issues, particularly those that have multidimensional characteristics, in their very
nature, present political risks to parties. Because these issues do not correlate nicely with the
left/right economic dimension, they will invariably alienate some voters, thus taking a position
could run the risk of losing votes and ultimately some, if not all, of the party’s political power. To
avoid these pitfalls, parties have two choices if they are colluding: they can ignore the issue or they
can take the same position on the issue, so that voters, will not have a party for which they can vote
their preference (Blyth and Katz 2005), thus structuring the choices that are ultimately available
to the electorate (Leeper and Slothuus 2014). This should, as the theory goes, force voter stability,
because voter defection on this issue will not be an option.
As the previous chapter shows, parties are showing the signs of collusion, by responding to
changes in rival parties, and ignoring their voters on the economic dimension. The system carteliza-
tion has not yet matured to achieve issue space stability or convergence on the economic dimen-
sion, yet parties do appear to be coordinating their positions, albeit imperfectly. Together these
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findings show that there is collusion on economic issues, but what remains unresolved is whether
other issues confronting parties also show collusive tendencies. As the preceding discussion ar-
gues, multidimensional issues should be more difficult for parties to deal with, and thus should be
even more tempting for collusive behavior. Following the logic that because these issues do not
map well on the the foundational left/right issue dimension, then parties should be drawn toward
collusion on these issues. These expectations form the basis for the first hypothesis:
H1 - Greater Collusion: Focal parties will be more collusive on issues of the environ-
ment, equality, and EU integration, because of their multidimensional characteristics,
compared to issues on the left/right economic dimension.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) suggest that cartelization
is a natural process in the evolution of democracies. This means that parties should eventually
find themselves colluding as democracies mature. Considering multidimensional issues are new
to the political mainstream, parties should show high levels of collusion on these topics, because
presumably parties are not learning to collude on these issues, but rather have been likely colluding
on these topics since they became politically salient. In other words, the expectation is that when
we look at how the pass of time influences party responsiveness, we should see parties continuing
to collude, rather than becoming collusive, and because they are predicted to already be collusive
on these topics, we should see them only moderately increase these behaviors. This implies the
second hypothesis:
H2 - Time: Because multidimensional issues are newer than economic issues, it is
expected that focal parties should already be highly collusive on these topics, though
their collusive behavior should increase over time.
Although party response to one another, while disregarding voter preferences meets the charac-
teristic requirements for pure collusion to be present, there is also reason to believe that collusion
should be more advanced regarding multidimensional issues. To briefly review, parties are ex-
pected to begin to work together because they each wish to stay in power (Katz and Mair 1995,
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Katz and Mair 2009). This suggests that parties will be motivated to manipulate issue spaces pre-
sented to voters, because they are interested in forcing voter loyalty (Blyth and Katz 2005). There
are two ways that parties might manipulate the issue spaces presented to voters in the hopes of
increasing stability at the cost of representation – they can work toward issue space consistency or
they can converge on the issue, taking increasingly similar stances on the topic. These strategies
suggest that focal parties should have a 1 to 1 or greater than 1 response to policy position changes
of mainstream parties, if they are manipulating the issue space. Focal parties may struggle to
achieve these high levels of coordination though, leading to an intermediate position of imperfect
coordination, where focal parties are responsive to mainstream parties in a collusive manner, but
are unable to match their movements exactly or converge on the topic.
Within the outlined expectations, not only should multidimensional issues that fall outside of
the political mainstream of the single left/right dimensions induce higher levels of collusion, they
also should show more consistent issue space size or convergence on the issue as time passes. In
other words, parties should also be better at coordinating their collusion with each other because
presumably these issue should induce collusion from the point where they become salient enough
to challenge current party positions, thus parties should have more practice colluding on these top-
ics and should consequently have a closer to 1 to 1 response to changes or a greater than 1 response,
signaling the convergence of the issue area. Thus, compared to the left/right dimension, where par-
ties have theoretically become collusive, multidimensional issues should induce collusion from the
beginning. This implies that parties are not learning to collude on these issues, as they are on the
economic dimension, but rather they should be advanced in their ability to collude on these topics.
These expectations suggest the third hypothesis:
H3 - Issue Space: Because multidimensional issues have been challenging and attrac-
tive reasons to collude since their emergence into political competition, focal parties
should have more practice colluding and should have a closer to 1 response or greater
than one response, compared to coordination on the left/right dimension.
Together the three hypotheses allow for the questions guiding this chapter to be explored. Al-
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though the previous chapter shows apparent collusion on left/right economic issues, it is expected
that collusion should be even more pronounced on issues that fall outside of the single economic
dimension of political competition. Multidimensional issues challenge parties to take positions
on new and novel topics that may undermine their voting coalitions, and ultimately their role in
government. These issues pose the types of risks that Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) suggest lead
rationally behaving parties to move toward cartelistic behavior. As the previous discussion has
outlined, multidimensional issues should be even more tempting for parties to collude over, this
behavior should increase over time and parties should show even higher levels of issue space co-
ordination. The following section will detail the methods and data used to explore these issues,
followed by the results of the models.
4.3 Data
To begin, two data sources are used to approximate voter and party policy positions over time: the
European Social Survey (ESS) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The multidimen-
sional issues that will be the focus of this chapter are: equality, the environment and EU integration.
Although the last chapter examines an expanded time period using the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP) to track voter positions on the left/right dimension over time, there are consid-
erably less available data covering multidimensional issues, particularly from the ISSP. To examine
voter positions on these issues, this chapter uses individual level survey data from the ESS, which
covers 32 countries from 2002 - 201612. The previous chapter requires an extended time period to
test the economic dimension, considering the presumed durability of these issue positions, but for
multidimensional issues this is less of a concern. These issues are more recent in developments in
political competition and thus the ESS time period is adequate for these topics. To examine party
policy positions over time, I use the CMP data again.
Although it would be preferable to include the concept of immigration into this work, the
1 Unfortunately, not all of these countries cover the whole time period though.
2 Complete lists of countries are provided in Appendix tables A.3, A.4, A.5.
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combination of ESS and CMP data for questions of immigration produce very small and erratic
models (131 data points), and thus have been omitted. The CMP has only recently started to code
immigration issues, and thus the countries that are available are limited.
To capture voter positions on the environment, the ESS survey asks respondents to what degree
it was “like them” to support caring for the environment and nature. Respondents were able to
place themselves on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating that this was “like me”, and 6 being
“not like me34.” Again, although this question does not directly ask to what degree the respondent
supports the government intervention in a social issue such as the environment, this does approx-
imate where a voter might stand on issues of the environment and how important that might be
to them. And consequently, this should show whether partisan voters or median voters express
increasing support for caring for the environment over time and whether parties are responding in
a representative manner to these changes. To examine party policy position on this issue, the CMP
scores manifestos on the percentage of these documents that mentioned environmental protection
issues. In theory, a party that remains responsive to their voters should incorporate more references
to protecting the environment in there manifestos if their voters are becoming increasingly more
supportive of these issues, and conversely, if their voters change and parties ignore this change and
respond to other parties with their manifesto positions, then this should be indicative of collusion.
To capture the issue of equality the ESS survey asks respondents whether it is “like me” or
“not like me” to believe it is important for people to be treated equally. For party policy positions,
CMP coders look for sentences that reference positive opinions about equality, such as support for
ending discrimination or lowering class barriers. Again, although not perfect matches, the content
is similar and presumably, if voters are expressing and increased personal importance of equality
issues in their life, this should be reflected in party manifestos of representative parties.
The final multidimensional issue to be explored is EU integration. Though not traditionally
considered on the spectrum of new political issues, there is reason to believe that this issue should
have multidimensional characteristics and be difficult to navigate in a similar way to the environ-
3 Multiplied by -1 to reverse directionality to match CMP responses.
4 Exact question wording for all questions provided in Appendix.
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ment and equality. To look at public opinion on this issue, the ESS asks respondents whether they
feel as though EU integration has “gone too far” or “not far enough” with a continuum of responses
provided. For the party perspective, the CMP data codes manifestos for positive and negative men-
tions of the European Union, which have been combined to create a score for the number of positive
EU mentions minus the negative EU mentions. Together these survey questions and manifesto data
gauge the issues that are centrally important to capturing party responsiveness on issues that fall
outside of the traditional left/right economic dimension.
The data are organized by the party/year making the voter positions on the issues not at the
individual level, but at the party level. Since our interest is to determine how parties change their
policy positions over the years, the dependent variable becomes party policy position, and as in
previous chapters will be referred to as the focal party. To examine whether parties respond to
different voter groups, the ESS survey data is used to create issue positions for partisan and median
voters by party/year. Parties may be interested in satisfying either of these voter groups if they are
attempting to maximize vote shares or maintain their partisan voter base, and neither of these
representative strategies should be considered deficient. As discussed in the theoretical chapter,
differentiating between these voter groups allows for partisan and dealignment representation to
be possible (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). Therefore, all models examine the median voter
changes in position from year to year in each country, while also looking how the party’s partisans
have behaved. To examine the possibility of cartel behavior though, how parties within the system
behave needs to be measured.
Again, consistent with the previous chapter, mainstream rival parties will be used to examine
the possible presence of inter-party collusion. To determine mainstream vs. niche status, niche
parties are considered: special issue, regional-ethnic, green and nationalist, because of their non-
economic focuses (Wagner 2010). The CMP party family coding used to create a mainstream/niche
dummy variable. To capture these changes in mainstream party positions relative to the focal party,
just as in the previous chapter, an aggregate of all mainstream parties is created and averaged across
the number of mainstream parties in the system, to standardize the systems against one another.
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In other words, the issue positions of all of the mainstream parties in the system each year are
combined and then divided by the number of mainstream parties in the system, giving us an average
mainstream party issue position change by party/year. In order to avoid counting the focal party
in both the mainstream party issue position change and dependent variable, the focal party issue
position score is removed from the average if the focal party is coded as mainstream. Together
these variables produce the necessary components to be able to answer whether the parties remain
connected to voters or other mainstream parties over time.
4.4 Methods
This chapter will address three issues: whether parties are more collusive on multidimensional
issues, whether this changes over time, and to what degree parties are able to perfectly coordinate
their behavior to limit the issue spaces presented to their voters. The multidimensional issues of
the environment, equality, and EU integration each have three models. The first model endeavors
to answer the first question: do these issues produce higher levels of collusion, compared to the
economic dimension? The second model for each issue tests the next question: does this behavior
increase, decrease or is it stable over time? And the third model answers the question: are parties
able to coordinate with greater precision to limit the issue areas presented to their voters on these
multidimensional issues? Each of these models should test these questions, but their specifications
will discussed before results are presented.
Each of the three model types utilizes the same approach as in the previous chapter to deal
with the dependencies in longitudinal data by parsing out the variance we are interested in order
to answer how parties respond to changes in voter groups and other parties (Hoffman 2015). Each
model therefore includes a mean score for the partisan, median voter and mainstream parties for
each focal party. Using the mean scores for partisans, median voter and mainstream party scores,
party/year change scores are created, by removing the party specific mean scores of each of these
groups. This means that the variables created specifically target what we are interested in testing –
do parties respond to changes in voter positions on the issues or rival parties?
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As has been discussed in greater detail in the preceding chapters, the size of the issue space that
divides the focal party and their rival mainstream parties is directly related to the starting position
of the focal party in relation to the other mainstream parties. In other words, if mainstream parties
move to the right on an issue, and the focal party responds by moving with that party to the right,
unless the movement is exactly 1:1, then we must control for relative location of the focal party to
the mainstream party in order to be able to determine whether the resultant issue space is expanding
or contracting. Using the same example from the last chapter, if mainstream parties move one point
to the right, and the focal party moves 0.5 points to the right, then the resultant issue space depends
on the primary location of the focal party. If the party is to the left of the mainstream parties, then
the mainstream party will be moving a whole point away from the focal party, with the focal party
only able to cover 0.5 of the shift, meaning that the distance between them would be increasing.
Conversely, if the focal party is to the right of the mainstream party and the mainstream party
moves one point to the right, and the focal party only moves 0.5 in response, then the distance
between them is decreasing by 0.5, and thus contracting. The theoretical discussion details the
expectation that parties will attempt to perfect their coordination and attempt to mimic changes
exactly, with 1:1 response, or they will attempt to converge on the issue space. In order to adjust the
models to equalize starting points, a lag has been included in the issue space models5. This makes
the starting points zero, and only gauges how parties respond to mainstream and voters across
the issues. Although including a lag removes much of the interesting variance in the indicators
and diminishes the observations, it is able to achieve the centering that is required to answer this
question, converting the dependent variable into a focal party change measure. This means that the
variable becomes how the focal party changes their position in relationship to changes in the voter
groups and mainstream parties away from their mean positions.
The data are longitudinal and nested, as mentioned before, meaning that the first level of the
data is the year, making the party the second, which is nested in the third level, the country. This
means that there are distinct levels in the data that should be considered. To account for this
5 The lag is two years because the ESS data is collected every two years.
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hierarchical nature of the data, multilevel models are used, allowing for the intercepts for party and
country to vary randomly with unstructured covariances.
The models in this chapter continue to use multilevel linear models for the issues of equality
and EU integration, though the question that examines the environment uses a tobit linear model
(Long 1997, Twisk and Rijmen 2009) . The dependent variable for the environment, equality and
EU questions use the CMP data, which gives percentages of manifestos that reference these topics.
Because this makes the dependent variable in these models a proportion, the values possible are
strictly bounded between 0 and 100. Though in the previous chapter the dependent variable for
the left/right economic dimension was also technically bounded in a similar manner, but treated as
continuous because the data cluster around the center of the the distribution in a manner that makes
impossible values less likely to be estimated. By treating bounded variables as continuous, models
are able to utilize the more conservative restricted maximum likelihood estimation, and residuals
are able to be structured in a manner consistent with model fit and data structure. For these rea-
sons, the models for the EU and equality have also been treated as continuous, though technically
speaking they are not6. The tobit estimation is used for the environmental question because this
maximizes model fit, considering the bounded nature of the variable. Though tobit models were
tested on the right/left, EU and equality issues, they produced poor model fits, compared to the
straightforward linear approach, therefore the environmental question implements this technique,
and the other models do not.
Each issue presents three different models to answer the primary questions for this chapter: Do
multidimensional issues create greater collusive responses? Does this change over time? And how
does this behavior influence the size of the issue space presented to the electorate? Together the
following models will answer these questions in relation to the findings presented in the previous
chapter.
6The EU question is a combination of the negative and positive comments in the manifesto, which in pure form
create a -100 to 100 scale, but have been recalled to capture the percentage of positive comments about the EU minus
the negative remarks. The question on equality is from 0 to 100. Though tobit analysis was conducted on these models
as well, model fit was maximized using the linear mixed model with exponential residuals and restricted maximum
likelihood estimation.
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4.5 Results
The results will be discussed by issue, and within each of these sections the three models to test
the three central questions will be presented. Each issue will first examine the degree to which
parties appear to be colluding with one another, comparing these results to the previous findings
in the third chapter. The second model for each issue will explore the influence of time, with the
expectation being that these issues should show high levels of collusion for the duration of the data
that should be either stable or somewhat increasing. Finally, for each issue the question of issue
space manipulation will be explored.
4.5.1 The Environment
The first three models presented in table 4.2 consider each of the central questions regarding party
behavior on the issue of the environment. The first model shows that when it comes to changes
in policy positions on the environment, parties respond to the changing positions of mainstream
parties, with no relationship to median or partisan voters. The dependent variable and mainstream
party variables have not been rescaled and remain from 0 to 100%, representing how often the
environment is mentioned in party manifestos over the years, to simplify the interpretation, voter
preference positions have been rescaled to the same 100 point scale. This means that the coefficient
estimates presented suggest that as partisan or median voters move one point toward viewing the
environment as more important in their lives (out of 100), focal parties are predicted to show no
response. Whereas when the mainstream parties increase their emphasis on environmental issues
in their manifesto by one point, focal parties are predicted to respond by increasing their mani-
festo emphasis by 1.25 percentage points. Comparing this to the ESS model of party response in
previous chapter, this response is over 6 times higher (6.17 times), meaning that when mainstream
parties shift on the environment one point the focal party response is 6 times as high as their re-
sponse on economic issues. Consistent with the expectations, focal parties are showing purely
collusive tendencies on the issue of the environment, and these behaviors are much higher than on
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the economic dimension.
Table 4.2: Party Policy Position Environment
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
ESS: Response ESS: Time ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 1.415∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.352) (0.357)
Mean Partisan 0.595∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.0941) (0.0945) (0.128)
Mean Median Voter -0.243 -0.238 -0.516
(0.139) (0.139) (0.378)
Mainstream Party Change 1.249∗∗∗ -105.2 1.586∗∗∗
(0.141) (100.5) (0.205)
Partisan Voter Change 0.0374 0.0359 0.00943
(0.0313) (0.0312) (0.0460)
Median Voter Change -0.0630 -0.0609 0.0505
(0.0626) (0.0624) (0.102)
Mainstream Party Change× Year 0.0531
(0.0501)
Year -0.0479
(0.0310)
Previous Position (Lag) 0.330∗∗∗
(0.0865)
Constant -57.00∗∗ 39.82 -64.83∗∗
(19.12) (65.40) (21.58)
Country
Constant 1.674 1.719 0.0245
(1.863) (1.886) (1.012)
Party
Constant 28.55∗∗∗ 28.61∗∗∗ 14.49∗∗∗
(3.290) (3.297) (4.171)
Residual: Exponential
Constant 7.950∗∗∗ 7.894∗∗∗ 7.512∗∗∗
(0.465) (0.462) (0.929)
Observations 861 861 420
AIC 4626.0 4626.0 2271.6
BIC 4673.6 4683.1 2316.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The mean positions also show that party position is connected to partisans, but more so to main-
stream parties. This means that if the average mainstream party is one point more supportive of the
84
environment, then focal parties are predicted to be more supportive with by 1.42 points. Compared
to the positions of partisans on these issues, focal parties are only predicted to be 0.60 points more
supportive of environmental issues when partisans are a full point more supportive. This means
that the general location of mainstream parties hold a greater predictive influence on focal party po-
sitions on this issue, compared to the average position of partisans. This means that the stationary
positions of mainstream parties are much more predictive of focal party positions than partisans,
unlike the models presented in the previous chapter. This is consistent with the expectation that
multidimensional issues should induce collusion when they become salient, rather than eventually
becoming collusive topics, such as the economic dimension. The mean positions of mainstream
parties being highly predictive of party locations signals that focal parties have considered their
rivals in locating themselves on this issue on both dynamic and stationary levels. The overarching
takeaway from this model though is that when it comes to dynamic representative connections,
when mainstream parties change on the issue of the environment, focal parties respond, while ig-
noring voters on this issue, signaling purely collusive behaviors on this topic. This response is over
6 times as high as the focal party response on the left/right dimension, showing higher levels of
collusion on this multidimensional issue.
The second model in table 4.2 tests the influence of time on how responsive parties are to
changes in policy positions of the mainstream parties. By interacting time with this variable we are
able to gauge whether there has been increase, decrease or if this behavior has stayed somewhat
the same from 2002 - 2016. The model findings are nearly identical regarding mean partisan and
mean mainstream party influence, as compared to the previous model, but the interaction is best
described by examining the marginal effects of time on this variable and how that translates in to
party behavior, which is presented in figure 4.1. This shows that as time has passed there has been
an increase in focal party response to mainstream parties’ change in position on the environment. In
2002 focal parties are predicted to respond to a shift in the mainstream parties’ positions one unit,
with a 1.03 shift in the same direction, whereas in 2016 the same shift in the mainstream parties
is predicted to induce a 1.77 point shift in the focal party. These findings suggest that mainstream
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Figure 4.1: Model 2 Marginal Effects
parties have induced highly collusive responses from focal parties from the very beginning of
these surveys, and their responsiveness has significantly increased over time. Again consistent
with expectations, the mere passage of time has increase focal party responsiveness to mainstream
party changes, though these collusive responses have been high since the beginning of the surveys.
The third model in table 4.2 shows what happens to the issue space on environmental issues
when the party’s previous positions are considered using a two year lag. The inclusion of this lag
changes the meaning of the dependent variable to now capture focal party change in position from
their previous stance that has now been controlled for with the lag. In order to be able to easily
assess whether parties are able to achieve a 1 to 1 perfect coordination, the independent variables
remain rescaled to match the dependent variable.
Model 3 shows that when partisan and median voters increase the importance of the environ-
ment in their lives, focal parties are not predicted to respond. This null relationship shows that
when voters move on these issues, parties do not try to accommodate these shifts. Conversely,
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when mainstream parties become more supportive of environmental issues by one point, the focal
party is predicted to change their position 1.59 points in response. This means, after accounting
for the previous positions of the focal party in relation to the mainstream parties, that the issue
space is decreasing because the parties are becoming increasingly close together, thus even fewer
options are being presented to voters. This clearly shows that issue spaces are converging on this
topic, which falls inline with the previously discussed expectations that parties should either move
in tandem or toward each other to maintain or diminish the issue space size. Although parties may
find that voter coalitions are more stable if the issue space is the exact same size across election,
voter stability can also be forced if parties present a narrowing range of positions on the topic.
The mean positions of the mainstream parties and focal parties, even with the lag, continues
to predict the location of the focal party, though focal party changes in position are nearly 3 times
more connected to the mean mainstream parties than their partisan voters (2.83). In other words,
when the mainstream parties are more supportive of the environment on average, this should induce
the focal party change their positions to be more supportive of this issue, but if partisans are more
supportive, this should have a marginal influence on changes in the focal party’s position. Although
this is convoluted sounding, this means that focal parties are more responsive in changing their
positions in relation to the stationary and dynamic positions of mainstream parties, rather than
either voter group. Again, this measure shows that the issue space is narrow both when it comes to
change and average location of parties.
In total the first three models examining party responsiveness on the environment show that
focal parties only respond to changes in policy positions of rival parties, indicative of pure collu-
sion. Although the mean positions of partisans impact focal party positions, it is considerably less
influential compared to the mean mainstream party position. As time has passed, parties have also
shown greater collusion on environmental issues and an increasingly narrow issue space presented
to voters. In the end, all of this shows that pure collusion seems to be present, with parties showing
greater collusion on this issue, compared to the economic dimension, with increasing magnitude
over time, and a diminishing issue space presented to voters.
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4.5.2 Equality
The second issue that is considered looks at how parties have responded to voters and mainstream
parties on the multidimensional issue of equality of opportunity. Table 4.3 presents the findings for
these three models.
Model 4 examines the degree to which parties respond to changing policy positions of voters
and mainstream parties and shows that when partisans and median voters change their positions to
become more supportive of the importance of equality, focal parties are not predicted to respond,
yet when mainstream rivals change their positions, focal parties adapt to these changes. This
means that the dynamic relationship between parties and voters on the issue of equality appears
undermined. When mainstream parties change their positions one point on these issues, focal
parties are predicted to respond with a 0.81 point shift. Compared to the left/right dimension
models, this is over 3.5 times the response magnitude (3.52 times). For representation to be strong,
parties are expected to dynamically respond to voters as they evolve on the issues. This model
again confirms that when voters change, focal parties are failing to respond, yet when mainstream
rivals shift their positions on this issue, focal parties show a dynamic response, consistent with
purely collusive expectations.
The mean positions of partisan voters are again predictive of focal party position, but similarly
to the environment, the mean mainstream position is much more influential in predicting the focal
party position (over twice the influence). This means that although the mean position of the parti-
san voter influences the position of the party, this is comparatively less influential, yet again, than
changes in mainstream parties’ positions and the mean position of the mainstream parties. The
mean median voter, similar to the economic dimension models, presents a negative relationship to
focal party position on this issue, again signaling that focal parties tend to avoid strictly moderate
positions on this topic. Again, these stationary positions confirm that connections between rival
parties is much more influential in determining focal party positions on issues of the environment
and equality, rather than voter preferences. This confirms the expectations that these multidimen-
sional issues produce higher levels of collusion and show that there are weak connections between
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Table 4.3: Party Policy Position Equality
(Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
ESS: Response ESS: Time ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 1.019∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ -2.783∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.210) (0.574)
Mean Partisan 0.441∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.0529) (0.0527) (0.0604)
Mean Median Voter -0.373∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗ -0.149
(0.114) (0.115) (0.351)
Mainstream Party Change 0.806∗∗∗ 36.74 0.900∗∗∗
(0.114) (55.85) (0.145)
Partisan Change 0.0241 0.0190 0.0103
(0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0372)
Median Voter Change 0.0172 0.0189 0.0144
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0321)
Mainstream Party Change × Year -0.0179
(0.0278)
Year 0.234
(0.250)
Previous Position (Lag) -0.0149
(0.0437)
Constant -52.78∗∗∗ -517.6 151.4∗∗∗
(11.67) (501.8) (32.95)
Country
Constant 1.320 1.464 44.39∗∗∗
(0.928) (1.000) (20.50)
Party
Constant 0.000000108∗∗∗ 0.00000221∗∗∗ 6.44e-15
(0.000000314) (0.00000632) (.)
Residual: Exponential
Constant 17.30∗∗∗ 17.08∗∗∗ 8.210∗∗∗
(1.549) (1.483) (0.910)
Observations 861 861 420
AIC 4294.1 4304.0 2033.0
BIC 4346.4 4365.9 2077.5
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
focal party positions and voter preferences.
Model 5 considers the influence of time on how parties respond to changing issue positions on
equality and shows that parties have presented fairly stable levels of collusion over time, though
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Figure 4.2: Model 5 Marginal Effects
decreasing slightly, presented visually in the marginal effects plot in figure 4.2. In 2002 parties
are expected to respond to a one point shift in mainstream parties by shifting 0.86 points. In 2016
they are expected to shift 0.61 points. Though this is somewhat of a decrease over time, it is fairly
marginal, with parties still showing a high level of collusion over time. As was expected, there
is a high level of collusive responses presented by focal parties on this issue, presumably because
it is multidimensional. It fits within the discussed expectations that this level of collusion should
be somewhat stable, since this issue has induced highly collusive responses for the entirety of the
surveys.
Model 6 adjusts the first model to control for the previous position of the party to evaluate
whether the issue space is increasing or decreasing when parties exhibit collusive responses. This
model shows that focal parties appear to be quite adept at maintaining a similar issue space, which
speaks to the reason why over time we see a fairly stable level of responsiveness in model 5. When
mainstream parties move one point toward supporting more equality, focal parties are expected to
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move 0.90 points in the same direction. This is close a perfect 1 to 1 response, but because it is
not, there is a marginal increase in the issue space size. As the previous model shows, parties are
responsive to one another in similar ways as time passes. The issue space model helps to explain
this consistency, since it shows that parties are approaching 1:1 responses, thus ensuring issue
space stability, therefore there is little reason to increase collusive responses.
Together these findings show similar trends in party behaviors on the issue of equality com-
pared to the environment. There is considerably higher levels of collusion on the issue of equality
and the environment, compared to the economic dimension, and parties are much closer to perfect
coordination on the issue of equality and converging on the issue of the environment. Time shows
a somewhat stable level of responsiveness on the issue of equality, which is explained by the high
level of coordination, which is able to maintain a fairly stable issue space size, thus removing any
reason to increase inter-party responsiveness.
4.5.3 EU Integration
The final issue to consider is EU integration, which has become considerably more salient since
the financial crisis, undermining traditional cleavage structures and further complicating political
competition. The last three models examine how parties behave regarding EU integration and are
presented in table 4.4.
Model 7 shows how parties respond to issue position changes of voters and mainstream parties,
again while controlling for the mean positions of these groups to target the issue position change
that we are interested in examining. Model 7 shows that when mainstream parties change their
position one point, focal parties are predicted to respond to this change by moving 0.57 points.
This is a nearly 2.5 times greater of a response compared to the economic dimension (2.48 times).
Unlike the other models presented, parties do seem to be responding to partisan voters, but mini-
mally in comparison to responsiveness to mainstream rivals. When partisan voters shift one point,
the focal party response is predicted to be 0.04 points. This means that, unlike all of the other
issues considered in this and the previous chapter, parties do seem to be connected slightly to voter
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Table 4.4: Party Policy Position EU Integration
(Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9)
ESS: Response ESS: Time ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 0.671∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.457
(0.198) (0.199) (0.237)
Mean Partisan 0.202∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0286)
Mean Median Voter -0.177∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.136∗
(0.0362) (0.0363) (0.0541)
Mainstream Party Change 0.576∗∗∗ -56.13 0.565∗
(0.175) (123.3) (0.282)
Partisan Change 0.0384∗ 0.0378∗ 0.0212
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0381)
Median Voter Change 0.0124 0.00392 0.0619
(0.0357) (0.0365) (0.0629)
Mainstream Party Change × Year 0.0282
(0.0614)
Year -0.0349
(0.0347)
Previous Postion (Lag) 0.482∗∗∗
(0.0683)
Constant -34.40∗∗∗ 34.63 -23.85
(10.16) (69.40) (12.29)
Country
Constant 9.55e-09 3.73e-08∗ 0.178
(0.00000792) (0.000000296) (0.313)
Party
Constant 2.170 2.128 9.82e-17∗∗∗
(1.000) (1.017) (3.38e-16)
Residual: Exponential
Constant 5.905∗∗∗ 5.966∗∗∗ 7.494∗∗∗
(1.001) (1.036) (0.653)
Observations 584 584 307
AIC 2764.6 2775.9 1535.0
BIC 2812.7 2832.7 1579.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
position changes and although representation is weak on this issue, it is not absent, as in the other
models.
Additionally, all of the mean positions contribute to the position of the focal party, though the
92
relative position of the mainstream parties has the greatest influence. If the mean mainstream par-
ties in the system are one point less supportive of EU integration, the focal party is predicted to
be 0.68 points less supportive as well. Comparatively, the mean partisan being less supportive of
EU integration only shifts the focal party 0.20 points. Mean median voters are also predictive of
party position, though the influence is again negative. So, if median voters are less supportive of
EU integration, then the focal party is predicted to be more slightly more supportive of integra-
tion by 0.18 points. In total, although focal parties do respond to changes of mean positions of
partisans, this response is considerably lower than their connections to the stationary and dynamic
positions of mainstream parties. The EU presents the first case thus far that supports only partial
collusion/representation, with some hints that representation may not remain intact, even if the
magnitude of influence is low.
Model 8 examines how time changes party behaviors, with the expectation that collusive ten-
dencies should increase over time, or be stable and high for the duration of the data. As figure 4.3
shows, the response to changes in mainstream party positions only becomes statistically significant
in 2006, where a one point shift induces a 0.49 movement in the focal party. By 2012 though, this
response has increased to 0.67. Crucially, the results past 2014 are inconclusive though, showing
the trend upward, but are indistinguishable from zero. There are a few possible reasons for this.
First, there are fewer data points from the ESS survey in 2014 and 2016, allowing for fewer parties
to be examined, which could be making these results unreliable. Alternatively, the EU has become
a much more salient issue since the financial crisis in 2008, meaning that parties may be becom-
ing more responsive to their partisans, as the significant partisan response is found this model and
model 7. At this time, it is unclear what might be driving these changes, but this model shows that
there is evidence for inter-party coordination from 2006 to 2012, though possible representation in
more recent years. Further exploration into this issue is required to determine whether this presents
an opening for continued representation.
Finally, model 9 examines how focal party behavior changes the issue spaces presented to
voters, using a lag to equalize focal party starting points. Similar to model 7, when mainstream
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Figure 4.3: Model 8 Marginal Effects
parties change their positions on EU integration one point, the focal party is predicted to respond
to these changes by changing their position 0.57 points in the same direction. This would lead to
a marginal increase in the size of the issue space that is presented to the electorate, but remains a
higher level of coordination than the left/right dimension in the previous chapter.
All in all, the issue of EU integration presents the first case for partial collusion/representa-
tion, with parties responding to changes in partisan voter positions, rather than ignoring voters
completely. These findings should be interpreted with some caution though because focal par-
ties still respond to changes in mainstream parties with over 14 times the magnitude, compared
to changes in partisan voter positions. Additionally, the mean positions of mainstream parties
are still 3 times more predictive of focal party position on EU integration, compared to the mean
influence of partisans. Though the model examining time finds inconclusive results for whether
parties are responding to changes in mainstream parties from 2014 forward, it may be too early yet
to interpret these inconsistencies as evidence of growing representation on this single issue. The
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EU integration question does show greater responsiveness to mainstream parties compared to the
economic dimension, confirming the first hypothesis. Regarding the expectation that time should
increase collusive behavior, it is unclear what is happening in more recent years on this issue. And
finally, the issue space shows higher levels of issue space coordination, compared to the economic
left/right.
4.6 Conclusion
Together these findings are fairly consistent with the expectations guiding the chapter. Issues of the
environment and equality show purely collusive tendencies, with parties failing to respond to voters
and moving with their mainstream counterparts. Though the response is minimal, the issue of EU
integration shows a small level of partisan responsiveness to changes in these voter’s preferences.
Overall, the findings are alarming for representation and suggest that cartel expectations may be
present as suggested by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009).
This chapter’s findings show that focal parties respond with a greater magnitude to changes
in mainstream parties on multidimensional issues, compared to the economic dimension. This is
consistent with the assumption that these issues have been highly attractive to parties to collude
over since they entered the political mainstream. The models testing this suggestion also provide
evidence that these have been highly collusive topics for quite some time. The environment shows
an increased prevalence of parties to collude on this issue from 2002 to 2016, while the issue
of equality has produced a stable high level of collusion, yet the findings for the issue of EU
integration show a trend in increased collusive responses, though the findings were inconclusive
for more recent years.
Issue spaces were expanding in all cases except for the environment, which shows issue space
convergence because of the very high levels of inter-party coordination on this topic. The issue
space is only marginally increasing on the issue of equality, with 1 : 0.9 level of coordination.
Finally, the issue space is marginally expanding on the issue of EU integration, but there remain
questions about whether parties may be becoming representative on these issues more recently, or
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whether the insignificant findings for more recent collusion (from 2014 - 2016) are just a reflection
of limited data.
In the end, there is evidence that parties have become unresponsive to voters and appear to
be working together to manipulate the issue spaces presented to voters, particularly on issues of
the environment and equality. If parties are colluding with one another to protect their positions of
power, then representation has been clearly undermined. The implications of the cartel party theory
suggest that parties should fail to represent voters and work together to fix the policies presented
to their constituencies (Blyth and Katz 2005). The evidence provided suggests that parties may
be doing just this, with evidence for pure collusion being found across the left/right economic
dimension, the environment, and issues of equality. Though partial collusion/representation was
found for EU integration, the degree to which parties are still connected to changing partisan
sentiment is minimal in comparison to the relationship they share with mainstream parties on the
issue. Together these findings are alarming for representation, yet fit within the implications of the
cartel party theory. Although multidimensional issues and the left/right economic dimension seem
to have relatively high levels of coordination and collusion present, it is possible that party type
may change collusive behavior, which will be the focus of the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Niche Parties
To this point, the preceding chapters have shown that parties appear to be colluding with one an-
other and restricting the issue spaces presented to voters on a variety of issues. Party behaviors,
thus far, have met the characteristic requirements for collusion to be present, as argued in the the-
oretical chapter – not only do they appear responsive to other mainstream parties, but they are also
ignoring voter preferences on the economic dimension and multidimensional issues. Furthermore,
the state of cartelization appears quite progressed, as focal party behavior also suggests that the
issue spaces presented to voters are being manipulated. Together, these findings show that parties
are not only failing to respond to voter sentiments, while coordinating with other parties, but the
issues that are ultimately allowed into the political mainstream have been manipulated by party
behavior in a manner that further undermines representation.
Thus, the prognosis seems grim, voter-party linkages appear broken in a manner consistent with
the predications of the cartel party theory, but might there be some parties that remain responsive
to voters? Could niche parties, as compared to mainstream parties, continue to keep their represen-
tative connections in the face of systemic cartelization? As was discussed in the second chapter,
there is reason to believe, within the relevant literature on representation, that party type matters
and that niche parties behave differently compared to their mainstream counterparts (Adams et
al. 2006, Ezrow et al. 2010). Thus a final question presents itself: do niche parties may remain
connected to voters in the face of broadly collusive behaviors of mainstream parties?
The niche party literature suggests that party type may influence proclivities to collude, with
mainstream parties, who generally find themselves with broad bases of support, being drawn to-
ward this behavior (Ezrow et al. 2010). Conversely niche parties, who cater to more specific
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issues, ones that often reside on the fringes of political discussion, should resist these temptations
(Adams et al 2006). Hoping to draw voters away from the broad issue positions taken by larger
parties, niche parties find their bases for political support in focusing on issues outside of the po-
litical mainstream, finding their bases of support on distinctly non-economic issues (Wagner 2010,
Wagner and Meyer 2016). This means that these parties both emphasize specific fringe topics and
consequently have narrow voter bases, suggesting that these parties may have different incentive
structures compared to mainstream parties. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the niche
party literature suggests that these parties should be responsive to their partisan voters and should
resist temptations to collude, particularly on issues that are foundational to their party programmes
(Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow et al. 2010). The literature suggests that niche focal parties should
resist collusion on specific issues, but do these parties remain responsive to their voters on the
left/right economic dimension? Do other multidimensional issues create incentives to collude?
The current chapter will precede as follows. First, the relevant literature will be discussed, out-
lining the competing expectations. Second, the hypotheses will be introduced that have guided the
model and data selection. Third, the data and methods will be reviewed, followed by the discus-
sion of the findings. Together this will show the competing expectations presented by the literature
on niche parties and the cartel party theory. On one side, the literature on niche parties argues
that these groups should be more connected to partisan voters and avoid collusion on foundational
issues (Ezrow et al. 2010, Adams et al. 2006, Meguid 2005) . While conversely, the cartel party
theory suggests that party type is not necessarily relevant in understanding propensity to collude
(Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009, Blyth and Katz 2005). Overall, this chapter endeavors
to address whether niche party status influences responsiveness of focal parties to mainstream rivals
in the system, whether this influences the size of the issue space presented to voters, and finally,
if issues that are foundational to the creation of the party dissuade these niche parties away from
collusive tendencies. This chapter will examine these issues across both the left/right economic
dimension and the multidimensional issues of equality, the environment, and EU integration.
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5.1 Niche Parties and The Cartel Party Theory
Does party type matter when it comes to collusive behaviors in parties? The previous chapters have
argued that it does by focusing on mainstream party positions as predictive variables. Thus far, the
preceding chapters have used mainstream parties’ policy positions to test whether these positions
influence focal party behavior, without distinguishing between focal party types. This means that
up until this point, the data show that focal parties (both mainstream and niche) respond to changes
in the left/right issue dimension and multidimensional issues of mainstream rivals. It was suggested
in the second chapter that niche parties are expected to behave differently than mainstream parties,
with niche parties having greater incentives to stay connected to voters in the face of collusion, a
point that will be argued in greater detail below. And although mainstream parties in a system were
targeted as a predictor, showing that undifferentiated focal parties do appear to be colluding with
mainstream rivals, what these previous models are unable to tell us is whether the type of focal
party changes these behaviors. The chapter that follows does just this, partitioning out the types
of focal party to test whether mainstream party positions on the left/right economic dimension and
multidimensional issues produces collusive responses that changes across party types.
The previous chapters have indicated that cartel behavior may be present as envisaged by Katz
and Mair (1995, 2009). Parties seem to meet the requisite conditions of collusion as outlined
in the theoretical chapter – they are both responding to each other while ignoring voter preference
changes. Additionally, parties seem to be manipulating the issue spaces presented to voters, further
undermining representation in modern democracies. What has yet to be tested is whether the
previous models were hiding intact voter-party linkages by failing to distinguish between party
types. Might niche parties be representative but this relationship is hidden by the more powerful
overriding tendencies of the mainstream parties in their collusion? There are two different sets of
expectations, guided by the literature. On one hand, the cartel party theory does not give us any
guidance on party type, but the systemic and evolutionary arguments put forth by Katz and Mair
suggest that all parties should be drawn toward collusion. Conversely, the niche party literature
seems to suggest that niche parties should hold durable positions on issues, particularly those that
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are foundational to their political agendas. In reviewing these ideas it will become clear that there
are several expectations about the influence of focal party type on collusive behaviors, even if they
may be contradictory.
5.1.1 Cartel Party Theory
The cartel party theory has guided this research, therefore it is appropriate to return to the theory
to consider whether it has anything to say about the possible influence of niche party status on
collusive behavior. Though Katz and Mair (1995), and more recent formulations of the cartel party
theory, do not address the issue of party type, this omission seems in itself instructive (Katz and
Mair 2009, Blyth and Katz 2005).
The authors do not address differences in party type, it seems, because there is little reason
to believe that party type would be able to alter the behaviors of parties within a system that
has fully cartelized. Recall that the theory hinges on the evolutionary process through which
the incentive structures change in such a fundamental way that any party would presumably be
unable to ignore without losing their role in government. Because party competition and issue
dynamics have changed so fundamentally, within the theory, parties find themselves unable to
remain responsive to changing voter sentiments without the risk of losing office (Katz and Mair
2009). As the theoretical chapter details parties become challenged by evolving political dynamics
leading voters to become more erratic, campaigns become more complicated, while parties are
unable to use catch-all techniques of increasing social spending to satisfy their voter bases (Katz
and Mair 2009). If individual politicians are rational actors, who’s interests are best satisfied by
their incorporation in the party, then the individual’s success relies on the success of the party (Katz
and Mair 2009, 756). This means that individuals, will rationally alter party behavior in a manner
that promotes the survival of the party, thus if political dynamics shift fundamentally and parties
can no longer rely on traditional means to satisfy voters, then parties will adopt new strategies to
maintain their positions of power (Katz and Mair 2009, Blyth and Katz 2005). Thus a feature of
these changing dynamics becomes inter-party collusion. In this argument the system changes at
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its core and this process is out of the control of individual parties. The individuals who make up
the party are interested in keeping their power and thusly the power of the party intact, this means
that niche parties should feel the same pressures and be faced with the same risks if they begin
to alienate any voters by responding to the changing issue positions of a diversifying population
of voters. Therefore, it becomes the most risk adverse option, in this theory, to ignore voters and
work with other parties to maintain their voting coalitions by limiting competition and ultimately
the issues presented to voters.
The cartel party theory seems to indicate that party type should not matter when it comes to
proclivity to collude because these changes are systemic and evolutionary, making them difficult,
if not impossible to counteract, while influencing all players in the system similarly. But might
niche parties have very different incentive structures not considered by Katz and Mair that reduces
niche party proclivity to collude?
5.1.2 Niche Party Literature
The niche party literature suggests two ways in which party type may influence party behaviors. On
one hand, the literature finds that mainstream parties tend to satisfy median or independent voters,
while niche parties remain representatively connected to their partisans (Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow
et al. 2010). Additionally, the literature suggests that parties may be punished if they deviate from
their previous positions, particularly on topics foundational to their party platforms (Adams et al.
2006).
Niche parties seem more responsive to their partisan constituents, while mainstream parties
have been found to make adjustments toward the independent or median voter (Ezrow et al. 2010).
Furthermore, niche parties are not often swayed by general public opinion, keeping connections
to their partisan voters (Adams et al. 2006). This suggests that these parties should be responsive
and connected to their partisans, implying that changes in mainstream parties should have little or
no influence on niche party behavior. Though niche parties should be interested in satisfying these
partisan voters more generally, the literature also suggests that they should stay committed to their
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positions that formed the foundation of their party’s emergence into political relevance.
Niche parties generally advocate for issues that reside outside of political mainstream, cham-
pioning topics that mainstream parties may be apt to ignore (Wagner 2010). Taking firm positions
on niche topics may force mainstream organizations to address the issues themselves, or they may
choose to let the niche parties continue their issue ownership (Meguid 2005, Budge 2015). There-
fore niche parties are wedded to specific foundational issues – usually cultural issues like migration
and European integration – that become central to their differentiation from mainstream rivals. The
foundational nature of these issues makes them hard to deviate from because by moving away from
them or altering their positions, there becomes a weak justification for the niche party to exist. For
example, an ecology party such as the Greens in Great Britain would most likely lose many of
their voters if they began deemphasizing or changing their positions on environmental issues. This
means that niche parties are incentivized to maintain their focus on their specific topics because
they may be punished for moderating their stances (Kitschelt 1989, Adams et al. 2006), or lose
their justification for functioning as a different political party. Additionally, if a niche party has
complete issue ownership of a topic, there becomes no incentive, even in a fully cartelized system,
to change a position on the issue. This suggests that although the systemic conditions may have
changed, as argued by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009), this may not be enough to make niche parties
participate in collusion on all issues. Alluding to this possibility, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, recent research has shown that although much of Western Europe’s mainstream parties
have shifted to the right ideologically, niche parties remain unresponsive to these systemic shifts
(Wagner and Meyer 2016). This research suggests that niche parties may be resisting the tempta-
tion to collude on the left/right dimension in the face of mainstream coordination to move toward
the right.
To review, the preceding discussion has highlighted the two opposing expectations regarding
how party type may influence inter-party collusion. The cartel party theory predicts that niche
focal parties and mainstream focal parties should show the same responsiveness to mainstream
parties’ positions and issue space manipulation over time. Conversely, the niche party literature
102
suggests that niche focal parties should not respond to mainstream parties’ positions on the issues,
attempting to stay connected to their partisan voters. Even if niche focal parties are presenting
collusive tendencies on general topics, these parties, at the very least, should not collude on topics
that are foundational to their party platforms. The following section will present the 3 hypotheses
that this discussion outlines.
5.2 Hypotheses
Although the preceding chapters indicate that parties may be working together to manipulate the
issues presented to voters, while failing to represent their interests on a variety of topics, there
remains the possibility that niche focal parties may continue to be representative of the interests of
voters because previous research suggests that these voter-party linkages may be more durable than
the linkages between mainstream parties and their voters. Though the cartel party theory suggests
that party type should have little bearing on party behavior – because the systemic alterations to the
incentive structure make voter responsiveness too risky – it remains a possibility that niche parties
may be comparatively less collusive.
The cartel party theory does not address party type and whether this should influence collusive
tenancies, while the niche party literature argues that party type plays a central role in under-
standing party behavior, implying that niche parties should resist collusion, particularly on issues
that are foundational to their party platforms. Together these literatures suggests three opposing
hypotheses:
H1a - Niche Responsiveness: Because niche focal parties have narrow constituen-
cies, they will less responsive to mainstream party movement on the issues because
collusion could be so costly that it outweighs the risks.
H1b - Cartel Responsiveness: Niche focal parties and mainstream focal parties should
be equally as responsive to shifts in mainstream parties’ positions over time, while ig-
noring voters, indicating collusion.
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H2a - Niche Issue Space: Niche parties should be less apt to manipulate the issue
spaces presented to voters because their responsiveness to their partisan voters is cen-
tral to maintaining their voter loyalty.
H2b - Cartel Issue Space: Because niche focal parties are subject to the same sys-
temic evolution that alters the incentive structures, niche focal parties will also actively
work to manipulate the issue spaces presented to voters.
H3a - Niche Foundational Issue: Even if niche focal parties are drawn to collude
on topics that are potentially less important to their voters, they will be particularly
resistant to collusion on issues that are foundational to their party platforms.
H3b - Cartel Foundational Issue: On issues that are foundational to niche focal
parties, there will be no difference in their proclivity to collude, making their behavior
not meaningfully different from their mainstream rivals.
Together these opposing hypotheses have guided the following research. The next section will
briefly overview the data and methods used, which will be followed by a discussion of the models’
results.
5.3 Data
There are three sources of data used in this chapter. First, to capture the positions of voters across
time, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)1 data are used, allowing for a greater pe-
riod of time to be examined. In order to incorporate more recent data and multidimensional issues,
the European Social Survey (ESS) is also used, covering 32 countries from 2002 - 2016. To capture
the positions of parties over the years on the left/right economic dimension and multidimensional
issues, the Manifesto Project data are again utilized. Together these sources capture the relevant
data for examining party responsiveness and voter issue positions over time.
1 As discussed in chapter 3, the British survey information is actually the from the British Social Attitudes Survey.
See chapter 3 for detailed explanation.
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To explore the left/right issue dimension, the ISSP and ESS ask respondents how much they
believe the government should be involved in reducing differences in incomes2. The ISSP data is
only used to examine left/right issues, because the survey has not consistently asked questions that
pertain to multidimensional topics until more recently. To capture these issues, the ESS survey is
used.
The ESS allows for the issues of the environment, equality and EU integration to be examined3.
The previous chapter argued that multidimensional issues should be more difficult for parties to
respond to, making them prone to collusive behaviors. To capture the environment, respondents
were asked to what degree it describes them to be caring for the environment. To examine public
sentiment regarding issues of equality and how this may change over time, the ESS asked respon-
dents how important it was to the respondent for people to be treated equally and to have equal
opportunities. And finally, to gauge public opinion changes regarding the EU, respondents were
asked whether they perceived EU unification as going “too far” or “not far enough”, with a scale
ranging from 0 to 10. The data for each of these questions was distilled into the party/year format.
There are two voter groups that are necessary to examine to consider both dealignment and par-
tisan representation (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). As discussed previously, mainstream
focal parties are predicted to satisfy median voters, while niche focal parties are thought to sat-
isfy partisans. Presented in more detail in the theoretical chapter, both dealignment and partisan
representation are possible, neither being deficient forms of representation, but these distinctions
are specifically important for the current chapter. As was argued, niche parties are predicted to
remain connected to partisans, suggesting that they should achieve partisan representation, while
mainstream parties are thought to satisfy median voters. It is possible that the findings presented
in the previous chapters have not considered the importance of party type, and that niche focal
parties may remain connected to their voters, even if mainstream parties are colluding. To capture
these groups, the mean partisan for each party is produced for each year the question is asked.
2 For specific wording, see the Appendix. Also greater defense of the relevancy of these questions to the topics is
provided in the chapters preceding. To avoid redundancy, these will not be discussed at length again.
3 Unfortunately, the CMP data has only coded issues of immigration recently and when combined with the ESS
data allowing too few data points to produce intelligible models.
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This allows for partisan voters and their changes on both economic and multidimensional issues
to be tracked over time. The median voter positions are created using the median voter for each
country/year.
As has been argued at length previously, manifesto data is used because it is the logical starting
point for which collusion may present itself. Parties should proclaim their positions in their man-
ifestos long before the collusion that they are participating in may translated into behavior that is
perceived by either individuals or experts through surveys. Therefore, this data source is the basis
for determining party position on both the economic dimension and the multidimensional issues of
the environment, equality and EU integration.
To determine the left/right placement of a party, the Manifesto Project provides a RILE vari-
able, bringing together several coded topics to capture the placement of the party on the economic
left/right dimension. For the environment and the issue of equality coders are asked to code these
issues throughout the manifesto. These multidimensional components are gauged on a 0 to 100
scale, which represents the percentage of the manifesto that is dedicated to this specific issue.
These scores change across the manifestos, and thus are able to capture the degree to which these
issues become emphasized or ignored as time passes. For the EU question, the manifesto data has
both negative and positive mentions of the EU coded separately. For the purposes here, these codes
are combined. Although it seems unlikely that a party would say conflicting things about the EU
in their manifesto, it remains possible and thus the codes have been aggregated.
To reiterate, the data are organized at the party/year level, so the dependent variable becomes
the focal party position each year, as determined by the manifesto data. To consider the influence
of voters over time, the median and partisan voters are considered. To test whether focal parties are
responding to the behaviors of mainstream parties over time, a variable was created that captures
the mean positions of all of the mainstream parties within a country each year. This means that a
variable was created that aggregated all of the mainstream parties’ positions on a topic, subtracting
the focal party position, and then dividing the sum by the number of mainstream parties in the
system – less the focal party, if the focal party is coded as mainstream. This provides a mean
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mainstream party position each party/year. Niche parties are those parties that have distinctly
non-non-economic focuses, and thus are the green, ethnic/regional, special issue, and nationalist,
consistent with previous chapters (Wagner 2010). These categorizations come directly from the
Manifesto Project and fit well with other sources (ParlGov database Doring and Manow 2018).
So far this discussion has covered the data sources and manipulations, the following section will
review the different methods used before the results can be presented.
5.4 Methods
The models presented in this chapter hope to answer three questions. First, does party type influ-
ence focal party responsiveness to mainstream parties? Second, does party type change whether
or not the focal party is manipulating the issue spaces provided to voters? And finally, do niche
focal parties respond to mainstream parties’ position changes on issues that are foundational? The
preceding discussion has suggested that there may be no difference between niche and mainstream
focal parties’ proclivities to collude, if the cartel party theory is correct in the assertions that these
changes in democracy are rooted in fundamental systemic alterations through a deterministic evo-
lutionary process (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009). It is also possible, using the niche
party literature, that niche focal parties and mainstream focal parties satisfy different voter groups
and thus assuming that all parties behave alike would be misguided (Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow
et al. 2010, Wagner and Meyer 2016). Even if parties are alike and collude in similar ways, the
niche party literature finally suggests that, at the very least, niche parties should continue to be
responsive to their foundational party issues (Adams et al. 2006). Using these expectations, the
three questions will be answered for the left/right dimensions and the multidimensional issues. The
following section will review how the data are used to build models that can test these questions,
with the possible conflicting expectations in mind.
The dataset created is longitudinal, making the dependencies within it serially correlated. Sim-
ilar to the previous chapters, the following models will also use the Hoffman (2015) approach,
separating partisan, median and mainstream party positions into mean and mean centered variables
107
– targeting the dynamic relationship we expect to exist between focal parties and their mainstream
rivals, if parities are indeed colluding with one another.
Using this approach to the variables, the first question will be answered by building models that
include the mean partisan, median voter, and mainstream party positions, to capture the historical
positions of these groups. This allows for us to gauge how these stationary positions influence the
overall policy positions of the focal party. To determine how responsive parties are to the voters
or to the mainstream parties, the change variables for these groups is also included. This tests
whether the dynamic relationship often assumed exists between focal parties and voters. Consistent
with the previous chapters, this tests whether parties are ignoring voters when they change their
positions, while responding to mainstream parties – the requisite conditions for collusion to be
present. Finally, to test whether party type matter in how responsive the focal party is to the
mainstream parties, the niche party dummy variable is interacted with mainstream party changes.
The second question – does party type matter in how a party manipulates the issue space pre-
sented to the voter – replicates this same model, but similar to previous chapters includes a lag.
This lag controls for the previous position of the party, to equalize the starting points of each focal
party in relation to the mainstream parties4. This allows for all of the party movements to have
the same starting point so we are able to access whether the issue space that are being presented to
voters is converging, stable or expanding. Inline with the arguments presented in previous chap-
ters, converging and stable issue spaces that are not related to changing voter sentiments, show that
parties are not only manipulating the issue spaces presented to voters, but that collusion matured.
The final question – do parties resist inter-party collusion on foundational issues? – can only
be examined using the environmental question. This is because there are no straightforward niche
parties that might consider equality or EU integration as foundational. This final question uses the
environmental model, but disaggregates the niche parties, so that the variable becomes categorical
with levels for the mainstream parties, ethnic/regional, green, nationalist, and special issue. This
allows for us to compare the different niche parties within a single model, with the expectation that
4 For a more detailed explanation see the previous chapters.
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green parties should be less collusive because this issue is foundational to their party platforms.
This discussion has presented how these questions will be tested in light of the expectations, but
there remains the more specific details of the models that should be reviewed.
Though a reiteration of the previous chapters, the structure of the dataset requires that the
models be multilevel in nature. The year becomes the first level, the party the second, which
makes the country the third, with all of these components clearly nested within each other. All of
the models in the current chapter also allow for the covariances to be unstructured for the random
intercepts at the party and country levels. Additionally, the data provide a relatively small number
of observations, therefore we use restricted maximum likelihood (REML) specifications. As in
previous chapters, the data are unbalanced, which has lead to the selection for an exponential
covariance structure to be applied (Hoffman 2015, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2015)5.
Although the manifesto data is clearly bounded, with scores ranging from -100 to 100 for the
rile question and from 0 to 100 for the multidimensional issues, these dependent variables have
been treated as continuous, with one exception. The issues of equality, the EU and the left/right
economic dimension have been treated as continuous because the distribution of these variables is
fairly clustered around the center, appearing quite normal (Long, 1997, Twisk and Rijmen 2009).
Though the variables are clearly not continuous, using a continuous model allows for more re-
strictive estimations to be used and covariance structures to applied, which makes the continuous
approach produce a greater model fit, compared to bounded models. The one exception where
continuous models are not used is for the environmental question. As discussed in the previous
chapter, these models continue to use a tobit procedure (Twisk and Rijmen 2009). The variable
does not cluster around the middle, being highly skewed, thus making outcomes predicted by a
continuous model nonsensical. Furthermore, the tobit model achieves better model fits, compared
to continuous approaches for this question, making it the most appropriate approach.
To conclude, the models presented in this chapter hope to address whether party type matters.
It is possible that it does not, which would be consistent with the cartel party theory expectations,
5 Again, for greater explanation please see preceding chapters.
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but the niche party literature – which provided the foundational reasons for examining mainstream
party change in the first place – suggests that these parties may be fundamentally different. If this is
true, the previous models may be obscuring intact voter-party linkages. The following section will
review the results from the left/right economic dimension models and multidimensional issues.
5.5 Results
The discussion of the results will begin with the left/right dimensions models, using the ISSP and
ESS data. This will move on to examine the findings for the multidimensional issues, beginning
with equality, followed by the EU and concluding with the environment. Because the issue of
the environment is foundational to green party programmes, this is the only issue that allows the
foundational issue hypotheses to be tested. Although it would be preferable to have more than
one test, this does serve as an interesting starting point to consider whether foundational issues
are particularly durable for niche parties. Each topic will present a model testing whether niche
party status influences how focal parties respond to change in mainstream parties. When data are
available, the issue space model will also be presented, including a lag of previous party position
to determine how changes in the mainstream party position influences the movement of the focal
party, and ultimately what this means for the resulting issue space that separates them.
5.5.1 Left/Right Economic Dimension
To examine an extended time frame, compared to the ESS data, the ISSP data have been used.
Though the data points are not consistently spaced, they do allow for examination of a variety
of unique democracies for the years from 1987 to 2010. Model 1 tests whether the niche party
interaction changes the behavior of the focal party in response to mainstream party change across
the left/right dimension.
Model 1, presented in table 5.1, shows that when niche party is interacted with mainstream
party change, there is no significant relationship. To better understand what is happening with the
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interaction term in substantive terms, it is useful to examine the marginal effects of the interaction,
which are presented in Figure 5.1. This shows that if the focal party is mainstream they are ex-
pected to respond to a one unit change in the position of the mainstream parties with a 7.76 point
response. The scaling for these variables is the same as the 3 chapter, with the dependent vari-
able remaining on the -100 to 100 scale and the units of the predictor variables being recalled to
5 levels, matching the likert scale of the ISSP survey question6. If the focal party is characterized
as niche, the findings are not statistically significant at an 0.05 level, but are quite close (0.054).
Although the findings should be interpreted understanding this caution, the predicted level for the
the niche party response is 19.46, because the confidence interval covers a very large range (- 0.34
– 39.26). This null finding, combined with the very wide confidence interval suggests that more
observations are clearly necessary to determine how niche parties are responding to mainstream
parties on this dimension. What is significant about these findings though, is that they confirm the
expectation that mainstream parties should be drawn toward collusion.
The remainder of the model shows remarkably similar results as in the 3 chapter. Yet again,
when it comes to left/right policy positions of focal parties, it seems as though focal parties deter-
mine their position based off of the mean position of their mainstream rivals and their partisans,
moving away from median voter positions. When the mean mainstream party is one unit to the
right, the focal party is predicted to respond by being nearly 19 points more right leaning. Simi-
larly, when the mean partisan is one unit more right leaning, the focal party is predicted to have a
20.2 point more right leaning stance. Interestingly, these mean positions are equally as influential
in determining focal party positions, unlike the multidimensional issues considered in the previous
chapter that showed a much greater influence of mean mainstream positions compared to mean
partisans.
When it comes to changing their positions though, focal parties still show no significant re-
sponse to either voter groups, but do show a dynamically responsive relationship to their main-
6 There are five levels for the mainstream party positions and for the voter positions. This is based off of the voter
data being presented in a 5 level likert scale. The mainstream party positions were recalled to match, to easily compare
magnitudes of influence.
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Table 5.1: Party Policy Position Left/Right ESS and ISSP
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
ISSP: Response ESS: Response ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 18.79∗∗∗ 12.48∗ 0.367∗∗
(4.562) (6.057) (0.136)
Mean Partisan 20.21∗∗∗ 23.88∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(3.164) (3.037) (0.0777)
Mean Median Voter -14.11∗∗∗ -19.49∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗
(4.096) (5.810) (0.119)
Mainstream Party Change 7.764∗ 8.872∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(3.676) (2.111) (0.0831)
Partisan Change 0.867 0.522 -0.0794
(2.329) (1.384) (0.0558)
Median Voter Change 1.697 -0.241 0.0543
(1.908) (1.935) (0.122)
Niche Party 1.430 3.476 2.749∗
(3.201) (2.495) (1.225)
Niche Party× Mainstream Party Change 11.70 0.715 0.0245
(10.73) (3.873) (0.175)
Previous Position (Lag) 0.200∗∗∗
(0.0485)
Constant -67.10∗∗∗ -46.10∗ 16.31∗
(12.01) (19.96) (8.233)
Country
Constant 1.29e-13 32.51∗∗∗ 1.64e-10
(.) (30.33) (0.000000223)
Party
Constant 57.49∗∗ 161.2∗∗∗
(80.88) (53.27)
Residuals: Exponential
Constant 281.1∗∗∗ 189.5∗∗∗ 51.93∗∗∗
(82.57) (46.27) (6.909)
r_logitr1
Constant 2.237∗∗∗ 2.009∗∗∗ 2.025∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.303) (0.235)
Observations 356 874 420
AIC 2846.9 6696.4 2629.6
BIC 2893.4 6758.4 2682.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
stream rivals. Yet again showing evidence of collusive behaviors, but only conclusively for main-
stream focal parties. Unfortunately, just as before, the ISSP data is unable to be used to test the
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Figure 5.1: Model 1 Marginal Effects
issue space assertions because the data are so scattered across time and country, somewhat in-
consistently, that when the lag is introduced, too many observations are lost to produce reliable
models.
The ESS data presented in models 2 and 3, also in table 5.1, show that when niche party
is interacted with mainstream party policy change, both niche and mainstream focal parties are
highly responsive. The marginal effects presented in Figure 5.2 show that when mainstream parties
change their position on the left/right dimension one unit, mainstream focal parties are expected
to respond with a 8.87 point shift. When the focal party is niche, this is predicted to be slightly
higher, at 9.59 points. This means that both party types, using the ESS data, show a response to
mainstream party position changes on the economic dimension, to surprisingly similar degrees.
This means that when it comes to the left/right economic dimension, it seems as though niche
parties and mainstream parties show similar responses to mainstream party behaviors. There is
also not response to either voter group when they change on the issues, meeting the characteristic
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Figure 5.2: Model 2 Marginal Effects
behaviors of purely collusive cartelistic parties, as predicted by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009).
The remainder of the model, also is very similar to the findings in chapter 3 for the ESS mod-
els, with one important exception. Focal party positions are connected to the mean positions of
partisans, but unlike the ESS model in chapter 3, focal parties now show a positive response to the
mean positions of mainstream parties as well. This means that using this data set, there remains a
connection between how focal parties determine their position on the left/right dimensions that is
connected to the average location of their partisan voters and their mainstream rivals. Ultimately,
this shows a stationary relationship that remains between parties and partisan voters, but hat when
it comes to dynamic representational responses, focal parties of both types are showing a similar
level of collusion. These focal parties, both niche and mainstream, show a significant relationship
between their positions on the economic dimension and changes in the mainstream parties in these
systems. Taken together, models 1 and 2 present evidence that mainstream focal parties are show-
ing consistent levels of collusion with their mainstream rivals, but the evidence for niche focal
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parties is somewhat unclear. More observations for are required to determine truly what is going
on with niche party behavior on the left/right dimension.
Model 3 includes a lag of the dependent variable of the focal party to test whether party type
changes issue space coordination. To recap, this allows for the positions of focal parties to be
equalized because the starting point, in relation to the mainstream parties’ positions, alters the size
of the issue spaces that divide mainstream parties and focal parties. To make interpretation of the
resultant issue spaces, all issue space models rescale the variables to a 100 point scale.
When it comes to the change variables, when voters change their position on the left/right
dimensions there is no distinguishable response from focal parties. Similar to the previous model,
when niche party is interacted with mainstream party changes on the issues, a nearly identical
response is witnessed across party type. Presented in figure 5.3, when the mainstream parties in
the system move one unit in their position on the economic dimension, mainstream focal parties are
predicted to change their positions by moving 0.40 points. Compared to niche focal parties, which
are predicted to move 0.43 points. Comparing this to the findings from chapter 3, which found
the movement before party type was accounted for at 0.41. Though this still shows a marginally
increasing issue space size, it implies that both niche and mainstream parties are manipulating the
issue spaces presented to voters, considering both types of focal party movement in the left/right
positions does not seem to be connected to voter preference changes on these issues. The mean
positions remain predictive of the changing positions of parties, with median voters remaining
negatively related to changes in the focal party position away from their previous locations on the
left/right dimension.
Together these models show similar findings to those presented in chapter 3. The ISSP data in
model 1 suggests that mainstream focal parties’ positions on the economic dimension show policy
responsiveness to mainstream parties in the system, while ignoring changing voter preferences,
leaving the influence of niche party status inconclusive. The ESS models confirm cartel party
expectations though; when it comes to colluding on the economic left/right, party type does not
change collusive behaviors. The same conclusion as presented in chapter 3 can be drawn from the
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Figure 5.3: Model 3 Marginal Effects
findings about issue space manipulation – though the issues spaces remain marginally expanding,
niche focal parties and mainstream focal parties show nearly identical changes in their positions
in congruence with mainstream party position changes on the left/right dimension. In total, the
ESS models suggest that cartel expectations hold and that the systemic conditions that alter the
incentives for parties effect both niche and mainstream parties similarly on the left/right dimension,
yet because the ISSP findings are inconclusive, it is clear that more data points are required to
determine whether niche focal parties are indeed responding to mainstream rivals.
5.5.2 Multidimensional Issues
As was previously argued in chapter 4, multidimensional issues are predicted to be difficult for
parties to navigate, due to their complexity and novelty, because they challenge political power
configurations, and put parties in position that may risk losing votes. Therefore, these issues should
induce collusion, but does this pressure apply equally across party type?
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5.5.2.1 Equality
Model 4 in table 5.2 takes the issue of equality and finds that considering niche party status does
not change the results of the model. Both niche focal parties and mainstream focal parties respond
to mainstream party changes on issues of equality, while disregarding the changing sentiments of
voters. When comparing the marginal effects of niche party status in figure 5.4, it is clear that
the responses are nearly identical, with mainstream focal parties responding to a one point shift
in mainstream party positions with a 0.8 point response, while niche focal party response is 0.84.
Contrary to the niche party literature, which suggests that niche parties should be connected to
partisan voters, it is clear that this not the case on the issue of equality, rather niche focal parties
show a greater response to mainstream party change, compared to mainstream focal parties. This
means that when it comes to comparing party types on the issue of equality, niche and mainstream
parties show very similar responses to mainstream party changes on the issue, suggesting that party
type does not seem to change collusive tendencies on this topic.
This model also shows that mean positions of mainstream parties dictates the positions of focal
parties over twice as much as the mean positions of partisan voters. Yet again, the positions of focal
parties is negatively related to median voters. This shows that the mean locations of mainstream
parties influences the positions of focal parties over twice as much as partisan mean positions on
the issue of equality, again suggesting that this issue has been attractive for collusion since the
beginning of the data.
Model 5 controls for the previous positions of focal parties using a lag and shows in figure 5.5,
that mainstream focal parties are changing positions in response to one point shifts in mainstream
rivals on issues of equality with a 0.85 movement. Niche focal parties change positions as response
to the same alteration with a 1.07 point shift. This means that niche parties are actually showing
a greater precision in promoting issue space stability, with their closer to 1 to 1 response than
mainstream focal parties. Mainstream focal parties are close to having a 1 to 1 response, but
the issue space is still expanding, but because this is not connected to voter preferences, this is
not meaningful for representation, merely it becomes a feature of imprecise coordination between
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Table 5.2: Party Policy Position Equality ESS
(Model 4) (Model 5)
ESS: Response ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 1.029∗∗∗ -2.796∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.576)
Mean Partisan 0.440∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.0530) (0.0607)
Mean Median Voter -0.373∗∗ -0.146
(0.114) (0.353)
Mainstream Party Change 0.797∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.163)
Partisan Change 0.0243 0.0109
(0.0219) (0.0373)
Median Voter Change 0.0172 0.0142
(0.0265) (0.0322)
Niche Party -0.511 -1.998
(2.463) (3.064)
Niche Party× Mainstream Party Change 0.0385 0.216
(0.273) (0.340)
Previous Position (Lag) -0.0163
(0.0439)
Constant -53.20∗∗∗ 152.6∗∗∗
(11.67) (33.11)
Country
Constant 1.284 44.58∗∗∗
(0.917) (20.99)
Party
Constant 0.000000928 1.36e-13∗∗
(0.000523) (1.24e-12)
Residuals: Exponential
Constant 17.39∗∗∗ 8.254∗∗∗
(1.415) (1.690)
r_logitr1
Constant 2.243∗∗∗ 1.523∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.430)
Observations 861 420
AIC 4298.1 2038.5
BIC 4360.0 2095.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
colluding parties. Contrary to the niche party literature, niche focal parties do not seem to be more
resistant to collusion on the issue of equality, rather they are showing even more precise issue
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Figure 5.4: Model 4 Marginal Effects
space coordination to maintain stability or promote convergence compared to their mainstream
counterparts. This means that when it comes to the issue of equality, not only is collusion high
and issue space coordination mature, but niche parties appear to be just as collusive as mainstream
parties, suggesting that the systemic conditions have influenced both party types equally.
Together these findings indicate that there is little difference between parties in their proclivities
to collude, with these parties behaving similarly on the issues of equality and possibly the economic
dimension . Considering the theoretical expectations guiding this chapter, it may appear that the
niche party literature may have been incorrect asserting that party type matters, but as the following
findings suggest, it may not be that clear cut.
5.5.2.2 EU integration
The previous chapter examined the issue of EU integration and found, unlike the other issues both
on economic and multidimensional issues, that focal parties respond to partisan voters when they
119
.5
1
1.
5
2
Ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 L
in
ea
r P
re
di
ct
io
n,
 F
ix
ed
 P
or
ti
on
0 1
Niche Party
Niche Party*Mainstream Party Equality (Issue Space)
Figure 5.5: Model 5 Marginal Effects
change their positions on the topic, although the movement was 1/14th the magnitude compared to
responsiveness to mainstream party changes across time. It is possible that this discrepancy may
be explained by differences in party type.
Model 6 in table 5.3 tests whether party type changes collusive tendencies of focal parties. As
figure 5.6 shows, mainstream focal party status produces a response to mainstream party position
changes of 0.66 to a one point shift. Comparatively, niche focal parties have a response that is
indistinguishable from zero7, indicating that mainstream focal parties show strong responses to
mainstream party position changes on the issue of EU integration, while niche parties do not. This
suggests that mainstream focal parties are behaving differently, compared to niche focal parties,
and participating in collusion on this issue. This means, that unlike the left/right dimension and
issue of equality, there does seem to be a difference between party types, one that is also inline
with the expectations implied by the niche party literature. The expectations drawn from the niche
7 Unlike the marginal effects interpreted in model 1 that showed niche party status being quite close to statistical
significance, these findings are nowhere near that range with a p-value of 0.58.
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Figure 5.6: Model 6 Marginal Effects
party literature suggest that niche focal parties should be connected to their partisan bases and
resist collusion, compared to mainstream parities, and although the findings have been mixed thus
far, this suggests that niche focal party connections to voters may be dependent on the issues
considered.
This model also shows a significant, though minimal, response to partisan issue position changes
on EU integration, as in the last chapter. This shows that when partisans change their positions on
the EU, parties are connected to these changes. The magnitude of this response is only 0.04 to a
one point shift in focal parties in response to partisan voters, compared to a 0.57 response to main-
stream party position changes. Though there appears to be a dynamic representative connection
that is maintained on this issue, it is hard to look past how minimal the response is to voter changes
on this topic.
The mean positions of mainstream parties is again a stronger predictor of focal party place-
ment (0.67), while mean partisan positions (0.20) are positively related, and median voters’ mean
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Table 5.3: Party Policy Position EU Integration ESS
(Model 6) (Model 7)
ESS: Response ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 0.703∗∗∗ 0.518∗
(0.197) (0.238)
Mean Partisan 0.199∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0287)
Mean Median Voter -0.172∗∗∗ -0.129∗
(0.0360) (0.0541)
Mainstream Party Change 0.662∗∗∗ 0.607
(0.195) (0.311)
Partisan Change 0.0380∗ 0.0254
(0.0192) (0.0382)
Median Voter Change 0.0111 0.0518
(0.0358) (0.0630)
Niche Party -0.661 -0.582
(0.354) (0.400)
Niche Party× Mainstream Party Change -0.439 -0.188
(0.443) (0.687)
Previous Position (Lag) 0.456∗∗∗
(0.0707)
Constant -35.88∗∗∗ -27.22∗
(10.08) (12.35)
Country
Constant 8.78e-15∗∗ 0.159
(1.08e-13) (0.304)
Party
Constant 2.018 3.54e-15
(1.084) (1.63e-11)
Residual: Exponential
Constant 5.966∗∗∗ 7.507∗∗∗
(1.238) (0.657)
r_logitr1
Constant 0.812 -0.695
(0.443) (0.722)
Observations 584 307
AIC 2764.4 1535.7
BIC 2821.2 1587.9
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
positions are negatively predictive of focal party positions on EU integration. Together this all sug-
gests that when it comes to focal party responsiveness on EU integration, mainstream focal parties
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respond to mainstream parties in the system, while niche focal parties show no collusive responses
to these changes. This suggests that party type may matter for this issue, with mainstream parties
showing partially collusive tenancies and niche focal parties remaining representative of partisans.
Considering niche focal parties do not respond to mainstream position changes, yet focal party
changes are predicted by partisan position changes, albeit minimally, this means that niche focal
parties have met the requirements to achieve partisan representation.
Model 7 considers the influence of party behaviors on the issue spaces for EU integration and
whether party type changes the results. Again, mainstream focal parties show a positive change in
their positions on the issue away from their previous stance in response to changes in the positions
of other mainstream parties. Mainstream focal parties are predicted adjust their position in response
to mainstream party position changes on the issue, with a one point shift being matched with a 0.60
point shift, shown in figure 5.7. This means that the issue space is expanding between mainstream
focal parties, though this is meaningless because it is unconnected to voter preferences changes,
because with the addition of the lag, the dynamic relationship between partisans and focal parties
disappears. Niche party response remains statistically insignificant, which suggests that when it
comes to the issue of EU integration, party type does matter and mainstream focal parties are
significantly more responsive to changes in mainstream party positions on the issues, compared to
niche focal parties.
The remainder of the model shows that focal parties change their positions on EU integra-
tion remains connected to mean mainstream party positions and partisan average positions, though
again the magnitude of influence is significantly less for partisans, while median voter mean posi-
tions remain negatively related to the issue position changes of focal parties. The model no longer
suggests that focal parties are responsive to partisan voters though, when it comes to changing fo-
cal party positions on the issue. Though this appears to be convoluted distinction, as mentioned in
the previous chapter, this means that model 6 shows that focal parties’ general issue position on EU
integration was influenced by partisan position changes on the issue, but model 7 now shows that
focal parties’ change on the issue of EU integration from their previous position is not connected
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Figure 5.7: Model 7 Marginal Effects
to these shifts. Overall the takeaway should be that there is some level of representation, although
small, that remains between focal party positions on the issue of EU integration, but when the lag
is introduced the weak relationship disappears.
Together these models suggest that when it comes to collusive behaviors, it appears as though
mainstream focal parties are colluding on EU integration, responding to the changing positions of
other mainstream parties, yet unlike other issues, they are not ignoring voter preferences entirely,
remaining somewhat connected to partisan voters. Niche parties, on the other hand, are not re-
sponding to mainstream party changes, while responding to partisans on the issue. This suggests
that niche focal parties are achieving partisan representation, while mainstream focal parties are
partially collusive/representative, keeping a weak connection to partisan voters in model 6. When
considering issue spaces presented to voters, mainstream focal parties show issue space coordina-
tion with other mainstream parties in the system, while niche focal parties do not. Together this
issue presents conflicting findings considering the previous models, with the issue of EU integra-
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tion now providing evidence that the niche party literature was on to something by suggesting that,
at least on this issue, that party type should change collusive behaviors. Although the issue of
equality and the left/right issue dimension show the contrary – that niche and mainstream focal
parties produce strikingly similar collusive tendencies – this may mean that the issue itself mat-
ters in predicting whether or not party type may change collusive tendencies, or possibly, that a
combination of both issue and specific party family may change the tendency to collude.
5.5.2.3 Environment
The final multidimensional issue of the environment presents the first topic that is clearly a foun-
dational for a niche party considered in this chapter. Green parties should consider environmental
issues foundational to their party platforms, and thus, if the implications of the niche party liter-
ature is correct, they should resist temptations to collude over this topic. This possibility will be
tested in the final model, but before this is presented, the models testing focal party response and
issue space manipulation by type will be discussed.
Model 8 in table 5.4 tests whether party type influences focal party response to mainstream
party position changes on environmental issues. By interacting niche party status with movements
of mainstream parties’ position on environmental issues, niche party status produces a greater re-
sponse to these changes, compared to mainstream focal parties. As the marginal effects show in
figure 5.8, when mainstream parties shift their position on the environment one point, niche focal
parties are predicted to respond with a 1.55 point movement, compared to mainstream focal par-
ties shifting 1.17 points. This means that niche focal parties show higher responses to mainstream
party position changes on the issue of the environment. This is not say that mainstream focal par-
ties are not showing highly collusive responses, but contrary to the expectations suggested by both
literatures, party type does matter, just not at all in the way suggested by the niche party litera-
ture. Rather than being more resistant to collusion, niche parties are showing more pronounced
responses to mainstream parties when they change on the issue of the environment in this model.
The remainder of the model is quite similar to the first model in chapter 4 without the interaction
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Table 5.4: Party Policy Position Environment ESS
(Model 8) (Model 9)
ESS: Response ESS: Issue Space
Mean Mainstream Party 1.302∗∗∗ 1.369∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.368)
Mean Partisan 0.557∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.0946) (0.127)
Mean Median Voter -0.215 -0.572
(0.140) (0.388)
Mainstream Party Change 1.173∗∗∗ 1.356∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.222)
Partisan Voter Change 0.0362 -0.00333
(0.0314) (0.0449)
Median Voter Change -0.0662 0.0297
(0.0626) (0.0991)
Niche Party 2.111∗∗ 1.964∗
(0.813) (0.851)
Niche Party × Mainstream Party Change 0.377 1.118∗
(0.353) (0.489)
Previous Position (Lag) 0.301∗∗∗
(0.0819)
Constant -52.11∗∗ -72.39∗∗
(20.16) (22.33)
Country
Constant 2.031 0.258
(2.033) (1.065)
Party
Constant 27.34∗∗∗ 14.91∗∗∗
(3.212) (3.950)
Residual: Exponential 7.931∗∗∗ 7.097∗∗∗
(0.464) (0.841)
Observations 861 420
AIC 4622.2 2264.3
BIC 4679.3 2316.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
term, showing that the mean positions of mainstream parties moves focal party position over twice
as much as mean partisan positions on the issue and unlike the other models, mean median voters
are not connected to focal party positions.
Model 9, presented in table 5.4, includes a lag of previous focal party position to target how
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Figure 5.8: Model 8 Marginal Effects
issue spaces are influenced by party behavior and whether this is altered by party type. This
interaction effect is presented in figure 5.9 and shows that both mainstream focal parties and niche
focal parties are converging, making the issue space increasingly narrow. Mainstream focal parties
are showing a 1.35 point response to 1 point shift in mainstream party position changes on the
environment, compared to niche focal parties that are responding with 2.47 point response. Yet
again, niche focal parties are showing a much higher magnitude response, narrowing the issue
space even further in comparison to mainstream focal parties. This means that when it comes to
the environment, mainstream focal parties are highly collusive, showing a converging issue space,
but that niche focal parties change their positions in response to their mainstream rivals when
they change on issues of the environment to an even greater magnitude. Again, none of these
movements are related to dynamic responses to changing voter sentiments, and these positions
remain only loosely connected to the stationary positions of their partisan voters. This ultimately
suggests that when it comes to the issue of the environment, niche focal parties are different than
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Figure 5.9: Model 9 Marginal Effects
mainstream focal parties in their collusive responses to mainstream position changes on the issue,
though not at all in the direction suggested by the niche party literature.
Finally, model 10, presented in table 5.5, examines whether disaggregating niche party type
uncovers a lower level of collusion among green parties on environmental issues. The niche party
literature would suggest that because this issue is foundational to green party positions, these
groups should resist colluding with mainstream parties on this topic. The expectation is that by not
clumping all of the niche parties together into the same category, we may uncover partial evidence
that green parties are ignoring mainstream party position changes on environmental issues because
green parties remain connected to voters on these foundational topics. The evidence should be
interpreted with some caution though because by interacting the party type with mainstream party
position changes we are able to determine how these party types respond to mainstream parties,
but not if the party type changes responsiveness to partisans (an issue that should be considered in
further research), thus we can only access whether party type changes collusive responses to rivals.
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Table 5.5: Party Policy Position Foundational Issue the Environment ESS
(Model 10)
Foundational Issue
Mean Mainstream Party 1.357∗∗∗
(0.323)
Mean Partisan 0.378∗∗∗
(0.0950)
Mean Median Voter -0.115
(0.125)
Mainstream Party Change 1.173∗∗∗
(0.154)
Special Issue 3.729∗
(1.571)
Green 6.985∗∗∗
(1.533)
Nationalist -0.520
(1.305)
Ethnic/Regional -0.0547
(1.271)
Special Issue × Mainstream Party Change -1.069
(0.929)
Green × Mainstream Party Change -1.745∗∗
(0.598)
Nationalist × Mainstream Party Change 1.335∗
(0.520)
Ethinc/Regional × Mainstream Party Change 2.277∗∗∗
(0.677)
Partisan Voter Change 0.0247
(0.0307)
Median Voter Change -0.0644
(0.0610)
Constant -57.70∗∗∗
(17.35)
Country
Constant 0.352
(1.278)
Party
Constant 26.32∗∗∗
(2.998)
Residuals: Exponential
Constant 7.557∗∗∗
(0.441)
Observations 861
AIC 4588.3
BIC 4674.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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When it comes to the interaction between niche party category and responsiveness to main-
stream party changes on the issue, it is again best to examine the marginal effects of mainstream
party change on focal party position across the party family categories. Examining the marginal
effects presented in figure 5.10, mainstream focal parties are highly responsive to shifts in the
other mainstream parties on environmental issues, again moving 1.17 points in response to a main-
stream party shift of 1 point. Special issue and green parties show no response to mainstream
party changes on this issue, while nationalist and ethnic/regional parties show strong responses
to shifts in mainstream party positions. This means that when it comes to shifting in conjunc-
tion with mainstream parties on environmental issues, green parties and special issue parties resist
these changes, while nationalist and ethnic/regional parties respond collusively. Comparing this to
the previous model, it is clear that the niche focal party response that was found to be greater than
mainstream focal party response was driven by nationalist and ethnic/regional parties. The findings
in model 10 confirm the expectations that niche parties may behave differently than expected from
the cartel party theory, if the issue that may induce collusion is foundational to their party platform.
These findings are further confirmed by the negative interaction of green party with mainstream
party change presented in table 5.5 – when mainstream parties move one point on the issue of the
environment and the focal party is green, the response should be negative (- 1.75) compared to
mainstream focal parties8. Overall, there remains no relationship between focal parties and voter
preference changes on the environment, so although this shows that green parties resist collusive
responses to mainstream party changes on the environment, the overarching trend is to ignore voter
preferences. This model is unable to tell us whether green parties specifically respond to voters on
the issue, but this should certainly be explored further in other research.
Mean mainstream party positions remains highly predictive of the position of mainstream par-
ties on the issue of the environment, over 3.5 times more influential than mean partisan positions.
Both special issue and green parties are predicted to be more supportive of environmental issues,
compared to mainstream parties, while nationalist and ethnic/regional parties show no significant
8 Mainstream focal parties are the reference category in Model 10.
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Figure 5.10: Model 10 Marginal Effects
relationship to predicting environmental positions. Interestingly, this suggests that on average, eth-
nic/regional and nationalist parties are not necessarily more or less supportive of environment, but
when it comes to mainstream parties changing their positions on the issue, they willing to collude
by responding to these movements.
In total this suggests that mainstream party change on the topic of the environment influences
focal party behavior if the party is mainstream, nationalist or ethnic/regional. Green parties do
not seem to be behaving collusively on this topic, as well as special issue parties. This suggests
that the foundational nature of environmental issues may be influencing green party behavior that
maintains representative connections with voters, though this model does not test this directly.
Though only a preliminary test of this possibility, foundational issues may prove difficult for niche
parties to collude with mainstream parties over, thus representation may remain intact on these
issues.
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5.6 Conclusion
Overall, the findings show that mainstream parties behave collusively when it comes to their in-
teractions with rival mainstream parties. Consistent with the niche party literature suggesting that
party type should lead to different party behaviors, indeed, mainstream parties are consistently
drawn toward collusion. Niche parties, on the other hand, show a variety of collusive responses
that seem to depend on the party and possibly the issue at hand, suggesting that there may be issues
over which niche parties find collusion attractive, while other issues may be more problematic.
The economic dimension models suggest that mainstream parties are drawn toward collusion,
producing high responses across both models when mainstream parties change their positions on
these issues. The results for niche party responsiveness on these issues is mixed across models,
with the ISSP data showing a null response to mainstream party changes, suggesting that there
are too few data points to make this finding reliable. Conversely, the ESS data, shows nearly an
identical response across party types, suggesting that when it comes to this issue, party type may
not change collusive tendencies (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009). It is possible that
niche parties do not face the same types of punishment from their voters on these issues because
they are not the primary focuses of these organizations. In other words, their voters may be less
concerned with moderation on the economic dimension, whereas moderation on a foundational
issue might lead to a vote loss for the niche party. Overall, these models show that mainstream
parties are more collusive than their niche counterparts, consistent with the niche party literature
(Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow et al. 2010). Though the ESS data suggests that party type may not
matter, it is clear from the multidimensional issues that niche parties do behave differently, but the
issue makes crucial differences in collusive tendencies.
The first issue of equality also shows that party types behave similarly in their collusive re-
sponses on this issue. Both mainstream and niche focal parties show high responses to mainstream
party changes on the issue, suggesting that when it comes to this topic niche parties experience the
same systemic pressures or incentives to collude, rather than remain representative of their voters.
Conversely, issue of EU integration suggests that on this very specific issue and only for niche fo-
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cal parties, representation may not be broken. This issue shows that niche focal parties are failing
to respond to mainstream party changes on this issue, while mainstream focal parties show high
responsiveness. This means that although the previous chapter found only partial collusion for
the issue of EU integration, this representative response may to be driven by the responsiveness of
niche parties, while mainstream parties are participating in collusion. Further research is necessary
to determine whether niche parties are what is driving this representative connection that remains
on this issue.
Finally, the issue of the environment shows that niche parties are actually more collusive, both
in response and issue space convergence, compared to mainstream focal parties, though by sepa-
rating the niche party category, we are able to see that this exaggerated response from niche focal
parties is driven by nationalists and ethnic/regional parties. Green parties and special issue parties
fight the collusive tendencies of the other parties in the system for this issue, failing to respond
to mainstream parties in a collusive manner. Overall, this suggests that niche parties may remain
connected to voters, or at least avoid colluding with mainstream parties, but that it may depend on
the specific niche party and issue. This does not directly conflict with the niche party literature,
rather these findings merely suggest that treating all niche parties the same on all issues may be
problematic. In the same way that the niche party literature has argued that treating all parties
as monolithic could distort findings, it may also be true that different niche parties may produce
conflicting responses.
In the end, the models remain indicative of collusion for mainstream focal parties, though the
findings for niche party behavior seems dependent on issues and even specific niche party types.
In every model, when mainstream parties change on the issues, mainstream focal parties respond,
while ignoring voters preference changes. Niche focal parties and mainstream focal parties show
similar response patterns to mainstream party change on the left/right dimension and the issue
of equality, and show even greater responses to mainstream party change on the issue of the en-
vironment. The models testing EU integration suggests that niche focal parties achieve partisan
representation, even though mainstream focal parties are partially collusive on this issue. Though
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green parties and special issue parties are resistant to collusion on environmental issues, this chap-
ter continues to show that cartel expectations hold for mainstream focal parties, because across all
issues these parties remain more connected to their mainstream party rivals than voters. Though
there is further research required to determine whether specific niche parties remain connected to
their voters on some issues, it is clear that mainstream focal parties are participating in collusion
across both multidimensional issues and the left/right economic dimension.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
At its core, the cartel party theory suggests that representation has been fundamentally undermined.
Parties, no longer responding to voters, are predicted to collude with their rivals to both limit
competition and manipulate the issues presented to voters in order to force voter stability (Katz
and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009). Under increasingly complicated political conditions, Katz
and Mair (1995, 2009) suggest that parties will have little choice but to adopt these tactics, because
representation and responsiveness on the issues becomes too risky. Motivated by rational self-
preservation to maintain their positions of power, parties are expected to break voter-party linkages
and begin to work together (Downs 1957, Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009).
In the end, this inter-party collusion suggested by the cartel party theory has negative implica-
tions for representation, suggesting that colluding parties will work together to undermine political
competition – a line of logic which presents the core expectations about inter-party collusion. As
outlined in the second chapter, it is expected that parties will present two characteristics if pure col-
lusion is present. First, parties will become unresponsive to their voters, satisfying neither median
nor partisan preferences. Second, parties will begin working together, and in doing so will respond
to policy positions of rival parties in attempt to limit political competition. These two conditions
define collusive behavior because they signal that voter preferences are not being met and that
parties are no longer attempting to differentiate themselves from their rivals. Using these charac-
teristics, this dissertation presented a typology of conditions expected, ranging from pure collusion
to pure representation. These theoretical distinctions allow us to answer the first central question:
are focal parties responding to rival parties, while ignoring their voters on the issues? This first ap-
proach tests whether parties are coordinating to limit inter-party competition, taking the theory one
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step further though, it was suggested that advanced cartelization should show manipulated issues
spaces presented to voters.
Collusion is the most provocative assertion made by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009), but why
would parties who hope to gain majorities in power work together and adopt the same policies?
Because structuring the choices presented to voters minimizes the risk that voters may switch
their vote. If all parties fail to respond to to voter changes – no party offers a place for voters
to express their preference – parties are able to avoid the perils of taking a position, one that
could ultimately alienate some voters at the cost of satisfying others. The implication undergirding
this argument is that the mechanism though which parties are hoping to force voter stability is
though the manipulation of the issue space. It was expected that parties should strive for issue
space stability or convergence if their goal was to produce artificial voter loyalty, suggesting levels
of issue space coordination under highly collusive conditions as either perfectly coordinated or
converging.
The purpose of this dissertation was to address these two questions: were parties colluding
and how were parties coordinating their issue spaces? Though the findings have some particu-
larities that should be discussed, two overarching conclusions emerge, suggesting that inter-party
collusion and issue space coordination appear present . First, on every issue examined collusion is
evident, particularly for mainstream focal party behavior, and inter-party collusion was higher on
multidimensional issues. Second, issue spaces are clearly being manipulated by parties showing
coordination to limit the policies presented to voters, even if the coordination was imperfect. To
following discussion will first address the totality of the findings regarding collusion, followed by a
review of the results regarding issue space coordination. Finally, some concerns with the research
will be presented, before the implications of the findings will be discussed.
6.1 Collusion
Collusion occurs when parties behave in a manner that breaks representative connections with
voters, while increasing responsiveness to rival parties; these two behaviors allow for a party to be
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categorized as purely collusive, because their behaviors are no longer connected to the voters they
purport to represent. Consistent with the implications fo the cartel party theory, this dissertation
uncovers evidence to support the emergence of cartelistic collusion.
There are three centrally important findings regarding collusion, reviewed in table 6.1, that
were presented within this dissertation. First, collusion was present on each of the issues exam-
ined, and most often, this collusion was pure, with focal parties showing no dynamic response
to voter preference on the issues. Second, multidimensional issues prompted highly collusive
responses, compared to the economic dimension. Finally, mainstream parties were consistently
purely collusive across all of the issues except EU integration.
Table 6.1: Collusion vs. Representation Findings
Collusion Mainstream Focal Parties Niche Focal Parties
Economic Dimension1 Pure Collusion Pure Collusion
Equality2 Pure Collusion Pure Collusion
EU3 Partial Collusion Pure Representation
Environment4 Pure Collusion Pure Collusion
This dissertation tests multidimensional issues and the left/right economic dimension, with the
expectation being that parties should be drawn toward collusion on these complicated topics, while
positions on the economic dimension should be foundational and stable. Consistent with these
expectations, this work finds that the issues of the environment and equality shows significantly
higher collusive responses, compared to the left/right dimension, though pure collusive tendencies
were found on the economic dimension as well. These purely collusive responses suggest that
when it comes to the left/right dimension, issues of equality and the environment, focal parties are
colluding with one another, showing that the dynamic relationship often assumed to exist between
parties and their voters is indeed undermined.
1β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: ISSP (7.76), ESS (8.87), Niche Focal Party: ISSP (null),
ESS (9.59)
2β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: (0.8), Niche Focal Party: (0.84)
3β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: (0.7), Niche Focal Party: (null)
4β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: (1.17), Niche Focal Party: (1.55) (null for green and
special issue niche parties)
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Also consistent with the expectations, mainstream focal parties show consistently collusive
responses to mainstream party changes on the issues, while ignoring voter preference changes,
signaling the coordination between mainstream rivals to work together in a manner that undermines
representative connections to voters. Though these results in total are alarming for the state of
representation, there were two minor findings that suggest the necessity of further research, but
also provide opportunities for continued representation, though these connections seem dependent
on the issue and the type of party.
The issue of EU integration suggests that voter preference changes are not being completely
disregarded by focal parties, presenting a case of partial collusion/representation. In chapter 4 the
findings show that focal parties were responding to mainstream parties primarily, but that when
voters changed their positions there was a response from focal parties. Albeit the response to
voters from focal parties was 1/14 the the magnitude of the shift compared to mainstream party
changes on the issue, there remains a relationship with partisan voters that should be considered.
The 5th chapter shows that party type may influence the response and suggests further research on
this anomaly may be warranted. When party type was interacted with mainstream party change
on the issue, it was clear that mainstream focal parties were showing highly collusive responses,
but niche parties response was null. This suggests that if niche focal parties are not responding
to mainstream party changes, but are continuing to respond to partisan voters. This alludes to
the possibility, though does not directly test it within the model, that mainstream focal parties are
colluding, while niche focal parties may be maintaining intact representative connections on this
issue. Clearly, there is more to be studied within this relationship, suggesting that this issue may
present different incentives for parties depending on their type.
The second hopeful finding for representation was presented in chapter 5, testing whether foun-
dational issues may lead parties to resist collusive tendencies. To review, chapter 4 found that when
it came to focal party collusion on the issue of the environment, pure collusion appeared strong,
while increasing over time and presenting a converging issue space, all very negative findings for
the state of representation. These results, though consistent with expectations under the cartel
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framework, were somewhat alarming. The 5th chapter hoped to address this strongly collusive
relationship by testing the possibility that niche focal parties may show diminished responses, as-
suming that the strong relationship was a result of highly collusive mainstream party responses.
Counter to the expectations, the issue of the environment showed even higher responses if the
focal party was niche. These findings suggested that there was a relationship being obscured by
the categorization as it stood, leading to the possibility that party responsiveness may be depen-
dent on the more specific type of niche party. Because green parties should find environmental
issues foundational to their party platforms, it was argued that these specific parties should resist
collusion on these topics. Consistent with these expectations, when the interaction was changed
into a categorical variable, considering all of the niche party types independently, it is clear that
green and special issue parties avoid collusion on the issue of the environment, consistent with
foundational expectations. This means that when it comes to the issue of the environment, green
and special issue parties resist collusion on this topic, though it is important to note that this model
does not show that these parties are representatively connected to voters on this issue.
In total, the findings suggest that pure collusion is evident on the left/right issue dimension,
issues of equality and the environment. The issue of EU integration presents partially collusive
tendencies, while none of the issues show that voters are being represented, rather, for the most
part, when voters evolve on issues, parties are not responding representatively to these changes,
with only the two minor exceptions discussed. The most collusive party type, as was expected,
are mainstream parties, showing highly collusive responses across all of the issues. Niche parties
show resistance to collusion on the issue of EU integration and green and special issue parties
resist these temptations on the issue of the environment. Though the findings are overwhelmingly
in support of the cartel expectations regarding inter-party collusion, there remain some areas of
hope for niche party behaviors on specific issues. The following section will review the findings
on issue space manipulation, before moving forward to the opportunities for further research and
overall implications.
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6.2 Issue Spaces
The issues that are presented to voters and the positions taken on these topics should, in a robust
representative democracy, be connected to voter preferences and issue salience at the time, thus
allowing voters a wide array of choices, allowing them to vote for the party that best represents their
interests. This means that issue spaces that are presented to voters should be fluid, adjusting over
time in direct relation to the changing emphasis and saliency patterns expressed by the populous.
Advanced stages of the cartelization process suggest that parties, in their attempts to force voter
stability across elections, will present manipulated issues spaces that are either stable or converging
(Blyth and Katz 205). These behaviors show as distinct disregard for representative connections
and behavioral attempts to force voter loyalty.
When it comes to issue space coordination as a sign of advanced cartelistic behaviors, the
preceding chapters were able to address this question from a variety of angles, reviewed in table
6.2. Consistent with the expectation that the left/right economic dimension should present the most
difficult place for parties to collude, chapter 3 shows that issue space coordination was imperfect,
meaning that although the issue space is technically expanding, this expansion is meaningless
because it is disconnected from changes in voter sentiments.
Table 6.2: Issue Space Findings
Mainstream Focal Parties Niche Focal Parties
Economic Dimension5 imperfect coordination imperfect coordination
Equality6 nearly perfect coordination nearly perfect coordination
EU7 imperfect coordination, meaningful expansion meaningful expansion
Environment8 convergence convergence
Inline with expectations, the multidimensional issues of equality and the environment in chap-
ter 4 show nearly perfect coordination and issue space convergence, signaling that parties are in-
deed manipulating the issues being presented to voters. The topic of EU integration shows the most
5β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: (0.4), Niche Focal Party: (0.43)
6β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: (0.85), Niche Focal Party: (1.07)
7β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: (0.66), Niche Focal Party: (null)
8β Mainstream Party Change - Mainstream Focal Party: (1.35), Niche: (2.47)
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promising results for maintained representation. Again, although the magnitude of the relationship
for partisan responsiveness on the issue of EU integration is low, this maintained connection means
that the imperfect coordination exhibited by focal parties must be considered possibly meaningful
because we are unable to determine whether this expansion is connected to partisan voters or main-
stream party changes. When considering the findings from chapter 5, it is clear that the issue space
expansion the exists for niche parties, because it is disconnected from mainstream party change, is
meaningful and thus representative. Together these findings suggest that yet again, the issue of EU
integration appears to be of emerging importance in understanding maintained connection between
niche focal parties and voters.
In total, there appears to be issue space manipulation, but the ability for parties to coordinate
these efforts in a manner that could ensure voter stability is much more advanced on the multidi-
mensional issues of equality and the environment. Presumably because the issues have been areas
of collusion since they became politically salient, there is little room for coordination improve-
ments on these issues. The issue space expansion connected to party positions on the left/right
dimension suggest fairly imperfect coordination, alluding to the possibility that as time passes this
should improve, which also presents a possible area of further inquiry. Finally, the issue of EU
integration shows issue space expansion and because this is connected, albeit weakly, to partisan
voter preference changes, this expansion is meaningful for representation. Together, these findings
show that issue space coordination is advanced on the multidimensional issues of equality and the
environment, but that EU integration shows some hope for representational issue spaces. When
it comes to the left/right issue dimension, coordination is imperfect, but because this issue space
expansion is unrelated to voter preferences, it is meaningless for representation. In total, it is clear
the parties are manipulating the issue spaces that are presented to voters across a variety of issues.
Before moving on to discuss the implications of these findings, opportunities for further research
should be discussed.
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6.3 Further Research
Though there are many directions this research could move forward from, one of the overarching
challenges within this dissertation concern the findings regarding time, which if considered more
carefully could offer greater insight into the evolutionary component suggested by the cartel party
theory. As was argued previously, the most basic interpretation of the cartel party theory would
suggest that as time passes, parties should become cartelistic. This is implied by the deterministic
quality of the argument presented by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009), which suggests that as party
systems evolve, they ultimately acquire the features that induce collusive behaviors – increased
complexity, cost, and an inability to spend to maintain voter loyalties. To test the basic premise,
chapters 3 and 4 considered time as an interaction, assuming that for the left/right dimension
this should show an increase over time and that for the multidimensional issues this should be
either stable and consistently high levels of collusion for the duration of the data. Contrary to
expectations, the left/right dimension showed that, at best, the influence of time was stable. Though
consistent with expectations, the issue of equality showed a stable, yet high level of collusion,
while the environment showed an increase over time. The EU findings were provocative yet again,
showing that the trend was increasing as time passes, but for more recent years, the findings become
insignificant.
In retrospect, using a time interaction to bluntly approximate the evolution of a system was
misguided. Though the passage of time, in the theory, lead to cartelization, as suggested by the
authors (Katz and Mair 1995, Katz and Mair 2009). It is crucial that the starting point needs to
be comparable for each of the party systems. As was discussed in chapter 3, regarding the ISSP
findings, that Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) would argue that the evolutionary stage a system finds
itself in would change the possibility that cartelization might emerge. It is clear now, that the stage
in democratic development should be considered more carefully, rather than merely instituting a
linear time variable. In other words, the maturity of the system should influence the possibility
that collusion and cartelistic behaviors may emerge, suggesting that newer democracies should be
unlikely places to find such democratic party evolution, though eventually it should emerge if the
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evolutionary component is correct. Therefore, party systems should be coded to distinguish the
ages of their democratic institutions, allowing for newer democracies to show more recent collu-
sion, while older democracies should exhibit a longer history of this behavior. Therefore, further
research should consider the stages a system is at in their democratic transitions more carefully,
rather than assuming a linear relationship with the passage of time and the proclivity to cartelize.
The final section will review the broad implications of these findings and final conclusions about
the study.
6.4 Implications and Conclusions
This dissertation began from a mere personal observation – parties in advanced democracies seemed
to be facing a discontented electorate, increasing support for niche and populist movements. Seem-
ingly fueled by growing political distrust among voters, there appeared to be a disconnect between
voter grievances and party responsiveness to these issues. The research on the growth of this pop-
ulist phenomenon shows that indeed there are strong connections between economic grievances
and political discontent expressed by populist voters (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck
2016, Hobolt and Tilley 2016, Essletzbichler, Disslbacher and Moser, 2017, Spruyt, Keppens, and
Van Droogenbroeck 2016, Rooduijn, van der Brug, and de Lange 2015), but what is fueling these
negative sentiments toward governing institutions and mainstream parties in the first place?
The cartel party theory presented the perfect framework for understanding why parties may
be to blame for their declining support, arguing that these negative opinions of the government
and vulnerable positions voters find themselves in might actually be fueled by the lackluster per-
formance of parties to aid their constituencies. In other words, parties may have done a poor job
of representing their voters and their voters are finally defecting. Using this theory as the central
focus to explain the motivations and behaviors of parties and how incentives may have changed
in a manner that has undermined representation, this dissertation asks: are parties colluding with
their rivals and ignoring their voters and might this explain the negative views expressed by voters
about the system?
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The findings suggest broadly that voter-party linkages are not performing as the representation
literature expect, once you consider the issue positions of rival parties. No longer is voter-party
congruence high over time, as previous research has found (Powell 2000, Adams 2004, Dalton
and McAllister 2011, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012), but parties appear to be responding to
the changing issue positions of rivals, rather than voters. These collusive tendencies are higher on
multidimensional issues and mainstream parties show the highest proclivity to collude. Overall,
consistent with cartel expectations, mainstream parties appear to be colluding with their rivals and
the issue spaces that are presented to voters seem to be manipulated and unrepresentative of the
changing perspectives of voters.
Together, the findings presented in this dissertation suggest an explanation for the growing
discontent we see across the aging democratic world, one that does not remove responsibility from
the parties involved. The rise in political discontent and negative views of governmental efficacy,
often found in the literature on rising populism (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016,
Rooduijn, van der Brug, and de Lange 2015), may be driven by a failure to represent that is a central
feature of a cartel party system. The findings presented here suggest that parties are showing signs
of collusive behavior across a variety of issues and manipulating the issue spaces presented to
voters. These behaviors undermine representative connections between parties and voters, and it
becomes clear why voters might increasingly believe that the political system had little influence
on the behavior of government and thus begin to vote for parties that reside on the political fringes.
In the end, an alternate explanation for growing niche and populist support becomes possible.
The story becomes not one about a diversifying electorate who’s behavior has challenged polit-
ical dynamics, but rather one that questions whether or not parties are to blame for the negative
views of their performance. Further research is required, but these preliminary results suggest that
representation in advanced democracies may not be as robust as previously found.
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Appendix A
Appendix
Table A.1: ISSP with Party Identification Question, LR Question and Manifesto Data
Country Years Data Points
Australia 92, 93, 96, 06, 09 18
Germany 87, 90 8
Great Britian 85, 87, 90, 91, 93, 96, 99, 00, 06, 09, 10 39
USA 87, 90, 92, 93, 96, 99, 00, 06, 09,10 20
Austria 2000 4
Ireland 2006 6
Norway 96, 00 14
Switzerland 87, 96, 06, 09, 10 38
Sweden 99, 00, 06, 09, 10 35
Bulgaria 92, 93, 96 11
New Zealand 92 ,93, 96, 00 14
Canada 93, 96, 00, 06 18
France 96, 99, 09 16
Japan 93, 96, 00, 06, 09 23
Russia 2009 4
Finland 2010 8
Croatia 06, 09, 10 8
Korea 06, 09 4
Latvia 06, 09, 10 9
Portugal 00, 06, 09 12
Belgium 2010 8
Cyprus 2009 5
Estonia 2009 5
Iceland 2009 5
Lithuania 09, 10 10
Turkey 09, 10 7
Spain 2010 8
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Figure A.1: Chapter 3 footnote 11
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Table A.2: ESS with LR Question and Manifesto Data
Country Years Data Points
Germany 02 - 16 39
Great Britain 02 - 16 34
Austria 02 - 16 13
Hungary 02 - 06 13
Italy 02, 10, 12 17
Ireland 02 - 16 45
Norway 02 - 08 28
Switzerland 02 - 10 44
Sweden 02 - 14 52
Slovenia 02 - 10 32
Bulgaria 06 - 12 14
Czech Republic 02, 04, 08 - 12 25
France 02 - 16 53
Poland 02 - 10 23
Russia 06 - 10 6
Denmark 02 - 10 41
Finland 02 - 10 40
Croatia 08 - 10 4
Portugal 02 10 21
Belgium 202 -10 46
Cyprus 06 - 10 18
Estonia 04 - 14 24
Iceland 04, 12 10
Lithuania 10 - 12 13
Slovakia 04 - 12 28
Turkey 04, 06 6
Ukraine 04 - 06 9
Spain 02 - 14 62
Netherlands 02 - 12 52
Israel 02, 08 - 14 37
Luxembourg 02 - 04 10
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Table A.3: ESS with Environment Question and Manifesto Data
Country Years Data Points
Germany 02 - 16 39
GB 02 - 14 34
Austria 02 - 06 13
Hungary 02 - 06, 10 15
Italy 12 9
Ireland 02 - 16 45
Norway 02 - 08 28
Switzerland 02 - 10 44
Sweden 02 - 14 52
Slovenia 02 - 10 32
Bulgaria 06 - 12 14
Czech Republic 02 - 04, 08 - 12 25
France 02 - 16 53
Poland 02 - 16 23
Russia 06 - 10 6
Denmark 02 - 10 41
Finland 02 - 10 40
Croatia 08 - 10 4
Portugal 02 - 10 21
Belgium 02 - 10 46
Cyprus 06 - 10 18
Estonia 04 - 14 24
Iceland 04, 12 10
Lithuania 10 - 12 13
Slovakia 04 - 12 28
Turkey 04, 08 6
Ukraine 04 - 06 9
Spain 02 - 14 62
Netherlands 02 - 12 52
Israel 02, 08 - 12 37
Greece 02 - 04,10 13
Luxembourg 04 5
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Table A.4: ESS with Equality Question and Manifesto Data
Germany 02 - 16 39
GB 02 - 14 34
Austria 02 - 06 13
Hungary 02 - 06, 10 15
Italy 12 9
Ireland 02 - 16 45
Norway 02 - 08 28
Switzerland 02 - 10 44
Sweden 02 - 14 52
Slovenia 02 - 10 32
Bulgaria 06 - 12 14
Czech Republic 02 - 04, 08 - 12 25
France 02 - 16 53
Poland 02 - 16 23
Russia 06 - 10 6
Denmark 02 - 10 41
Finland 02 - 10 40
Croatia 08 - 10 4
Portugal 02 - 10 21
Belgium 02 - 10 46
Cyprus 06 - 10 18
Estonia 04 - 14 24
Iceland 04, 12 10
Lithuania 10 - 12 13
Slovakia 04 - 12 28
Turkey 04, 08 6
Ukraine 04 - 06 9
Spain 02 - 14 62
Netherlands 02 - 12 52
Israel 02, 08 - 12 37
Greece 02 - 04,10 13
Luxembourg 04 5
149
Table A.5: ESS with EU Question and Manifesto Data
Country Years Data Points
Germany 04 - 08, 12 - 16 30
GB 04 - 08, 12 - 14 28
Austria 04 - 06 9
Hungary 04 - 06 8
Italy 12 9
Ireland 04 - 08, 12 - 16 34
Norway 04 - 08 21
Switzerland 04 - 08 26
Sweden 04 - 08, 12 - 14 37
Slovenia 04 - 08 19
Bulgaria 06 -08, 12 10
Czech Republic 04, 08, 12 14
France 04 - 08, 12 - 16 40
Poland 04 - 08 13
Russia 06 - 08 4
Denmark 04 - 08 24
Finland 04 - 08 24
Croatia 08 2
Portugal 04 - 08 13
Belgium 04 - 08 29
Cyprus 06 - 08 12
Estonia 04 - 08, 12 - 14 19
Iceland 04, 12 10
Lithuania 12 7
Slovakia 04 - 08, 12 22
Turkey 04, 08 6
Ukraine 04 - 06 9
Spain 04 - 08, 12 - 14 41
Netherlands 04 - 08, 12 35
Israel 08, 12 - 14 21
Greece 04 3
Luxembourg 04 5
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Table A.6: Question Wording
Data
Source
Question Wording Concept Captured Years Available
ESS Political System Allows People to
have a say in what the government
does
2016
ISSP Is it the responsibility of the govern-
ment to reduce the income differ-
ences between the rich and the poor
Left/right Economic
Dimension
1987, 1990,
1992, 1993,
1996, 1999,
2000, 2006,
2009, 2010
ESS "Using this card, please say to
what extent you agree or disagree
with each of the following state-
ments?The government should take
measures to reduce differences in
income levels "
Left/right Economic
Dimension
2002, 2004,
2006, 2008,
2010, 2012,
2014, 2016
Manifesto Right/Left Measure coded by the
Manifesto Project
Left/right Economic
Dimension
1920-2018
ESS is it like you to support caring for
the environment and nature
Support for Environ-
mental Policies
2002, 2004,
2006, 2008,
2010, 2012,
2014, 2016
Manifesto "Environmental Protection preser-
vation of natural resources country-
side, forests national parks animal
rights"
Support for Environ-
mental Policies
1920-2018
ESS Important that people are treated
equally and have equal opportuni-
ties
Support for Equality 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008,
2010, 2012,
2014, 2016
Manifesto "Equality: Postive special protec-
tions for underprivileged groups
class barriers, distribution of natu-
ral resources end discrimination "
Support for Equality 1920-2018
ESS European Union: European unifica-
tion go further or gone too far
Support for the EU 2004, 2006,
2008, 2010,
2012, 2014, 2016
Manifesto EU/Community Positive (minus)
EU/Community Negative
Support for the EU 1920-2018
151
Appendix B
References
[1] Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garret Glasgow. 2004. “Understanding
Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past
Election Results?” British Journal of Political Science 34: 589-610.
[2] Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow and Garret Glasgow. 2006. “Are Niche
Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral
Consequences of Western European Parties’ Policy Shifts. 1976-1998.” American Journal
of Political Science. 50 (3): 513-529.
[3] Adams, James and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009. “Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response
to Rival Parties? Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in
Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 39: 825 - 846.
[4] Anderson, Christopher. 2000. “ Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative
Perspective. ” Electoral Studies 19L 151-170.
[5] Albright, Jeremy J. 2009. “Does Political Knowledge Erode Party Attachments?: A review
of the Cognitive Mobilization Thesis.” Electoral Studies. 28: 248-260.
[6] Albright, Jeremy J. 2010. “The Multidimensional Nature of Party Competition.” Party Pol-
itics. 16 (6): 699 - 719.
[7] Algan, Yann, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioannou and Evgenia Passari. 2018. “The European
trust crisis and the rise of populism.” Presented at the Brookings Papers on Economic Ac-
tivity Meeting.
152
[8] Bartels, Brandon L. 2015. “Beyond ?Fixed versus Random Effects’: A Framework for Im-
proving Substantive and Statistical Analysis of Panel, TSCS, and Multilevel Data.” In Quan-
titative Research in Political Science, ed. Robert J. Franzese. Sage.
[9] Beck, Nathaniel and Johnathan N. Katz. 2011 “Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series?Cross-
Section Political Economy Data." Annual Review of Political Science 14: 331 - 352.
[10] Budge, Ian. 2015. “Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A Historical
and Conceptual Analysis.” West European Politics 38 (4): 761 - 777.
[11] Blyth, Mark and Richard Katz. 2005. “From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political
Economy of the Cartel Party.” West European Politics 28 (1): 33 - 60.
[12] British Social Survey. 1985. ID number 2096. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[13] British Social Survey. 1987. ID number 2567. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[14] British Social Survey. 1990. ID number 2840. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[15] British Social Survey. 1991. ID number 2952. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[16] British Social Survey. 1993. ID number 3439. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[17] British Social Survey. 1996. ID number 3921. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[18] British Social Survey. 1998. ID number 4131. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[19] British Social Survey. 1999. ID number 4318. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[20] British Social Survey. 2000. ID number 4486. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[21] British Social Survey. 2001. ID number 4615. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[22] British Social Survey. 2006. ID number 5823. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[23] British Social Survey. 2009. ID number 6695. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
153
[24] British Social Survey. 2010. ID number 6969. Downloaded August 2, 2017.
[25] Camia, Valeria and Daniele Caramani. 2012. “Family meetings: :Ideological convergence
within party families across Europe, 1945-2009.” Comparative European Politics 10 (1): 48
- 85.
[26] Dalton, Russell. "Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial
Democracies.” The Journal of Politics 46 (1): 264-284.
[27] Dalton, Russell. “Party representation across multiple issue dimensions.” Party Politics 23
(6): 609 - 622.
[28] Dalton, Russel and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2000. Parties without Partisans. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[29] Dalton, Russell, and Steven Weldon. 2007. “Partisanship and Party System Institutionaliza-
tion.” Party Politics 13(2): 179-196.
[30] Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister. 2011. Political Parties and Demo-
cratic Linkage: How Parties Organized Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[31] Dalton, Russell J. and Ian McAllister. 2015. “Random Walk or Planned Excursion? Con-
tinuity and Change in the Left/Right Positions of Political Parties.” Comparative Political
Studies 48 (6): 759 - 787.
[32] Doring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2018. Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov):
Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version.
[33] Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.”The
Journal of Political Economy. 65 (2): 135-150.
[34] European Social Survey. 2002. Edition 6.5. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
[35] European Social Survey. 2004. Edition 3.5. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
154
[36] European Social Survey. 2006. Edition 3.6. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
[37] European Social Survey. 2008. Edition 4.4. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
[38] European Social Survey. 2010. Edition 3.3. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
[39] European Social Survey. 2012. Edition 2.3. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
[40] European Social Survey. 2014. Edition 2.1. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
[41] European Social Survey. 2016. Edition 1.1. Downloaded May 3, 2018.
[42] Essletzbichler, Jurgen, Franziska Disslbacher and Mathias Moser. 2017. “The victims of
neoliberal globalisation and the rise of the populist vote: a comparative analysis of three
recent electoral decisions.” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society. 11: 73 ?
94
[43] Ezrow, Lawrence, De Vries, Cathrine, Steenbergen, Marco, and Erica Edwards. 2010.
“Mean Voter Representation and Partisan Constituency Representation: Do Parties Respond
to their Mean Voter Positions or to their Voters?” Party Politics. 17(3): 275-301.
[44] Gelman, Andrew and Jennifer Hill. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and Multi-
level/Hierarchical Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[45] Goodwin, Matthew. 2018. “The Party is Over.” Foreign Policy. October 24.
[46] Hellwig, Timothy. 2008. “Explaining the Saliency of the Left-right Ideology in Postindus-
trial Democracies: The Role of Structural Economic Change.” European Journal of Political
Research. 47: 687-709.
[47] Henley, John, Helena Bengtsson and Caelainn Barr. 2016. “Across Europe, distrust of main-
stream political parties is on the rise.” The Guardian. May 25.
[48] Hoffman, Lesa. 2015. Longitudinal Analysis. New York: Routledge.
155
[49] Hobolt, Sara B. and James Tilley. 2016. “Fleeing the centre: the rise of challenger parties in
the aftermath of the euro crisis.” West European Politics 39:5, 971-991.
[50] International Social Survey. 1985. ZA Study Number 1490. Downloaded April 27, 2017.
[51] International Social Survey. 1987. ZA Study Number 1680. Downloaded May 2, 2017.
[52] International Social Survey. 1990. ZA Study Number 1950. Downloaded May 2, 2017.
[53] International Social Survey. 1991. ZA Study Number 2150. Downloaded June 27, 2017.
[54] International Social Survey. 1992. ZA Study Number 2310. Downloaded May 2, 2017.
[55] International Social Survey. 1993. ZA Study Number 2450. Downloaded June 27, 2017.
[56] International Social Survey. 1996. ZA Study Number 2900. Downloaded May 31, 2017.
[57] International Social Survey. 1998. ZA Study Number 3190. Downloaded June 26, 2017.
[58] International Social Survey. 1999. ZA Study Number ISSP99. Downloaded June 6, 2017.
[59] International Social Survey. 2000. ZA Study Number 3440. Downloaded June 15, 2017.
[60] International Social Survey. 2006. ZA Study Number 5400. Downloaded May 23, 2017.
[61] International Social Survey. 2009. ZA Study Number 5400. Downloaded May 23, 2017.
[62] International Social Survey. 2010. ZA Study Number 5500. Downloaded June 14, 2017.
[63] Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party
Democracy.”Party Politics. 1 (1): 5-28.
[64] Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 2009. “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement.” Perspec-
tives in Politics. 7(4):753-766.
156
[65] Kayser, Mark Andreas and Michael Peress. 2012. “Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral
Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison.” American Political Science Review 106
(3): 661 - 684.
[66] Keman, Hans. 2007. “Experts and manifestos: Different sources e Same results for compar-
ative research?”Electoral Studies. 26: 76 - 89.
[67] Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. The Logics of Party Formation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
[68] Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[69] Kitschelt, Herbet. 2000. “Citizens, politicians, and party cartellization: Political represen-
tation and state failure in post-industrial democracies.” European Journal of Political Re-
search 37: 149-179.
[70] Koole, Ruud. 1996. “Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel
Party.” Party Politics 2(4): 507-523.
[71] Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and
Timotheos Frey. 2006. ?Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political
Space: Six European Countries Compared.” European Journal of Political Research. 45:
921-956.
[72] Leeper Thomas J. and Rune Slothuus. 2014. “Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and
Public Opinion Formation.” Advances in Political Psychology 35 (1): 129 - 156.
[73] Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter
Alignments. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments.” New York: Free Press.
[74] Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.
Sage Publishing.
157
[75] Mair, Peter. 1998. “Representation and participation in the changing world of party politics.”
European Review 6(2): 161 - 174.
[76] Mair, Peter. 2000. “Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy.” Paper draft presented at the
ECPR Workshop on Conceptions of Democracy. University of Copenhagen, April 14 - 19
2000.
[77] Comparative Manifesto Project. Versions 2017-1 until excluding 2018-2: Lehmann, Pola
/ Lewandowski, Jirka / Matthie, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Werner, Annika
(2017): Manifesto Corpus. Version: 2017-b. Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
[78] Marks, Gary, Lisbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson and Erica Edwards. 2006. “Party Competition
and European Integration in the East and West.” Comparative Political Studies. 39 (2): 155
- 175.
[79] Meguid, Bonnie. 2005. “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream party
Strategy in Niche Party Success.” The American Political Science Review. 99 (3): 347-359.
[80] Pardos-Prado, Sergi. 2015. “How Can Mainstream Parties Prevent Niche Party Success?
Center-Right Parties and the Immigration Issue.” Journal of Politics. 77 (2): 352 - 367.
[81] Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Pro-
portional Visions New Haven: Yale University Press.
[82] Powell, G. Bingham. 2013. “Representation in Context: Election Laws and Ideological Con-
gruence Between Citizens and Governments.” Perspectives in Politics 11 (1) : 9 - 21.
[83] Powell G. Bingham and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic
Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science 37
(2): 391-414.
[84] Raabe-Hesketh, Sophia and Anders Skrondal. 2005. Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling
Using Stata. College Station: Stata Press Publication.
158
[85] Rohrschneider, Robert and Steven Whitfield. 2009. “Understanding Cleavages in Party Sys-
tems Issue Position and Issue Salience in 13 Post-Communist Democracies.” Comparative
Political Studies 42 (2): 280-313.
[86] Rohrschneider, Robert and Steven Whitfield. 2012. The Strain of Representation: How Par-
ties Represent Diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
[87] Rohrschneider, Robert and Stephen Whitefield. 2015. “Responding to Growing EU-
skepticism? The Stances of Political Parties Towards European Integration in Western and
Eastern Europe Following the Financial Crisis.” European Union Politics. 17(1): 138 - 161.
[88] Rohrschneider, Robert and Stephen Whitefield. 2016. “Responding to growing European
Union-skepticism? The stances of political parties toward European integration in Western
and Eastern Europe following the financial crisis.” European Union Politics. 17 (1): 138-
161.
[89] Rooduijn, Matthijs, Wouter van der Brug, and Sarah L. de Lange. 2016. “Expressing or fu-
elling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent.” Elec-
toral Studies 43: 30 - 40.
[90] Scarrow, Susan E. 2006. “Party subsidies and the freezing of party competition: Do cartel
mechanisms work?” West European Politics. 29 (4): 619 - 639.
[91] Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien. 2009. Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public
Opinion, and Policy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[92] Spruyt, Bram, Gil Keppens, and Filip Van Droogenbroeck. 2016. “Who Supports Populism
and What Attracts People to It?” Political Research Quarterly 69 (2): 335 - 336.
[93] Snijders, Tom A B and Roel J Bosker. 2002. Multilevel Analysis. Los Angeles: Sage Publi-
cations.
159
[94] Tavits, Margit. 2008. “Policy Positions, Issue Importance, and Party Competition in New
Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies. 41 (1): 48-72.
[95] Twisk, Jos and Frank Rijmen. 2009. “Longitudinal tobit regression: A new approach to
analyze outcome variables with floor or ceiling effects.” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology.
62: 953 - 958.
[96] van Biezen, Ingrid and Petr Kopecky. 2014. “The Cartel Party and the State: Party-state
linkages in European Democracies.” Party Politics. 20(2): 170-182.
[97] van Biezen, Ingrid, Peter Mair, and Thomas Poguntke. 2012. “Going, going, . . . gone?
The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe.” European Journal of Political
Research 51: 24-56.
[98] van Biezen, Ingrid and Ekaterina R. Rashkova. 2014. ?Deterring New Party Entry? The
Impact of State Regulation on the Permeability of Party Systems.” Party Politics. 20 (6):
890-903.
[99] Wagner, Markus. 2011. “Defining and measuring niche parties.?? Party Politics. 18(6): 845
- 864.
[100] Wagner, Markus, and Thomas M. Meyer. 2016. “The Radical Right as Niche Parties? The
Ideological Landscape of Party Systems in Western Europe, 1980?2014.” Political Studies.
1- 24.
160
